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PREFACE
In 1890 Alfred M arshall published his “Principles o f Econom ­
ics” in which he included a chapter on “industrial districts” , as 
he defined the geographic concentrations o f specialised indus­
tries. A fter the Second W orld W ar the term  “industrial district” 
has been applied to the em ergence o f econom ic specialisation 
in specific com m unities in Italy, m ostly in the northeast re­
gions o f the country. A century later from  M arshall’s book, 
M ichael Porter’s neo-M arshallian cluster concept has burst on 
the scene through a series of seminal articles (Porter 1998a, 
1998b, 2000). By the time this book com e to fruition we are at 
the height o f a cluster boom. Econom ists, sociologists, dem og­
raphers, ecologists, biologists, and policym akers debate cluster 
theories and practices. Every year, hundreds o f weighty tomes 
and books on clusters pour out o f the universities and think 
tanks assessing the significance of past events, investigating 
the consequences and discussing what will be done in the 
future. International conferences are held on the topic and 
specialised, governm ent-driven agencies have been established 
with the purpose of creating clusters and im proving cluster 
developm ent. All in all, it is fashionable to say that “we are all 
cluster supporters now ” .
There are also institutions such as the European Com m ission
—  Inform ation Society D irectorate General that see the cluster 
phenom enon in the perspective of the early literature on
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growth poles, holding the view that there does exist a certain 
kinship betw een clusters and growth poles —  according to the 
seminal research on growth poles going back to Francois 
Perroux’s work in the 1950s (Perroux 1950, 1955). In A 
Newsletter on New Methods o f  Work & e-Commerce (July 
2002, No 17) published by that Director General it is stated 
that the growth pole “was concerned with the transport of 
physical goods and, for this reason, stressed the im portance of 
physical proxim ity to the eventual success o f a given growth 
pole. W ork on clusters also stresses the im portance o f physical 
proxim ity, but with a much greater stress on face-to-face 
knowledge flows than on the flow of physical goods. Here, the 
paradigm  case o f a successful cluster is Silicon Valley. Both 
the flow of goods and the flow of know ledge, how ever, share a 
com m on requirem ent to mitigate the negative effects o f spatial 
d istance... we integrate the grow th-pole and cluster concepts 
into a single term: the grow th-node” .
Seductive though the cluster concept is as a m otor o f growth, 
there is much about it that is problem atic The term inology is 
used in a quite cavalier m anner and, on the other hand, the 
character o f the concept poses a problem  o f definitions. In­
deed, the concept o f cluster in social science inhabits the realm  
o f speculation rather than science. As scholars and experts of 
this subject have been increasingly looking at the “softer” 
attributes of clusters —  trust, social capital, leadership, team ­
work, networking, creativity, and the like —  it has become 
increasingly difficult to assess with any rigour w hether their 
hypotheses are true or false. Recent attem pts by the OECD  to 
construct a trust indicator shows that the research com m unity 
has taken a course of action that is in harm ony with the needs 
of a scientific approach to the cluster econom y.
Clusters can be likened to the living organism s in the rain for­
est populated by a num ber o f species with a wide range o f 
attitudes, such as those of the parasite, the predator, the sym bi­
ont, and the table com panion, which will be described in
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Chapter 1. In the rain forest what is valuable is the internal 
design, which means relationships. The quality o f relationships 
in a cluster is heavily affected by that o f social capital, which 
is a set o f conventions, values and beliefs shared by every­
body’s interaction, com m on working styles and overlapping 
objectives. The quality o f social capital tends to reflect the 
special characteristics o f a particular cluster com m unity in 
terms of mores, manners, and in the hearts and m inds o f those 
who live in it. Social capital thus differs from  one cluster to 
another, and each cluster is unique as is the case in the rain 
forest where o f two identical organism s only one survives. 
Clusters are ‘one-of-a-kind’ and not ‘one-size-fits-all’ living 
organisms. This is the reason why we have elected some test 
cases for analysing the conditions for em ergence and develop­
m ent of clusters.
;}; sjs ;js
Although in the cluster literature it is an entrenched contention 
and even a cherished belief the argum ent that people and their 
interpersonal relationships are the life-blood o f clusters, a 
careful scrutiny is required in order that such confidence will 
not sadly prove to be misplaced. If we focus our attention on 
the forces that create and develop clusters, a line can be drawn 
between relations that portend a loss o f personal autonom y and 
others that, conversely, m agnify the independence o f each and 
every individual inside a given relation.
In the first instance the individuals are “insiders” subordinated 
to the norms and procedures of the organisations to which they 
belong. They act “in the name or on the behalf o f ’ and end up 
doing what the organisation is resolved to do. W e term 
“industry clusters” those clusters where it is not the individuals 
but the organisations that hold the whole show together.
In the second instance the clustering process takes root in the 
ground of lateral or longitudinal relations, which refer to inter­
personal exchanges that are developed by individuals in their
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own capacity (to wit: “outsiders” ) rather than as representa­
tives’ organisations. These individuals form  affinity groups or 
com m unities o f know ledge practice, which coalesce in know l­
edge pools that, in turn, forge what we call “know ledge clus­
ters” .
Theodore Zeldin in his Intimate History o f  Humanity has noted 
that affinity groups are those interm ediaries or catalytic agents 
who “can create new situations and transform  peop le’s lives by 
bringing them together” (Zeldin, 1994: 155). By the way, it is 
em phasised that “affinity” was the word used by N ew ton and 
Goethe (Elective Affinities is one o f the m ost fam ous of 
G oethe’s books) in relation to the chem ical phenom enon (later 
on known as catalysis) o f two substances that com bine to form 
a third one.
If in industry clusters the organisations give orders to people 
“where to go” , then in know ledge clusters, the individuals are 
able to use their know ledge autonom ously and effectively in 
taking decisions. The distinctive features o f collaboration be­
tween individuals without the hierarchical ties, which bind 
industry clusters, are the openess o f the exchanges (there is a 
grey area between insiders and outsiders, both o f them  using 
the same lingua franca made up from  several languages), the 
ability to question the routines and, as a consequence, the rad i­
cally innovative mental tools and experim ents to turn know l­
edge into innovation.
There are authors who have already used know ledge clusters 
as models for their investigations. For exam ple, D ebra Am i- 
don’s (2002) setting o f the Innovation SuperHighway brings to 
the forefront of the scene in her “innovation theatre” the practi­
tioners who often “extend their position o f leadership beyond 
the boundaries of their enterprise or nation” . They are exam ­
ples o f “knowledge applied to action, [which is] the process o f 
innovation” . The knowledge cluster perspective is also d is­
cernible in Leif Edvinsson’s (2002) exploration o f the “corpo­
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rate longitude” side of the firm, which highlights knowledge 
workers who “navigate east-w est” (instead o f accounting ana­
lysts who navigate “north-south”) so as to capture the real 
value o f the firm, which normally does not reside in the bal­
ance sheets —  to wit: “its intellectual property rights, know l­
edge recipes, and solutions com ing from  a know ledge out­
sider” . A m idon’s and Edvinsson’s studies reinforce the famous 
assertion made by Peter D rucker in his Post-Capitalist Society 
(1993): “In the knowledge society the most probable assum p­
tion and certainly the assum ption on which all organizations 
have to conduct their affairs is that they need the knowledge 
worker far more than the know ledge w orker needs them ” .
That know ledge clusters are highly conducive to innovation 
holds a two-fold meaning. In one respect, innovative products, 
services and organisations, which have been incubated within 
the knowledge clusters, will form  tom orrow ’s high growth rate 
industry clusters. The Am erican Entrepreneurial Revolution 
(Jeffry, 1999) to which we make reference in Chapter Two is 
the most vibrant example o f this evolution. From  another view ­
point, knowledge clusters innervate, nourish and provoke 
innovation processes within the fabric o f today’s industry clus­
ters.
Distilling wealth creation from  the work o f knowledge clusters 
requires the ability of com bining production of knowledge 
with devices for dissem inating it as widely as possible, and the 
aptitude of the organisations and individuals concerned to ab­
sorb and use it.
There are deep cultural roots that may propitiate or prevent this 
from happening. Even for the m ost advanced industrial 
econom ies it is a hard struggle to capture the potential benefits 
o f the m odern-day knowledge society. The path towards a new 
age o f prosperity by applying knowledge to business is full of 
traps. The industrial culture, mainly focused on the production
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of objects, does not help to understand the very nature of 
knowledge, which is that o f a flow and not o f goods.
The configuration of the industrial econom y as a set o f indus­
tries drives policym akers and even businesspersons re-label- 
ling knowledge clusters as the existing industry clusters since a 
new, know ledge-intensive industry has been added to them. 
From  this view, people believe they can buy pieces o f know l­
edge from  a knowledge firm  as they usually buy goods and 
services. W hat is m issed is the im portance o f m anaging know l­
edge for doing current businesses in a different way or for in­
troducing innovative activities. In this respect, com m unities, 
which are free o f the cum bersom e afterm ath o f the Industrial 
Revolution, are in a unique position. Their ability to detect and 
manage knowledge sources, flows and processes instead of ob­
jects gives them instinctive and intuitive ways o f understand­
ing the business context o f know ledge issues. These types of 
com m unities challenge the ways industry clusters behave and 
think, today.
Entrepreneurs are the engines o f the cluster econom y. In the 
past, their average educational attainm ent has been even lower 
than a secondary education. Through practical experience they 
have been exposed to the entrepreneurial process. Today an 
increasing num ber of nascent entrepreneurs hold a university 
degree. Their exposure to the entrepreneurial process is a m ix­
ture o f formal education and experience in the field. New types 
o f educational institutions —  the entrepreneurial universities, 
described in Chapter 2 —  extend the boundaries of the entre­
preneurial education so as to bind stronger links betw een the 
entrepreneur and the innovation process. In C hapter 2 we 
expound the reasons why knowledge clusters are the kind of 
environm ent we need for creating healthy and dynam ic en tre­
preneurial universities: those who can thrive by satisfying the 
demand of a better entrepreneurial education —  which can, in 
turn, help the nascent entrepreneur to becom e a more com pe­
tent person in the process of innovation.
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Public authorities have shown them selves eager to use their 
powers to intervene in the organisation o f the cluster economy. 
Thus cluster policy making has com e to be accepted as an 
established fact and it is now entirely w ithin the scope of 
policym akers. They subscribe to the principle that spontaneous 
and uncontrolled efforts of individuals provoke m arket failures 
or markets that produce only short-term  results. C luster build­
ing is a long-term  process that requires a strategic enabling 
factor. This is associated with a mode o f governance based on 
policym akers’ deliberate actions.
In this respect, our view, in line with the sort o f criticism  that 
M artin and Sunley (2002) have been voicing, is that under the 
principle o f governm ent intervention for cluster-building lies 
the influence o f Porter, his disciples and followers, who have 
first created an intellectual product called “cluster” and then 
have turned it into a successful brand, which has been exten­
sively sold to policym akers and a vast group o f practitioners 
and consultants surrounding them.
The shape of public policy has, unfortunately, taken something 
of a back seat in the cluster research agenda. Follow ing on 
from the pioneering work o f Vernon Smith (2000), the 2002 
Nobel Laureate in Econom ics, in the field of experim ental eco­
nom ics, efforts should be made towards the creation of labora­
tory experim ents to test different institutional environm ents for 
clusters. There are many questions that rem ain to be answered. 
For exam ple, is there really a need for cluster policy-m aking? 
W hich types o f social norms, rules and choices would better 
help to change the pace o f developm ent through a process of 
cluster building? And what if participants in the economic 
arena are willing to find, by means o f the m arket mechanism, 
their own way in order to change them selves and their com m u­
nities?
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In Chapter 3 the ‘state’ mode o f governance is analysed 
through its privileged instrum ent o f intervention —  that is, the 
bureaucratic facilitating agency, which is an interm ediate body 
between the m arket and the state form ed by m eans o f collabo­
ration between the governm ent and the private sector organisa­
tions (the so called “public-private partnership” ). The agency 
is a syndicalist or corporative body that replace the im personal 
and anonym ous m echanism  of the m arket by its own deliberate 
actions in order to reach com m on chosen goals. Paraphrasing 
H ayek’s The Road to Serfdom  (1944), we can say that in the 
policym akers’ state of mind the agency is like “the gardener 
who tends a plant [read “cluster”] in order to create the condi­
tions m ost favourable to its grow th” .
The agency is the result o f governm ent intention according to 
“the highly debatable idea that there are cluster ‘b lueprin ts’ 
that can be readily im plem ented in quite different local 
economic, social and institutional contexts” (M artin, Sunley, 
2002: 42). In Chapter 3 consciously constructed blueprints are 
challenged by a mode o f governance driven by a large num ber 
of agents spontaneously self-organised, autom atic co-ordi- 
nated, interacting and evolving dialectally in the m arketplace 
(we call them “free agents”) —  as it happens in a com plex 
adaptive system s (Stacey, 1996: 347).
Small firms can succeed if they have access, apart from  physi­
cal infrastructures, to intangible resources —  basically these 
are services such as specialised training, research, technology 
transfer, technical support, financial advice, m arketing and 
design services, and information. These can be envisaged e i­
ther as “private” services the provision o f which is the out­
come of seminal, market driven interventions by profit-seeking 
free agents in the m arketplace or as “club” services whose 
conceptual foundations can be detected in the theory of clubs 
(Buchanan, 1965; Casas-Pardo et al., 2001). In our context 
clubs take the shape o f agency-originated business service 
centres which back the costs of producing services partly by
PIERO FORMICA 21
adm ission fees and fees for utilising a specific service paid by 
its m em bers, and partly through a governm ent fund raising 
m echanism . In the club fram ew ork free agents are bound to the 
ruling elite o f the agency and they are ‘free’ only in terms of 
adjusting their activities to the agency’s deliberate control.
The agency m onopolistic stance inevitably develops a full 
range o f pathologies such as patronage system s to prevent the 
em ergence o f competition, organisational dystrophy triggered 
off by a bloated bureaucracy, and unresponsiveness. These dis­
eases unavoidably sap free agents’ energies.
The agency also distorts com petition by m anaging subsidies 
and raising artificial barriers to entry into the “subsidies m ar­
ket” . In one way, companies becom e addicted to handouts. In 
another, grants encourage the agency to lobby different gov­
ernm ent levels for more money, while, in consequence, a lar­
ger bureaucracy is created to handle those subsidies.
All this explains why, in terms o f policy, we have attempted in 
this book to set the tone for an unfolding array o f argum ents 
which make all the more urgent the need to highlight the pro­
found cultural clash between the genuine entrepreneurial na­
ture o f the cluster com m unity and the mode o f governance 
through the agency’s bureaucratic apparatus.
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CHAPTER ONE. INDUSTRY CLUSTER
Businesses have clustered into 
networks o f various sorts 
throughout history. The medie­
val guild system was a primitive 
networking exercise.
(National Com m ission on En­
trepreneurship)
1. INTRODUCTION
There are local com m unities which nowadays are in better 
shape than they they have been in generations. Unprecedented 
econom ic developm ent has not been inspired by governm ent 
intervention, but by the simple fact that these comm unities 
have been growing organically.
Organic growth can be defined as a spontaneous, self-organ­
ised, self-sustaining and self-reinforcing form ation o f intercon­
nected businesses, whose seed is a ‘food’ m olecule (catalyser) 
without which the ‘business reaction1 would proceed only with 
great difficulty. High quality local resources such as skilled 
individuals and local-rooted entrepreneurial heroes usually act 
as catalysts. Success comes about almost by accident.
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An industry cluster —  as this phenom enon has been nam ed 
is a system  centred around a core of highly specialised enter­
prises within the same industry enriched by close links with 
supporting firms which produce what the form er need. Core 
businesses are fam ily-controlled groups, few of which are 
listed in the stock market.
Geographical prox­
imity allows intense 
interaction, so that a 
large amount o f in­
form ation can be ex­
changed within and 
betw een established
The idea is that companies should 
concentrate on a few  core processes 
while buying in the rest from third- 
party suppliers under a long-term 
service agreement. This is the fact 
that features most prominently in the 
cluster economy.
webs of com plem en­
tary or interdependent activities that forms tight supplier-cus- 
tom er links through a com m on vision, leading to form al and 
informal networking. The core spawns new firms and arouses 
plenty of rivalry between com panies. Yet co-operation and 
trust occur at the core. Supporting firms include banks, ac­
countants, lawyers, designers, freight forw arders, com ponent 
producers, suppliers o f specialised inputs and their sub-con­
tractors, providers of raw m aterials, equipm ent supply and 
servicing.
In this type of environm ent 
organisations (e.g., industry 
are comm on, which, in 
Turn, generate public- 
private partnerships 
aiming for significant 
support from gov­
ernm ent programmes 
(the C luster Com peti­
tiveness Group, www. 
competitiveness.com ).
jo in t projects betw een specialised 
associations and insider lobbies)
Looking at companies from two dis­
tinct angles, one slots them into 
their posture in the marketplace, the 
other into their specific attitude to­
wards clustering. The enlargement 
o f the habitat populated by the sym­
biotic species makes possible more 
and stonger complementary links 
within the cluster.
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The prevailing business species in a cluster com m unity is that 
o f the sym bionts seeking connection with other sim ilar com pa­
nies. There are other species, such as the parasites who leave at 
the expense o f other species, the predators who hunt other 
species, and the stable com panions who do not bring a dowry 
with them, nor cause turbulance or interact with other species, 
but they are rare.
A cluster can take different but also overlapping forms. Both 
faculty researchers and practitioners have provided several 
definitions. For instance, close geographical proxim ity o f inter­
connected industries
such as businesses that Industry clusters can be circum- 
share sim ilar workforce, scribed using any combination o f a 
input, or infrastructural broad spectrum o f criteria. 
needs, gives rise to a re­
gional cluster.
Industrial districts are local clusters where spatial concentra­
tions of micro-to-sm all inward looking local firms and small- 
to-m edium  companies predom inate. The latter often hold an 
international niche leadership operating close to one another 
and producing sim ilar goods. These firms are also engaged in 
interdependent production processes. This type is strongly rep­
resented in Italy, mainly in the N orth-East regions of the coun­
try where industrial districts are a striking example o f an evo­
lutionary environm ent from  the original structure o f all-equal- 
small firms to a set of ‘w edges’ with a prime com pany at the 
top.
An industrial cluster is focused on buyer-supplier relation­
ships, comm on technologies and distribution channels. An in­
novative milieu is a cluster characterised by a process o f learn­
ing and discovery driven by local businesses, academ ic, and 
public sectors working together.
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The OECD-DA TA R first W orld Congress on Local Clusters 
has pointed out sim ilarities and differences characterising local 
clusters. The form er encom pass a high degree o f m arket sensi­
tivity, flexible means o f production and proxim ity-based in ter­
actions between firms. The latter include econom ic, cultural 
and social assets, services, and levels o f trust, latent conflicts 
and cut-throat com petition among firms (O EC D -D A TA R , 
2001a).
2. THE PACKAGING MACHINERY CLUSTER
Case studies o f successful regions in Europe suggest that the 
viability o f local econom ies relies on clusters o f small and me- 
dium -sized businesses that are a m ajor platform  ( ‘w restling 
school’) for flexible, adaptable and capable workforces. One of 
these success stories is represented by the packaging m achin­
ery cluster in and around Bologna, in the Italian region o f Em i­
lia-Rom agna (Farrell, Lauridsen, 2001; Form ica, 2001).
The Italian packaging m achinery industry stands out interna­
tionally for its ability to m eet the specialised needs o f m anu­
facturers throughout the world. At the same time it rem ains the 
main supplier for Italian m anufacturers. W hile about 85% of 
production is sold abroad, the industry is still able to fulfil 
more than 60% of dem and at national level. Italian m achines 
cover 25% of the world export m arket and Italian m anufactur­
ers are particularly strong in food, tobacco and pharm aceutical 
m achines which account for over 70%  of all equipm ent m anu­
factured. The Italian trade balance in the sector is structurally 
positive in all m ajor areas of production, including m achines 
for cleaning, dying, labelling, filling, packing and packaging 
goods, as well as for the m anufacturing o f the individual m a­
chine parts.
W ithin the sector in Italy, we find com panies large enough to 
offer a complete range of products to all world m arkets
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alongside sm aller firms which are able to fill in specific 
m arket niches. Both 
large and small com ­
panies provide the 
m arket with up-to- 
date, state-of-the-art 
technology. They 
are able to dem on­
strate a special sen­
sitivity to the market needs o f the m anufacturers who use their 
services. System s and m achines are tailor-m ade to fit the spe­
cific needs o f their custom ers, using innovative techniques, 
new packaging materials or w hatever else custom ers may re­
quire. That is why their agenda is full o f crucial deadlines for 
innovation.
Innovation refers to something 
newly introduced, new method, cus­
tom, device, et cetera; change in the 
way o f doing things; renew, alter.
(Webster’s New World Dictionary, 
Second College Edition, 1982)
3. SU CCESS FACTORS
Two trends that coalesce are responsible for the success o f the 
Bologna packaging m achinery industry there are two trends 
which were destined to come together. On the one hand, the 
great tradition in precision m echanics which merged with en­
trepreneurial creativeness in an unique m anner and paved the 
way for new industrial enterprises. On the other hand, the rap­
idly expanding demand for packaging in the market of large 
consum ption products,
and the need for adapt- A profound technical culture and a 
ing packaging machines widespread entrepreneurial spirit 
to fit the particular re- from within the business community 
cjuircrncnts o f each cus— ^  0/ the foundation o f the success. 
tomer, so that even mass produced products include a 'person­
alised touch’. Both these elem ents have combined to assure 
quality production through careful specialisation in all facets of 
m anufacturing. The com bination o f the two trends gave birth 
to the packaging machinary cluster. The cluster is an im-
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pressive case o f collaboration betw een small and m edium ­
sized enterprises operating in continental or even global niche 
markets. The main industrial features that have contributed to 
them leading the field in this area encompass:
• Close vertical links between independent businesses, 
which have enhanced co-ordination as the prevalent type 
o f interfirm  collaboration.
• Adoption o f state-of-the-art technology.
• Flexible production system s and methods.
• Closeness to the custom ers.
New trends include horizontal links betw een com panies and a 
determ ination to work with partners for state-of-the-art re­
search and developm ent in a fram ew ork o f co-operation and 
com petition ( ‘com petitive co-operation’ or ‘co-opetition’).
4. CLUSTER FORMATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLES 
OF ENTREPRENEURIAL HERO ES’ 
AND DIFFERENT BUSINESS SPEC IES
Cluster form ation and developm ent is a self-organised, organic 
process for which thinkers have not yet developed ways of for 
m aking clones. That this result can be reached by cluster-based 
public policy is a m atter in dispute, as argued in Chapter 3. 
However, if success cannot be assured, there is alw ays room  
for a com m unity to draw lessons and inspiration from the pros­
perity that other clusters have achieved.
4.1. COMMUNITY-ROOTED
ENTREPRENEURIAL HEROES
The clustering process is fed and catalysed by com m unity- 
rooted entrepreneurial heroes. A breakthrough in the field o f
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education and training in Bologna has played the role of 
incubator for those
ing entrepreneurial
heroes with another archetype: the ‘pro-business academic 
hero’. Thanks to the social creativity o f two prom inent aca­
demics, entrepreneurial heroes have m aterialised who have 
paved the way for the economic success o f the cluster. This 
process has been driven by their personality over the pioneer 
period o f start-up and early developm ent.
D ifferent business species populate the cluster economy. Yet 
not all the species contribute to cluster form ation and develop­
ment. They can be classified according to the “linkage m odel”, 
which is an attem pt to evaluate the m arket positions of differ­
ent categories of firms, their links with the local environm ent, 
and the attidute to clustering (Table 1.1). The model is illus­
trated by a 3 x 3 m atrix where the three colum ns are related to 
the m otivation to be located in a specific area, and the three 
rows are related to the markets (both supply and destination 
markets) in which the com panies operate.
The three colum ns and rows identify, respectively:
•  Com panies that are localised in the area just for inciden­
tal or historical reasons (Column A).
• Com panies whose location is the outcom e of the local 
availability o f factors that are relevant to their business, 
including the closeness to their m arket am ongst these 
factors (Colum n B).
•  Com panies localised because o f the strategic relations 
they have activated in the area, such as participation to
heroes. Indeed, this 
process, a long chain 
of events, has lasted 
for 150 years, link-
Pro-business academics and entre­
preneurial heroes are the driving 
forces o f a self-organised, organic 
process o f clustering.
4.2. BUSINESS SPECIES
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local supply networks, availability o f strategic services 
connections with universities, et cetera (Colum n C).
•  Com panies that operate in the local or m ainly in national 
markets (Row 1).
• Com panies engaged in global/continental but m ainly 
captive m arkets (Row 2).
• Com panies whose operations em brace global /continen­
tal open m arkets (Row 3).
Nine species o f firms can be visualised: i.e., fragm ented, tradi­
tional, and local leaders (Row 1); cathedrals in the desert, ex­
ploiters, attractors (Row 2); opportunity developers, local 
champions, pivot (Row 3). Their distinctive characters are dis­
played in Table 1.1.
The largest populated species usually occurs in the “fragm en­
tation” box, follow ed by the grouping o f firm s serving local 
needs with local resources (they fit into the in “traditional” box 
o f the matrix). The clustering process is triggered o ff by one or 
a m inor num ber of com panies engaged in weaving a network 
leveraging on the web of relationships they can access in the 
area. W e term them  “local leaders” whose founders show a 
profile associated with the business-hero type we are going to 
describe for the packaging m achinery cluster form ation.
Local leaders prefer to em phasise the cluster evolution 
whether out o f their capability to attracting opportunity devel­
opers (box A3), or because they have been upgraded to the 
“pivot” role (box C3). This reinforces their ability to create re­
ciprocal collaborative relationships —  in this case, linking 
large international netw orks in which they are enm eshed with 
the hom e cluster. In the m echanical engineering cluster 
between Bologna and M odena, problem -solver suppliers (see
Table 1.1
Classification of business species and their relevance to the clustering process
3
OPPORTUNITY DEVELOPERS 
Firms belonging to an 
international network. They 
represent an opportunity for the 
cluster if it is possible to link them 
to the local network.
LOCAL CHAMPIONS 
Firms that operate in inter-national 
markets exploiting local factors. 
They represent the local champions 
but are not necessarily involved in 
creating a local innovative environ­
ment.
PIVOTS
They are the connection between the 
large meshes of the international net­
works formed by firms operating in 
global markets and their cluster.
2
CATHEDRALS IN THE 
DESERT
Corporations’ subsidiaries/plants 
whose contacts are with faraway 
headquarters.
EXPLOITERS
Firms exploiting the favourable fac­
tors of the cluster economy, but not 
contributing to its development.
ATTRACTORS
Firms in this situation show that the 
local economy is strategically attrac­
tive to multinationals, which, setting 
in the area, could successfully con­
tribute to the clustering process were 
they to play as opportunity develop­
ers.
1
FRAGMENTED
Firms in this situation have family 
and social roots in the local econ­
omy, but they haven’t the capabil­
ity of contributing to cluster for­
mation.
TRADITIONAL 
Firms usually serving local needs 
with local resources. They activity is 
at stake in times of change.
LOCAL LEADERS 
Firms leveraging on the web of rela­
tionships they can access in the local 
economy. They are usually engaged 
to weave the network.
A В С
1— National/local markets; 2 —  Global/continental captive markets; 3 —  Global/continental markets.
A —  Location due to incidental and/or historical reasons; В —  Location due to the presence of favourable factors; 
С —  Location due to the presence of network relationships.
Source: Formica, Mitra, Nicolõ, 1996.
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Figure 1.8) o f a leading brand oriented com pany like Tetrapack 
are a striking exam ple o f the role played by “attractors” (box 
C2). An exam ple o f the p ivot’s case is dem onstrated in the 
case of IM A ’s internationalisation —  the local leader o f the 
packaging m achinery cluster in Bologna, which is linking its 
offshore relationships with the local cluster the company 
contributed to develop in Bologna (see par. 17 in this Chapter).
5. LOCK-IN DEPENDENCE
The cluster econom y is rem arkably resilient. “The speed at 
which labour, land and capital are reallocated is breathtaking”
—  say the experts. Yet success by organic growth induces 
lock-in or path-dependence, which is a consequence o f positive 
feedback that confines the cluster econom y within the en­
trenched practices o f thinking and doing things (Arthur, 1989). 
This syndrom e has been recognised by several authors. For 
example, according to M artin and Sunley (2002: 28), “The 
com petitive strategies
of firms in clusters, Cluster decline, albeit genteel and
which are initially relative i f  not absolute, is a potential 
highly innovative com- problem or, worse, an inherent sys- 
pared to firms outside tematic feature o f cluster dynamics.
clusters, tend to con- (Martin, Sunley, 2002). 
verge (for example
through mimetic and normative isom orphism ) and to be less 
innovative over time because cluster firms define their field of 
com petition as the cluster to which they belong, rather than as 
the wider external industry.
This restricted collective perspective gives rise to competitive 
‘blind spots’ which limit cluster firm s’ innovative potential, 
strategic positioning, and ability to anticipate and react to in­
dustry-w ide shocks” .
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Bologna has suffered from  the lock-in dependence at the time 
of the first Industrial Revolution when the city was at the peak 
of its success in developing the wool and silk textile industry 
for which it was renow ned in Europe as was Lyon. Precepts 
and forms o f the new scientific and technology dom ain, to ­
gether with w orkforce 
practices that the In­
dustrial Revolution in­
troduced, caused a deep 
and prolonged recession 
in the Bolognese econ­
omy, influenced by a 
“Cargo Cult Science” 
of people, who had dif­
ficulty in understanding 
the principles o f the in­
coming scientific age (Exhibit 1.1).
N ow adays, when the packaging m achine industry is con­
fronted with the leap from  the industrial to the knowledge 
economy, from  the production o f ‘atom s’ in form  o f m achines 
that perform  “cold” or unintelligent functions to that o f ‘b its’ 
associated with m achines that even affect our very culture —  
in other words, from  “making things” to “think-oriented, ideas- 
based businesses” —  the reliance on the past success makes 
the cluster vulnerable to lock-in syndrom e and “Cargo Cult” . 
New heroes are heralded as essential to the m astering o f a new 
domain. In the business-as-usual, good character actors replace 
the protagonists, but the shape o f things to com e is traced by 
the em ergence of new leading personalities who are w illing to 
change the fabric of traditional mental habits and conventional 
ideas supported by people with sim ilar thought processes.
The achievements o f the past change 
into losing values. Know-how and 
skill, experienced workers, special­
ised infrastructure, inter-firm link­
ages, strong political support and, 
in general, all the institutional, so­
cial, cultural, economic and techno­
logical factors that once made it a 
successful cluster, then cause lock- 
in dependence.
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Exhibit 1.1
The Cargo Cult Science
“Cargo Cult Science” is the expression used by the Nobel 
Laureate Richard P. Feynman, the father of nanotechnology, to 
describe the behaviour of the South Sea Islanders after World 
War II:
“During the war they saw airplanes land with lots of good 
materials, and they want the same thing to happen now. So they 
have arranged to make things like runways, to make a wooden 
hut for a man to sit in, with two wooden pieces on his head like 
headphones and bars of bamboo sticking out like antennas —  he 
is the controller —  and they wait for the airplanes to land. They 
are doing everything right. The form is perfect. It looks exactly 
the way it looked before. But it does not work. No airplanes 
land. So I call these things Cargo Cult Science, because they 
follow all the apparent precepts and forms of scientific 
investigation, but they are missing something essential, because 
the planes do not land”.
Source: Feynman, 1999: 208-209
It is questionable whether new heroes can em erge from  a suc­
cessful industry. W ell regarded packaging com panies have 
been attracting the best talents, but for new heroes this is not 
enough. The local com m unity ought to dem onstrate long-term  
com m itm ent and w ill­
ingness to create a Long-term commitment and willing- 
new culture and invest ness are needed to create a new cut- 
in co-operative ven- ture and invest in sharing contents. 
tures. This carries far-
reaching im plications in the fields o f research, education and 
training is crucial. As already happened in Bologna, a fresh 
educational institution such as the ‘entrepreneurial university’ 
could be the cradle of new heroes.
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6. THE INDUSTRIAL PIONEER
The packaging m achinery industry in Bologna started with the 
foundation of A C M A -A nonim a Costruzioni M acchine Auto- 
m atiche on 31 July 1924, and has since then achieved a series 
o f successes and major transform ations in technology, research 
and product quality (Figure 1.1). In fact, alm ost all the com pa­
nies in Bologna, dealing in packaging m achines today, origi­
nated from  that very first enterprise and from  the w orkers and 
technicians trained by ACM A.
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Figure 1.1. From the first packaging machine to a complete package 
of services.
The founder was a partner in Gazzoni, a local pharm aceutical 
com pany which, at the beginning of this century, started the 
production of a powder to add sparkle to drinking water. Idro­
litina: This was its trade mark. The pow der had to be m easured 
and packaged in paper by the hands o f dexterous lady workers. 
In the early 1920s, as a result o f a growing m arket for Idrolit­
ina, the inventor, Signor Gazzoni, asked his associate, who ran 
a machine shop, to build a packing m achine for the autom atic
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packaging o f table water powders. After this initial, successful 
experience, the ACM A m achine production was enlarged to 
cover a wide range o f chemical, pharm aceutical, confectionary 
and food products. In the early 1930s the company began to to 
diversify into European and other foreign markets.
Six firms between The industrial pioneer builds the
1937 and 1946, and entrepreneurial spirit into the local
38 between 1950 and community. Blue collar workers and
1991 were spin-offs technicians working in “mother
from  ACM A Their firm s” like ACMA started up their
r . . own companies.
founders —  artisans
and technicians of the m other com pany —  opened new market 
segments in producing autom atic m achinery and a range of 
other products. As Farrell and Lauridsen (2001) have ob­
served, “First, burgeoning cross-sectoral dem and for packag­
ing machines meant that there was a wide variety o f m arket 
niches, and room  for many producers, and technicians could 
strike out on their own without succum bing to com petition 
from their parent firm  or other firms. Second, despite this 
variety, the mechanical skills needed to produce packaging 
m achines for one market segment usually transferred with 
relative ease to another” .
Today, in this industry in Bologna are a m yriad o f com panies 
engaged in designing, making the m achine parts (nuts, bolts, 
studnuts, washers, and many others), and assembly autom atic 
m achines for a wide range o f industries, such as foodstuffs, 
bakery, confectionery, beverage, tea, tobacco, pharm aceutical, 
chemical. Several of them are internationally renow ned, and 
some (GD, SASIB, IM A) are world leaders supported by 
chains o f suppliers and subcontractors who deliver prom ptly in 
order to make the machine parts.
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7. AN EXAMPLE OF THE 
AUTOCATALYTIC SYSTEM
ACM A was the ‘food’ m olecule w ithout which the 'industrial 
reaction’ would only have taken place with a great difficulty. 
The A CM A  m achines were conceptualised in the heart o f the 
factory —  the engineering departm ent —  directed by Bruto 
Carpigiani, the ‘father’ o f autom atic m achine designers from  
1927 to 1945. He had acquired the m echanical know ledge dis­
sem inated through a local, com m une-funded, technical school, 
Aldini-Valeriani, founded in the m id-1880s. Indeed, m ost of 
the spin-ees from the ACM A had been form er students o f the 
Aldini-Valeriani. In the early days o f the industrial revolution 
two Bolognesi —  Giovanni A ldini, a scientist, and Luigi V ale­
riani, an econom ist, visited the new technical and professional 
schools in France, Great Britain, Germ any and Belgium , learn­
ing the best practice of the new technical education and train­
ing on offer in Europe. The fruit o f their travel was first the 
gestation and then the foundation o f a technical school. A self­
sustained trend of new firm  form ation was the outcom e of a 
cross-fertilisation process betw een in-com pany learning by 
doing training and formal training at the technical school for 
new m echanical qualifications. Therefore, A CM A had been 
catalysed, in turn, by the Aldini-Valeriani School, in turn, has 
been the incubator of the catalytic process initiated by A CM A 
(Exhibit 1.2).
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Exhibit 1.2
Aldini-Valeriani: How an innovative technical school has
been fostering a clustering process
Aldini-Valeriani’s long term life cycle has allowed the foun­
dation and diffusion of mechanical knowledge and entrepreneu­
rial culture in the local community. Its major achievements are:
• Incubation of entrepreneurship, particularly in the sector of 
packaging automatic machines for which Bologna region is a 
worldwide leader. A self sustained mode of new firm forma­
tion has been the outcome of a cross-fertilisation process be­
tween in-company ‘learning by doing’ training and formal 
training at the technical school for new mechanical qualifica­
tions.
• High levels of working class professionalism and social mo­
bility.
• By means of education and training, contribution to the for­
mation of a mesh of artisan subcontractors who deliver 
promptly to make the machine parts.
Gestation (1794-1844)
• Learning the best practices of the new technical education and 
training in Europe. A scientist, Giovanni Aldini, and an 
economist, Luigi Valeriani, visit the new technical and profes­
sional schools emerging from the industrial revolution in 
France, Great Britain, Germany and Belgium.
• Regeneration of the preindustrial revolution experience in 
promoting the link between knowledge and work as an es­
sential condition of development in the wool and silk textile 
manufacturing for which Bologna was at that time renowned 
in Europe.
• Strong commitment of the local Public Administration.
Take off (1844-1860)
• Opening of the Bologna Technical Schools attended by the 
city’s craftsmen.
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Exhibit 1.2 continued
Early development (1860-1877)
• Experimental phase of the Valeriani School of Applied De­
sign of Industrial Arts.
Second development (1878-1930)
• Establishment of the Aldini-Valeriani Institute for Arts and 
Trades, attended by young apprentices, teaching manual work 
done in the school workshops.
Growth (1930-1965)
• Transformation of the Institute into the Aldini-Valeriani In­
dustrial Technical Institute that updates technology and teach­
ing methods to train intermediate level technicians.
Maturity and decline (1965-1995)
• Due to the weakness to cope with the needs of the local firms 
for the innovative devices in the fields of mechatronics and 
information technologies, the Institute suffers for a relaxation 
of its industrial ties.
• Work practice resulting from new industrial relations within 
the Institute discourage collaboration with industry.
• The Institute becomes less attractive to young students.
• The Institute suffers also from a lack of a vision by the local 
City Council whose commitment slowly fades away.
• Several plans for a full recovery do not lead to the regen­
eration of the original entrepreneurial spirit.
A collectively autocatalytic system  is defined as “one in which 
the m olecules speed up the very reactions by which they them ­
selves are formed: A m akes В; В m akes С; С m akes again. 
Given a supply o f food m olecules, the netw ork will be able to 
constantly re-create i ts e lf ’ (Kauffm ann, 1995). In F igure 1.2 
the form ation of the autocatalytic system  of the B ologna pack­
aging machinery industry is highlighted.
Figure 1.2. Formation of the autocatalytic system.
A O  —  artisans; В О  —  technicians; С (white) —  companies; D (black) —  food molecules.
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Dots ‘buttons’ (nodes) are at random  connected by an increas­
ing num ber o f lines ‘threads’ (edges). А, В. С and D buttons 
sym bolised the key players: respectively, artisans, technicians, 
com panies and ‘food’ m olecules —  the first m olecule being 
the technical school, followed by ACM A and, then, by other 
companies. Threads sym bolised relations betw een players. 
“W hen there are very few threads com pared with the num ber 
o f buttons, most buttons will be unconnected. For large 
num bers o f buttons, as the ratio o f threads to buttons passes a 
threshold of 0.5 a phase
transition occurs; most Willingness and capability o f  the key
component, and a giant
cluster suddenly forms. As the ratio passes 1.0, closed path­
ways of all lengths begin to em erge” (Kauffm ann, 1995). The 
Bologna packaging industry has overcom e the transition phase 
and is now like a giant com ponent, w hose“rate o f growth 
slows as the num ber of rem aining isolated buttons and isolated 
small components decreases” (Kauffm ann, 1995). This is why 
the builders o f autom atic m achines are com pelled to innovate 
in the relationships with their custom ers in such a way as to ac­
celerate the growth rate by selling a com plete package of ser­
vices, the machine being ju st one part o f the package.
Knowledge is the fuel for innovation. Namely:
• Knowledge converted or em bedded into processes, 
goods, and services.
• Different sources o f know ledge joined together to in­
crease the value o f a product or service.
points become con­
nected in one giant
players to generate new relations in 
the system determine the pace o f 
growth o f the cluster.
8. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR 
INNOVATION: KNOWLEDGE AND 
EDUCATION
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• Know ledge ‘productized’ and then com m ercialised in 
the marketplace.
T oday’s challenge is shown in Figure 1.3 in which three hills 
o f self-organised knowledge are displayed. The first hill repre­
sents the knowledge dom ain o f the pre-industrial Revolution 
age. During that time Bologna reached the top o f the hill (P I) 
through relentless innovation in the wool and silk m anufactur­
ing system.
industry
manufacture knowledge
know-nothing land
'desert and holes of ignorance where nothing is known, 
everyone avoids, so nothing is discovered"
Figure 1.3. Hills of self-organised knowledge. 
Source: Adapted from Kelly, 1994.
G roundbreaking innovations in m echanical engineering that 
perm anently change
the m arket conditions Innovation means parting with the
lead to the decline conventional wisdom.
(point 1 at the left side (Isao Nakauchi, leading entrepre-
of Figure 1.3) of the neur in the retail industry) 
Bolognese m anufac­
turing system. Crossing the area o f (point 2) ignorance in order 
to savour the benefits of the incom ing Industrial Revolution
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was a long and painful run, ending with the conquest o f a new 
peak (P2), again —  that of the industrial age. This was the 
ability to com bine theoretical know ledge with m anual practice 
at the innovative organisation for technical education —  the 
Aldini-Valeriani Institute —  and of an im pressive, w idespread 
learning o f how tangible assets ought to be handled —  thanks 
to a range o f spin-offs (mostly from  A CM A ) acting as teaching 
companies.
Today the acquisition of new theories and m odes o f organisa­
tion is becom ing more and m ore im portant as innovation accel­
erates under the stimuli o f the know ledge econom y. “Let go at 
the top” o f a new peak (P3) involves four key factors, which 
will be analysed in Chapter 2:
• A know ledge process for m apping and exploring the 
holes of ignorance.
• The capability of m anaging not only tangible assets but 
also intellectual capital.
• The access o f the local com m unity to entrepreneurial 
higher education institutions co-opeting with the tradi­
tional academ ia and technical schools.
• An increasing num ber o f know ledge-based startups from  
the research and learning environm ent —  the very engine 
of firm  creation in the digital era as the shopfloor was in 
the industrial one.
9. CLUSTER MUTATION
Not only breakthrough innovations but also changes in shop­
pers’ tastes can affect a cluster com m unity with a long tradi­
tion of m anufacturing. This is the case o f the straw hat cluster 
in Carpi, a small industrial town near M odena in the Em ilia- 
Rom agna region. The area was m ade fam ous by wom en skilled 
in staw -w eaving on to which a m odem  entrepreneurial spirit 
was grafted during the 19th century. W hen, by the end o f that 
century, the straw hat (“paglietta” ) turned into a smart
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accessory for men, Carpi pioneering entrepreneurs marketed 
the new fashion in Europe and the USA. But the straw hat 
fashion faded after the First world war, causing a structural 
crisis from  which the local economy em erged at the end o f the 
Second world war when a second generation o f pioneers dis­
covered that the same technique o f straw -shaving could have 
been applied to knitted work. This was the beginning of a 
w idespread and self-
sustaining process of As clusters are getting more suc-
technology transfer cessful, they are getting speed wob-
which engendered, as bles.
far back as the Fifties,
a swarm  of hom e located workshops. In those m icro-laborato­
ries wom en, using a knitting machine, produced knitwears for 
m erchants who supplied the raw m aterials to workshops and 
sold the finished products on the “piazza” (marketplace) of 
Bologna, the main town of the local area, at weekends.
This exam ple dem onstates that SM Es endorse business-sensi­
tive models o f technology transfer. M arket m otivations that 
nurture new business ideas encourage creative imitation 
through the ability to com bine different technologies —  what 
has been dubbed a “technology fusion” process o f technology 
transfer (Kodama,
1992). The reward is The ability to combine and transfer
a large diffusion of technology is as important as the
the m eaning o f a original discovery o f a technology.
cessful applications
on the m arketplace. Its application in a creative way beyond 
the current use is the outcom e of the transm ission of informal,
technology, which 
nurtures both new 
ideas and their suc-
(William E. Coyne, former Senior 
Vice President, Research and Devel­
opment, 3M -  Coyne, 1996)
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tacit know ledge1 dissem inated through face-to-face verbal, 
uncodified com m unication, particularly m oulded in the cluster 
comm unity.
As a result o f this evolutionary change, today’s knitw ear and 
clothing cluster in Carpi accounts for m ore than 1 500 m icro 
firms engaged in goods-in-process for third parties. Both the 
phase-firm s and the leading prim es, which are focused on 
designing and delivering the finished products, are small in 
size. Indeed, throughout the 1990s the average size firm  has 
been generating a turnover o f 5.5m  euro with 5 -6  em ployees. 
Overall, 700 enterprises with less than 50 em ployees account 
o f 70%  of the cluster turnover. In term s o f com parison, Benet­
ton’s size is com parable to C arp i’s, w hereas the rival cluster of 
Vicenza, in the Veneto region, consists o f 20 m edium  to large 
com panies with an average o f 200 em ployees in each.
10. THE LIFE CYCLE OF LEADERSHIP
There is frequently a conflict in the cluster com m unity be­
tween the old guard m anagem ent with its tyranny of seniority 
and the inform ality and openness o f w ould-be heroes and driv­
ers o f change who steer the chaos (Figure 1.4).
The leadership o f the past pioneers and early followers, those 
who created myths and symbols o f the packaging cluster, still 
rem ains and influences their business com m unity, even if de­
m ography has contributed to erode the ‘tyranny o f seniority’.
1 Tacit versus explicit knowledge and the difference between knowl­
edge and information are expounded in Chapter 2, par 2.
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Figure 1.4. Between chaos of heroes and tyranny of seniority.
As for the new heroes, there is a lim ited understanding o f their 
presence. Some ‘young T urks’, the last generation o f the foun 
ders’ fam ilies, are
The cluster’s path o f destiny is 
traced by the life cycle and features 
o f its leaders.
searching for a new 
perception, tapping 
creativeness and 
benefiting from  di­
versification inside 
the industry, or 
have m oved on to 
new pastures —  
for instance, launch­
ing interactive m ultim edia software for presentation of auto­
matic m achines, parts of them and industrial lay-outs, for inter­
active teaching courses, interactive m anuals of instruction and 
spare parts’ catalogues. Others have attem pted to carve out a 
niche for them selves in the Internet economy. They have set up
Clear, visible and shared leadership 
within a loose hierarchy allows the 
sharing o f ideas throughout organ­
isation and encourages innovation.
(Stanford, 2002)
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vertical portals (see par. 19.2 in this Chapter) in close co l­
laboration with tech-savvy, experience-poor new entrepre­
neurs. These are either ICT graduates in their twenties and/or 
engineers and jun io r m anagers in their m id-thirties who have 
been working for the leading SMEs. Am ong their backers are 
also bankers, venture capitalists, individual consultants, and 
consultancy firms. Key online activities are m anagem ent of 
orders betw een m anufacturers and their suppliers, searching 
for and screening o f information.
11. LEADERS, ENTREPRENEURS 
AND MANAGERS
There are three categories of individuals who take initiative 
and create the context on which the cluster is built. The first 
category includes the ‘catalysts’, who instigate the cluster for­
mation and renewal. They shape an environm ent o f collabora­
tive behaviour and challenge the cluster’s status quo and suc­
cess factors. These individuals are acknow ledged as the indus­
try leaders whose life cycle has been featured above. T oday’s 
tyrants and titans are those leaders who have been building a 
context o f business collaboration and creating a spirit o f com ­
mon purposes and ambitions. W hile the new heroes are those 
who typically provide today’s new visions whereby the ‘young 
T urks’ leaders undertake the consequent actions for the clus­
ter’s renovation. The leaders’ tasks and their attributes —  i.e., 
personal traits, knowledge and specialised skills —  are listed in 
Table 1.2.
The second category features the ‘doers’, who build on the 
cluster’s foundations established by the industry leaders. Their 
profile is sim ilar to that o f the entrepreneurs who have not had 
the chance to gain a foothold on the industry-leaders ladder. 
They are either owners of fam ily com panies or em pow ered
Table 1.2
Leaders, entrepreneurs and managers in the cluster community: Their tasks and attributes
Managers
Linking dispersed resources 
and skills
• Cluster-team builder
• Knowledge of commu­
nity of practices, 
understanding of in­
terpersonal dynamics 
both in company and 
cluster
Reconciling short-term and 
long-term commitments and 
pressures
• Ability to fine tune
• Understanding short-term 
priorities as the means and 
long-term goals as the ends
Encouraging and supporting 
extroverted initiatives
• Ability to pass responsibility 
on to subordinates, to em­
power
• Knowledge of the individu­
als’ quality, understanding 
how to influence them
Attitude to integration • Acuteness • Be a coach, a supporter 
and flexibility _______________________________________________
Task
Skills
Knowl­
edge
Traits
i k Attracting new skills and Continuous performance Creating and pursuing Task
resources improvement opportunities beyond the 
clusters horizon
Entrepre­ • Ability to motivate and • Ability to take care of • Ability to grasp the new Skills
neurs drive people demanding targets potential
• Knowledge of skills and re­ • Knowledge of the clusters • Knowledge of the changing Knowl­
sources in and out of the 
cluster
business times edge
• Attitude to attract and 
engage
• Spirit of competitiveness • Creative, intuitive, eager to 
challenge the unknown
Traits
Leaders
Building a context of strong 
trusting relationships
• Inspiring confidence and 
creating beliefs
• Knowledge of the clusters 
culture, structures, processes
• Fairness
Creating in the cluster a spirit 
of common purposes and 
ambitions
• Ability to communicate
Broad knowledge of all 
players in the cluster 
Insightful
Challenging the embedded Task 
success factors by a new vision
• Questioning and demanding Skills
• Understanding of how doing Knowl- 
new things in new ways edge
• Visionary-minded Traits
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m anagers and em ployees who are responsible for the com ­
pany’s entrepreneurial initiatives ( ‘intrepreneurs’ —  as they 
have been termed). Entrepreneurs constitute the glue or the 
‘jam  in a sadw ich’ between leaders and operational managers. 
Their m ajor tasks involve attracting o f new skills and re­
sources for supporting trust-based inter-firm  relationships, en­
deavoring to achieve continuous perform ance im provem ent 
needed to nurture the spirit of com m on ends and aspirations in 
the cluster, and the creation and pursuit o f opportunities in ac­
cordance with the new ideas the leaders have envisioned. The 
tasks, traits, knowledge and skills characterising the entrepre­
neurs’ category are listed in Table 1.2.
The third category are the ‘developers’, who transform  the 
ideas of the leaders into concrete proposals, which the entre­
preneurs then convert into reality. The developers’ profile is 
sim ilar to the operational m anagers, who link resources and 
skills attracted by the entrepreneurs, develop the initiative for 
the opportunities which the entrepreneurs have opened up, and 
align short- and long-term com m itm ents on the basis o f the en­
trepreneurs’ performance metrics. Tasks and attributes in this 
category are outlined in Table 1.2.
To understand how the three categories o f individuals here de­
scribed com e into existence, it is essential to grasp the business 
model that characterises the com m unities where the cluster 
configuration has the greatest chance to take root and succeed. 
As has been previously pointed out, in those com m unities most 
of the com panies are family businesses in which the essential 
resource is the personality and know ledge of everyone who is 
involved in them, from the entrepreneur and his managers 
down to the forem an and shoopfloor workers. The versatile 
organisation o f this type o f com pany does not stifle individual 
creativity and initiative, while in the old-style big business a 
rigid and authoritarian structure tended to repress the talents of 
people and did not encouraged them  to take risks and challenge
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the status quo. So, to galvanise the cluster process, in which 
the critical mass o f grouping m akes the difference, is the 
‘individualised’ com pany —  that is, the organisation that exalts 
the individual. It is worth noting that it is only in the late 1990s 
that hum ble and unknown business, that for too long tim e had 
been the ‘individualised’ com pany, em bedded in a cluster 
environm ent, becam e the model for companies in a wide range 
of industries which aspired to become successful global players 
(Ghoshal, Barlett, 1998).
12. SOCIAL CAPITAL
Social capital, along 
with hum an capital, 
knowledge, physical 
capital and infra­
structures, are a key 
factor o f the cluster 
form ation and de­
velopm ent. An in­
ternational survey 
carried out by ex­
perts has identified social capital am ong the top three ranking 
attributes o f a successful cluster (Table 1.3).
Table 1.3
Top three ranking attributes of a successful cluster 
Technology and knowledge formation
Pools of specialised skills and technology that provide quality in­
puts into production systems.
Strong commitment to, and investment in knowledge formation, 
that underscores a robust and integrated regional innovation sys­
tem.
Networks of dynamic SMEs that can drive local innovation.
Social capital is embodied in the 
relations among people. It refers to 
a learning process o f sharing norms, 
values, meaning and expertise, goals 
and aspirations, decision-making, 
work, risk, et cetera that propitiates 
relationships fo r collective actions 
with mutual benefit.
(Coleman, 1990: 304; Stanford, 
2002).
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Civic entrepreneurs*
They champion issues, and are able to produce outcomes through 
their credibility and networks.
They leverage off the social capital within the region/industry and 
bring others into the agenda.
Social capital
A sense of shared vision and destiny.
Common values that facilitate collaboration and wealth creation.
A ‘sense of community’ and progressiveness that attracts the in­
terest of external stakeholders.
* They resemble the community-rooted business heroes as described 
above (par. 3).
Source: The Clustering Alliance Newsletter, July 2002, No 31.
Yet the concept of social capital must be handled with care so 
as not to encourage a form of protectionism  among those who 
are involved in forging links among them, since this may lead 
to the exclusion o f people outside their own com m unity. By 
restricting the area o f collaboration betw een insiders and out­
siders, protectionism  damages both parties. The outsiders can­
not benefit from  the wealth that social capital has contributed 
to generating in that comm unity. On the other hand, the in­
siders isolate them selves from new visions that the outsiders 
could contribute. In view of the above —  as observed by Fuller 
(2002) —  “social capital is an example o f what the economist 
Fred H irsch originally called a ‘positional good’, that is, a 
good whose value is principally tied to the exclusion of spe­
cific consum ers” . Fuller has also observed that there is a 
source o f corruption in “the intimate linking o f social and eco­
nomic interests so valorised by social capital thinking”.
Traditional and spontaneous sociability are prim ary com po­
nents o f the social capital. Traditional sociability “can be said 
to be loyalty to long-established social groups, [as in the case
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of] the m edieval pro- Social capital breaks down in tradi-
ducers” , such as the tional and spontaneous sociability.
Guilds of the Han-
seatic League. Conversely, spontaneous sociability, “ is the 
ability to come working together and cohere in new groups for 
com m on purposes, and to thrive in innovative organisational 
settings” (Fukuyam a, 1995).
W hich type o f sociability will prevail in a given com m unity, is 
due to the predom inant set o f values and beliefs, unwritten 
norms and conventions which are shared am ongs individuals 
of that com m unity in their everyday interactions. If  traditional 
sociability is to be the outcom e, then the com m on trait o f that 
com m unity would be kinship and fam ily ties where people 
trust solely close relatives. In com m unities which live in a so­
cial climate o f fam ilist behaviour, firms m istrust one another, 
and then the entrepreneurial energy generated by the founding 
fathers tends to be dissipated and degenerate into a syndrom e 
of the ‘third generation’ once the baton has passed from  the 
founders to their descendants (Figure 1.5).
Spontaneous sociability Trust comes out from a personal 
is associated with strong feeling. It is a distinguishing char- 
trusting relationships acteristic o f a relationship.
that extend well beyond Trust is a social dividend that 
the fam ily ties. Trust springs from the individual need to 
reduces the costs of preserve his own reputation within 
m onitoring contracts and the community. 
allows risks and informa- ^ ay 
tion to be shared. People
dissem inate knowledge and valuable inform ation betw een 
firms as they use to do within them. W hen the succcess o f the 
partnership is at the top o f the agenda, no one will seek ways 
to take advantage o f the others, and therefore put aside self in ­
terest be if for him self or for the fam ily m em bers (Uzzi, 1997).
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kinship groups
family businesses 
founder-entrepreneurs
g  family ownership concentration 2
Vf"1- -sf •
The third generation syndrome 3
firms atomized 
and distrustful of 
one another
*entrepreneurial energy weak associational life
familist behaviour social distrust
Figure 1.5. Familist behaviour and family-held company evolution.
1 —  Founding fathers have been mainly blue collars and techni­
cians, unorthodox and independent-minded individuals in quickly 
changing times.
2 —  The original entrepreneurial spirit turns into a bureaucracy with 
successors who, as recipients of university diplomas, expect to play 
executive roles in their family company.
3 —  Inheritors are not as tied to continued ownership as their par­
ents or grandparents.
Clusters are relatively high-trust com m unities in which non­
kinship relationships predom inate and don’t rot in interest 
groups2 that support restrictive practises and cartelised groups.
2 Interest groups are coalitions of interests organised around eco­
nomic, social, political factors. They tend to accrue benefits for 
themselves and only then they consider the interests of their mem­
bers. Prestige as well as the capability to initiate actions that can 
damage other competing interest groups or the community as a 
whole determine the strength of each group.
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A cluster com m unity is built on a ‘chain reaction’ betw een the 
individuals’ spontaneous
ability to associate with Spontaneous sociability character- 
each other, the degree to ises a cluster community. 
which the com m unity
shares norms and values placing com m on interests before in­
dividual ones, and trust that comes out o f such shared values 
and, in turn, feeds spontaneous sociability. The higher the level 
of spontaneous sociability, the easier for the cluster to adapt 
itself effectively and rapidly to econom ic and social changes. 
So, the quality o f social capital deeply affects the cluster 
performance.
Social capital and its involvem ent o f trust is a key factor un­
derpinning innovation and increased productivity, as has been 
shown by a positive correlation betw een the innovation index 
and the trust index produced, respectively, by the European 
C om m ission’s DG Enterprise and the OECD (Rousseau, 
2002).
The accum ulation of social capital gives force to the proposi­
tion that the path to prosperity is an am bition that could be 
attained by practically anyone. A shared prosperity rather than 
a widening inequality is the striking feature o f the cluster com ­
m unity.
13. BUSINESS COLLABORATION: 
THE CO-ORDINATION MODE
The pursuit of trust is the outcom e o f the practice o f appren­
ticeship for collaboration at all levels. Business collaboration is 
an enduring process of learning how to m anage inter-firm  re­
lationships. Trust and social capital are the ‘genes’ that dictate 
the evolution o f so com plex an adaptive web as business 
collaboration.
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Practices o f apprenticeship for collaboration are popular 
among com panies in the 
packaging cluster. All 
have been experiencing 
the prim itive form  of 
collaboration, defined 
as ‘co-ordination’ Some 
are adopting a fresh ap­
proach in ‘co-operating
while the avant-garde is practising the very sophisticated 
opetition’ game (Figure 1.6).
... the quality and quantity o f mean­
ingful collaboration often depends 
upon the tools used to create it... 
Collaboration is like romance... it 
can’t be routine and predictable.
(Schrange, 1990)
CO-
IDEAS-BASED BUSINESSES
• knowledge workers
• intellectual capital
•  trust, fashion, roles
MAKING THINGS
• raw materials
• components New product development t
• tools
W co-opetitior^^^
upgrading existing ■
product lines f a complex balance of
co-ordinatioj^>’̂ ^ partnership andrivalry
tangible RESOURCES intangible
Figure 1.6. Forms of business collaboration in an evolving cluster.
From co-ordination, com panies learn to enhance the process of 
“sim ultaneous adoption o f identical or com plem entary strate­
gies by independent agents” (Kay, 1995), whose relationships 
mainly o f a com m ercial supply- type are informal and implicit, 
based on unwritten rules and unwritten codes o f conduct. 
Building co-ordination on strings o f tangible resources (i.e., 
raw m aterials, tools, components, and interm ediate products) 
imbued with tacit knowledge, vertically disintegrated supply 
chains have been growing in the packaging cluster. Distinctive
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features o f the relationships prevailing in the co-ordination 
environm ent are condensed in Figure 1.7.
Figure 1.7. Distinctive features of relationships in the co-ordination 
environment.
14. THE ART OF NETWORKING  
THROUGH SUPPLIER SPEC IES
M ass production is characterised by vertically integrated sup­
ply chains with many remote, external com m odity suppliers 
(i.e., spot-m arket/ off-the-shelf suppliers), and m any internal 
links between ‘quasi’ firms which are operational units inside 
the vertically integrated
leading com pany that in- In the cluster economy, specialised 
teract with each other partners are in a close relationship 
through a sort o f open with the industry leaders, and each 
market price mechanism. ° f  ^ iem operates at a specific seg- 
Conversely, the flexible ment ° f ^ ie supply chain. 
production mode which
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distinguishes the cluster econom y tips the balance o f power 
tow ards vertically disintegrated supply chains where the indus­
try leaders m anage close relationships with collaborative spe­
cialists (i.e., detail-controlled parts suppliers) and problem  
solvers (i.e., suppliers concentrated on early design and with 
an independent market mission). The leading com pany shows 
few er in-hom e links because an external netw ork —  where d if­
ferent types of suppliers, which encom pass also the ‘quasi’ 
firms changed into spin-off com panies, coalesce with the 
leader —  replaces the internal network.
By sharing functions such as order taking and shipping, cluster 
com panies em bedded in supply chains derive econom ies of 
scale, thereby lowering chain m em bers’ costs. H istorical pat­
terns in the Italian districts suggest that in the early days o f a 
cluster form ation these chains were m ade up of small and m i­
cro firms, each o f them specialising in merely one phase o f the 
cycle —  resem bling the Rom an phalanx, a body of soldiers in 
close form ation arrayed for combat. In the packaging cluster, 
collaborative specialists form  the Rom an phalanx. These are 
highly skilled low tech suppliers in close liaison with their pri­
mary custom ers (Figure 1.8).
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Figure 1.8. Supplier species.
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COMMODITY SUPPLIER
• Spot-market supplier.
• Low cost/low price priorities.
• Little or no differentiation.
• Captive or independent market mission.
COLLABORATIVE SPECIALIST
• Detail-controlled parts made under specifications of the indus­
try leaders.
• Cyclical, quasi dependent market mission.
• M ember of a closed network in each industry with few cus­
tomers in each.
TECHNOLOGY SPECIALIST
• Innovation in product technology used to produce high barri­
ers to entry.
• First mover advantages.
• Uses design capability for competitive advantage.
• Does not work closely with customers.
• Counter cyclical quasi independent market mission.
PROBLEM SOLVER
• Independent market mission.
• Differentiation strategy.
• Competes primarily on his ability to solve process and product 
problems for his industry clients.
• Uses advanced management practices (e.g. quality practices, 
employee empowerment programmes).
• Sells to many customers in various industrial markets.
Source: Adapted from Wood, Kaufman, Merenda, 1996.
Later on, as some firms take up the role of decision-makers at 
local level, an evolutionary form of co-ordination emerges 
whose configuration resembled a wedge. The leading company 
at the tip of the wedge embraces problem solvers or co-makers, 
involved in the early phases of the leader’s development 
process (Figure 1.8). Secondary and tertiary subcontractors
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underpinning the new 
situation, historically 
rooted in the archi­
tecture of co-ordi­
nation, a grey area 
appears in the clus­
ter, where opportun­
istic actions and pro­
pensity to conduct 
business through bind­
ing commitments co­
exist side by side (Fig­
ure 1.9).
business configuration emerge. In this
Leading firms are those who retain 
control o f design, marketing and 
sales and the strategic phase o f as­
sembling the final product executed 
iti collaboration with the co-makers.
Subcontractors are small artisan 
firms that produce pieces to specifi­
cation, taking part in one or few  
phases o f the production process.
INDIVIDUALISM
• arms-length ties/ 
market relationships
• family trust
•  kinship/family ties
•  self-interested 
opprtunism*
• opportunistic relations
• short-term relations
• price & quantity data 
exchanges
•  econom ies o f  scale
•  cost efficiency
Figure 1.9. Collaboration through co-ordination.
(*) In the case of the packaging machinery cluster in Bologna, Far­
rell and Lauridsen (2001: 20) have noted that “There was consider­
able opportunism among firms in certain areas. A severe shortage of 
qualified workers in the industry meant that firms had little com­
punction in poaching workers, and in using their new employees to 
find out about the production methods and techniques used in their 
former workplaces (emphasis added). Indeed, there was a more gen-
COMMUNITARIANISM
• embedded ties/non-market 
relationships
0  •  social trust
p  •  non-kinship ties
^  • spontaneous sociability
q  •  unselfish behaviour
2  •  co-operative relations
^  •  non-price information
! j  exchanges
•  econom ies o f time
• flexibility
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eral phenomenon of diffusion of technical information through 
copying of designs; while this may have had some positive effects 
for the district overall, it also discouraged major investments in re­
search that could not be protected by patent” .
Those, who attempt to co-ordinate their business activities and 
seek to do so over the long term, frequently discover that their 
activities are jeopardised by their parties’ opportunistic behav­
iour. Implicit commitment of long-term links induces the par­
ties to invest in the relationship. Yet, once investment has been 
made, the major company in the partnership may sometimes 
attempt to exploit the weaker parties. This situation can lead to 
the termination of the business relationship. Sharing the gains 
of the relationship with the stronger organisation only in part 
counterbalances the risk of the termination for the weaker 
parties.
It is generally the case that parties in co-ordination tend to act 
as shortermist firms,
which sacrifice fu- Parties in co-ordination tend to act
ture market gains as shorter mist firms.
for short-term profits,
disregarding the general interest. A ‘hit-and-run’ conduct for 
which “a larger slice is better than a larger cake” (Kay, 1995) 
erodes trust as a social dividend.
15. THE CO-OPERATION MODE
Co-ordination is suitable in the case where there are steady sets 
of products matching with routine and incremental inno­
vations. Supply chains are the entrepreneurial version of verti­
cally integrated companies without the inconveniences of bu­
reaucracy which common ownership encourages. But things 
totally change as new product development rather than upgrad­
ing the existing product lines becomes the key factor for sue-
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cess. At this stage 
the primary custom­
ers carefully select 
their collaborative 
specialists, who were 
accustomed to oper­
ate as detail-con­
trolled parts suppliers 
under a market mis­
sion dictated by their
Industry leaders stand out in terms 
o f strategic capability and strength 
o f personality.
By contractual solutions fo r  long­
term relationships, the leaders form  
stable networks with their problem 
solvers. The latter are independent 
firms, which develop distinctive 
competencies and serve ever other 
companies outside the network.
customers. The latter
carefully look carefully for suppliers capable of solving their 
process and production problems. These problem solvers are 
drawn into the design and development of new products and 
components at a very early stage and are often integrated into 
the custom er’s organisation. The two parties conduct research 
and development together, and in so doing share a common 
vision and goal.
Both customers and suppliers are subject to the ‘five year’ and 
‘20% ’ rules. The first states that “customers share proprietary 
product designs with suppliers as much as five years in ad­
vance in order to ensure access to state-of-the-art compo­
nents”. The second one states that, ’’firms prevent their busi­
ness from accounting for more than 20% of a supplier’s reve­
nues and prefer that no customer accounts for more that 20% 
of their own revenues either” (Saxenian, 1993).
Lessons drawn from co-ordination and related supply chains 
induce the most innovative companies to invest in ‘untraded’ 
or non-commercial factors
of interdependency, such Co-operation allows the parties to 
as educational attainment, maximise the joint product o f their 
developing team works as relationships rather than the indi- 
multidisciplinary commu- vidual returns. 
nities of practice, commu­
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nicating and promoting favourable attitudes towards industry 
(Storper, 1995). From this investment the expectation is that an 
increasing number of firms would plan actions for maximising 
the joint product of their relationships rather than the indi­
vidual returns. This is the ‘co-operation’ mode that fosters a 
sense of community whereby the invisible hand of the market 
is accompanied by an invisible handshake. All through the 
cluster evolution an increasing number of companies show a 
will to co-operate, for which their budgets are directed to in­
vestment in strings of intangible resources (knowledge work­
ers, software, trust, fashions, roles). This gives birth to ad­
vanced workplace and management practices by which net­
works of firms and network-firms replace the old-style supply 
chains. The network code is outlined in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4
Network code
Voluntarism —  Partners are free to withdraw from relationships 
they believe are unfairly structured.
Openness —  Network relationships are external and thus highly 
visible to all parties.
Explicitness —  External, visible relationships tend to be explicit.
Simpleness —  The less you sign, the more you achieve.
Performanceness —  Network relationships are guided by per­
formance rather than by procedures.
Accessibility —  Full-disclosure information systems assure that 
all decisions are made objectively and fairly.
Self-renewal —  Many autonomous, intelligent work units inter­
acting rapidly with the outside world and each other, and quickly 
rearranging themselves to solve new problems.
Source: Adapted from Miles, Snow, 1992.
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16. THE CO-OPETITION MODE
The co-operative pattern embodies a good deal of competition 
within (not only outside) the relationship for both the genera­
tion and the distri­
bution of the net Co-opetition is to compete and co­
gain of the non- operate with the same companies. 
zero-sum game.
This results in a variety of situations of competitive co-opera­
tion or co-opetition across parties.
As Nalebuff and Brandenburger explain: “Business is co-op- 
eration when it comes to creating a pie and competition when 
it comes to dividing it up. In other words, business is War and 
Peace. But it’s not Tolstoy —  endless cycles of war followed 
by peace followed by war. It’s simultaneously war and 
peace... You have to compete and co-operate at the same time. 
The combination [that is, co-opetition] makes for a more dy­
namic relationship than the words competition and co-opera- 
tion suggest individually. [In the co-opetition game] your suc­
cess doesn’t require others to fail —  there can be multiple win­
ners” (Nalebuff, Brandenburger, 1996: 4-5).
Co-operation and competition are mixed together in various 
ways. Varying blends of competing and co-operating — state 
Hampden-Tumer and Trompenaars (1997) —  correspond to 
different co-opetition games. The two authors call “finite 
games” those situa­
tions in which co­
operative compet­
ing is an attitude 
that leans toward 
competitiveness.
Conversely, endless or mnniie are mose games mat mcnne 
toward cooperativeness. Distinct traits of the two kinds of 
games are shown in Figure 1.10.
In Finite Games you compete, the 
better to cooperate. In Infinite Games 
you cooperate better to compete.
(Hampden-Turner, Trompenaars, 
1997: 25)
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Finite game:
•  Leans toward competition
• The object is to win the game
• Adherence to contract terms
•  Competing for segments o f  
existing markets
ite game:
Leans toward co-operation 
The object is to improve the plays 
Dynam ic reciprocity o f  relationships: 
one partner does more than the 
customer to do more also 
Creating new markets
CO-OPERATION
Figure 1.10. Competition and co-operation: finite and infinite
games.
Source: Adapted from Hampden-Turner, Trompenaars, 1997.
The main characteristcs of companies in co-opetition are ac­
cess to external business partners, constant reconfiguration of 
business relationships, and a dramatic increase in outsourcing. 
Companies “behave like the Internet, where everyone can par­
ticipate and the total effort is greater than the sum of the parts” 
(Tapscott, 1995).
Throughout the 1990s the co-opetition mode has been evolving 
through the “dynamics of the world economy [that] are forcing 
companies to cooperate in order to compete” . This results in 
competitive
alliances that are Competition forces companies to co-
“ventures between operate.
strong international
companies that generally remain competitors outside the rela­
tionship” (Cauley de la Sierra, 1995).
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On the other hand, in order to overcome the risk of a ‘Byzan­
tine’ bureaucracy (that is, a non-co-operative attitude replacing 
the co-operative behaviour inside the firm), competition spurs 
companies to compete within them, so as to foment an ‘intra­
corporate market’. This gives rise to ‘quasi-firms’, some of 
them emerging as independent companies linked to the 
mother-company by means of competitive co-operation rela­
tionships.
Both these views, however, confine co-opetition to big busi­
ness. Besides, co-opetition is perceived as a two-tier game: be­
fore, ‘domestic’ (inside the relationship) co-operation across 
the parties and after ‘foreign’ (in the open market, outside the 
relationship) competition between them. What is left out is the 
intrinsic nature of this relationship, which is the unification and 
not the division between co-operation and competition. This is 
equivalent to saying that competitive co-operation fits the 
principle of multivalence or fuzziness instead of that of bi­
valence or two-valuedness (Kosko, 1994). It means a large 
spectrum of competition and co-operation options, of which 
those mentioned above are only the two borderline cases. So, 
for example, to some degree the area of co-operation might be 
related to the ‘untraded’ factors of the interdependency, for 
which collaborative actions are developed by autonomous 
(ownership-independent) inter-company teams, whereas to 
some degree the ‘traded’ factors might provoke competition 
across parties inside long before than outside the relationship. 
In short, competitive co-operation is an overlapping world 
made up of competing and co-operating firms whose border­
lines are ‘domestic’ co-operation and ‘foreign’ competition.
As far as SMEs are concerned, IC leading companies, their 
problem solvers and collaborative specialists, already bonded 
together for a common purpose, show a greater openness in 
communication with each other, whereby the self-contained 
cluster develops an outward-looking perspective. In fact, it 
cannot be sufficiently emphasised, in the co-operation mode
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companies accept that whenever there is a trade-off between 
short-term profits and investment for breeding the network 
competitiveness, the latter must prevail.
The attitude for which “a larger cake is better than a larger 
slice” opens the door to co-opetition, whose distinctive feature 
is the predominance of horizontal disintegration by the out­
sourcing of non-core competencies along with dynamic net­
works where different but complementary partners come to­
gether to create a new venture and, on completion, part com­
pany. Co-operation is needed to increase the market share of 
the industry, while competition remains the essential ingredient 
that motivates companies to strive for excellence. A complex 
balance of partnership and rivalry results in a permanent state 
of disequilibrium. For example, owing to his independent 
market mission and the ability to sell to many customers in 
various industrial markets, a problem solver might acquire re­
sources to obtain a much greater advantage over the other par­
ties who have contributed to enlarge the market. In contrast, 
the traditional com­
petitive paradigm can Co-opetition set o ff a complex bal- 
only lead to each ance ° f  partnership and rivalry’
than the ‘cake’ shrinks.
It is an ever-increasing effort, unbearable in the long run. In 
fact, this strategy requires aggressive pricing and/or costly 
product customisation. Also it leads to lower margins and di­
minishes the level of resources available for the development 
of strategic competencies on which to build competitive ad­
vantages.
Figure 1.11 pigeonholes how the different forms of business 
collaboration, supply chain and network are interrelated.
company struggling 
to make its own share 
of the market ‘cake’ 
increase more rapidly
across parties in cluster and within 
them (Jarillo, 1993).
Collaborative advantages are 
sources o f competitive advantages.
PIERO FORMICA 71
Figure 1.11. Types of business collaboration, supply chain, network, 
and their matching.
INTERNAL NETWORK —  A firm creates a market inside itself. 
‘Quasi firm s’ interact through the open market price mechanism. A 
lead partner ( ‘broker’) plays a central role. The ‘broker’ stands out 
in terms of experience, strategic capability, and strength of 
personality.
STABLE NETW ORK —  Long-term relationships. Independent, 
specialised firms are connected to a central company (or ‘core unit’) 
through contractual solutions. Each independent firm keeps and de­
velop its distinctive competence, serving even other companies out­
side the network. The central company stands out in terms of experi­
ence, strategic capability, and strength of personality.
DYNAMIC NETW ORK —  Based on short-term or one-time rela­
tionships. Several, specialised partners are coupled contractually for 
a particular project and then part company for the start-up of a new 
venture, each of them operating at a specific segment of the value 
chain. There are no special, privileged relationships. A central unit 
of co-ordination plays the leading administrative role.
VERTICALLY INTEGRATED SUPPLY CHAINS (“mass produc­
tion”)
• Many remote external, commodity suppliers (spot-market/off- 
the-shelf suppliers.
• Many internal links in supply chain.
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VERTICALLY DISINTEGRATED SUPPLY CHAINS (“lean pro­
duction”)
• Closer relationships with collaborative specialists (detail-con­
trolled parts suppliers).
• Fewer problem solvers (suppliers concentrated on early design 
and with an independent market mission).
• Fewer internal links in supply chain.
HORIZONTAL DISINTEGRATION
• Outsourcing of non-core competencies
• Short-term external collaborations through electronic links.
Source: Adapted from Miles, Snow, 1992.
Co-opetition is further encouraged by web-based trading appli­
cations. Within an online community tailored to serve a spe­
cific industry, activities can be coordinated in such a way that 
they are good for the entire industry. A ‘net’ infostructure ap­
pears more promising than a ‘pit’ architecture where the hold­
ers of information behave as the owners of wells. The available 
information is that the well’s owner wants supply. Partial and 
opportunistic disclosure of information engenders a climate of 
distrust within the customer-supplier relationships. Conversely, 
while maintaining the dynamics of competition, the online 
enriched flow of information allows companies to improve the 
co-ordination of activities so that, for example, it comes more 
naturally to sell inventory in excess to direct rivals. Revealing 
inventory, pricing, design specification and other kinds of hot 
information to competitors is something that sounds strange in 
the conventional business culture. Nevertheless, this conduct 
becomes a crucial challenge, albeit with unpredictable 
consequences, as soon as companies are aware that they have 
to change their own behaviour going online (Henig, 2000; see 
par. 19 in this Chapter).
Co-opetition engenders “business ecosystems” such as the in­
teractive multimedia industry that encircles a variety of com­
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panies from different but convergent sectors. Content, comput­
ing and communications enterprises comprise an extended web 
of suppliers and end-users.
Companies in business ecosystems are internetworked from 
the point of view of organisation, independent of ownership, 
and work “co-operatively and competitively to develop new 
products, satisfy a large number of customers in various mar­
ket segments and incubate new businesses” (Moore, 1993). In 
the “strategic network” model of business ecosystems, some­
one in the company “takes the role of ‘central controller’ and 
organises the flow of goods and information among many 
other independent companies, making sure that the final client 
gets exactly what he or she is supposed to get, in an efficient 
way” (Jarillo, 1993).
17. BRAND POLICY
‘Selling what is produced’ has been the IC traditional ‘modus 
operandi’. Buyers like industrial corporations and big whole­
sale traders thereby dominated IC markets. IC companies, even 
the leading firms, were price takers. Due to successive 
evolutions, the ‘product-out’ attitude has been replaced by a 
business culture addressed at ‘producing what can be sold’ and 
therefore focused on markets, customers and services.
First, IC companies learnt how to increase the export share of 
their production (the “openness” phase). Later, they deployed 
and directed their efforts to foster trading relations within a 
given economic area —  the ‘natural’ one was that of the Euro-
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pean Common Mar- Three phases o f trading relations:
ket —  (the “integra- openness, integration, and global-
tion” phase). The isation.
latest move is that
initiated by some early birds among the leading companies, 
which are now attempting to enter the “globalisation” phase 
stretching their trading relations across the globe. To be global, 
they have to be aware that, in one way, it implies the dimin­
ished importance of geography (i.e., the European Union area) 
to trade. It also shows that they have to adapt to each market 
place in order to 
be customercentric 
companies. That 
means —  as Ama­
zon’s Jeff Bezo has 
emphasised —  “To 
listen to customers 
and figure out what 
they want and how to give it to them. To invent and innovate 
for your customers is the object of the exercise. Personal­
ization: put each individual customer at the center of their own 
universe” (Price, 2002: 71). The challenge is that of devoting a 
lot of resources, time and energy to export their ideas and hire 
local people, rather than simply to transfer their technology or 
people.
Today, wholly or partially owned wholesale subsidiaries, pro­
prietary retail chains and franchising chains are the new com­
mercial weapons.
In the past, the lead- Brand policy pursued by the leading 
ing firms, which have companies affects the cluster-based 
turned into market and business model. 
price makers over time,
took advantage of proximity to their suppliers. The IC local 
outsourcing mode has proven to be superior to the vertically
We hire local people and I define 
how global a company is by how 
many employees are local.
(Jerry Yang, Yahoo’s co-founder, 
interview with Christopher Price, 
2000: 33)
PIERO FORMICA 75
integrated business organisation. Nowadays the superiority of 
local outsourcing seems no more so fetching for the overriding 
concerns about its enduring capacity to reward industry lead­
ers. Under intense market pressures, they have to make deci­
sions consistent with an aggressive brand policy, vital to boost 
their market performance.
The new principles on which industry leaders insist are:
• Better brand management is a complement to the tradi­
tional build-to-order and customised products, and is 
also the best defence against the commodity-oriented 
policy of the low-cost Asia manufacturers. Customers 
who already value the products should appreciate also 
the producers who provide them. The brand transmits the 
message that industry leaders rather than merely 
manufacturers are solution providers who co-innovate 
and forge alliances with their clients.
• The industry leaders’ ultimate pattern is that of changing 
entirely into brand owners (BOs). Which means that 
they will do only the core tasks of researching, design­
ing, prototyping, engineering and marketing products. 
Everything else, even the final assembly, may be done 
by the parts suppliers.
• A very close connection between production and market­
ing implies that production lines are reorganised into 
modules and sub-modules whose main responsibility is 
taken by co-makers —  to wit, by few but extremely reli­
able specialist sup­
pliers upgraded as Through modularity alongside flexi- 
problem solvers to bility, production lines can be 
build major subas- quickly reconfigured to reflect de- 
semblies As a re- m andfor particular brand models.
suit, co-makers gain
access to the industry leaders’ cutting-edge technical de­
velopments and, on the other hand, the leaders take ad­
vantage of the co-makers’ specialised knowledge. In the
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packaging clusters industry leaders and their co-makers 
develop an increasing number of complete and automatic 
lines through modular design of integrated machines 
instead of separate units (i.e., ‘monoblocs' rather than 
separate filling, wrapping, boxing machines, et cetera). 
Modularity serves a more ambitious mission than that of 
cutting production costs. It responds to the BOs 
requirements of improving responsiveness to customers 
by reducing the time needed to develop and start making 
a new model (Figure 1.12).
Industry leader
Problem Solvers
Co-maker 
A
modules’
I Co-maker \
IMPROVING 
RESPONSIVENESS 
TO CUSTOMERS 
Я
''  Under three years 
to develop and 
start making a 
new model
сюЪ
Specific Components Categories
CUTTING
COSTS
Five years to develop and 
start making a new model
“basic units”
Brand Owner 
Design and Marketing
Figure 1.12. M odular production.
• BOs are inclined to create local brands to suit local tastes 
and needs. Their vision and commitment is to become 
indigenous brand owners, who have a full understanding 
of how to do business in that specific country —  to wit, 
“thinking about what makes people different, not what 
they have in common”. This approach may lead to the 
introduction of a hybrid model between local and global 
outsourcing. To get the right mix, Industry leaders go 
international and, therefore, the local cluster expands
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outside its tradi­
tional borders 
within the coun­
try for example, 
the industry 
leader in pack­
aging machines 
for tea and phar­
maceutical prod­
ucts —  IMA,
Brand owners (BOs) concentrate 
high-tnargin and headquarters op­
erations in their cluster, but move 
manufacturing to cheaper, but 
equally well-run, areas in selected 
pockets o f their country or abroad 
either. BOs expertise in management 
and production will be used at the 
cheaper local rates and property 
prices, also providing them with 
access to a wider market.
which was incu­
bated and grew in the packaging cluster of Bologna 
(Exhibit 1.3) —  is the catalyser of a complementary clus­
ter in Mumbai region.
Exhibit 1.3
IMA —  Industrie Macchine Automatiche
IMA (Industrie Macchine Automatiche) is an industrial leader in 
packaging machines for tea and pharmaceutical products. The 
company is located in the automatic packaging and processing 
machinery cluster of Bologna.
The lack of a tradition of technological reliability and high- 
quality service is a real factor in the difficulties encountered by 
Bologna-based companies trying to export during the years in 
which the district system developed.
The flexibility of production organisation and the versatility of 
products and solutions were the most important competitive ad­
vantages for Italian manufacturing during this period.
1980s
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Exhibit 1.3 continued 
1990s
The great leap forward in customer relations only occurred dur­
ing the 1990s. The strategic factor making it possible to over­
come the problem was the ability to generate value beyond the 
criteria of price and specification obligations.
Direct business relations, creativity, openness, friendliness and 
entrepreneurial courage all became critical factors for success. 
These factors enabled the Bologna-based mechanical engineer­
ing industry, together with mechanical engineering throughout 
Italy, to enjoy a higher annual growth rate than their main for­
eign competitors.
During the 1990s Bologna-based companies transformed me­
chanical engineering production from a manufacturing basis into 
a shared intelligence product. This happened by:
• Investing in services based on personal business relations and 
the total involvement of individuals in a way characteristic of 
the small company.
• Spreading of knowledge, both at local level —  with ideas 
such as the Museo del Patrimonio Industriale (Museum of 
Industrial Heritage) —  and at world level —  through adver­
tising campaigns and a large presence at trade fairs —  con­
cerning the ability of people of Bologna to supply technology 
and services.
I The result has been significant and is perhaps an example to be 
copied by other districts. This openness, also known under the 
neologism “co-design”, has given IMA as well as other com pa­
nies in the cluster the right to full membership, for better or for 
worse, of the mechanical engineering community on a par with 
Germany.
2010s
Five kinds of innovation will continue to challenge this industry. 
They are:
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Exhibit 1.3 continued
• Technological innovation originated by investing in ideas 
rather than existing knowledge. A primary role ought to be 
conferred on invention teams where researchers, business 
strategists, sales forces, and patent experts are brought to­
gether and spend their time with customers to really under­
stand the problems that need to be solved.
• Organisational innovation based on new lifestyles and new 
aspirations.
• Training innovation as the only viable option to tackle the 
generation gap and the disintegration of entrepreneurial cul­
ture.
• Web marketing. For companies engaged in e-commerce and 
inserted in “mature“ clusters, that is to say capable of distanc­
ing external competition without decreasing market value, 
web marketing can only be implemented solely once policy 
discussion is underway concerning at least the following three 
factors:
• Structural innovation generated by the alliance between 
companies and the social and administrative environment, 
based on the production of value rather than subsidies.
• Current added-value is generated inside the customer rela­
tionship, which is the final product of the company, the or­
ganisational target. The product itself only generates a 
portion of the overall cost of the final product. The impli­
cations of this concept are still not fully recognised.
• Web technologies are still immature, not for reasons re­
lated to the product itself, i.e. the production potential of 
dedicated software, but because the web’s world ap­
proaches the B2B market in an immature fashion, similar 
to the ‘product positioning’ of companies undergoing 
growth during the 1960s.
• Only as part of a vision that places marketing (suitably re­
defined) at the core of business growth will B2B compa­
nies be able to ensure change, growth and leadership.
Source: Views expressed by Daniele Vacchi, IMA Director of
Communication.
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By entering into other markets and locations while still seizing 
the opportunity for local outsourcing to superior suppliers, in­
dustry leaders contribute to widen internationally the cluster’s 
image. Apart from brand owners, there are other players like 
policymakers and groups of companies who invest in con­
structing a cluster’s new identity. For example, the regional 
government of Tuscany in Italy is leveraging the brand of the 
industrial districts in the region (Exhibit 1.4). In Brazil, to add 
to the capacity of resolving the crisis of the Sinos Valley’s 
footwear cluster in the Rio Grande do Sol, a group of local 
manufactures has incorporated the brand policy in their own 
business-policy package (Exhibit 1.5).
Exhibit 1.4
Leveraging the brand: The case of the industrial districts in 
Tuscany
The Regione Toscana is involved in image promotion of the 
industrial districts in Tuscany. It is being undertaken as a spe­
cific territorial marketing policy, aiming to promote and 
strengthen the visibility of the industrial districts by linking them 
to the broader image of Tuscany. The industrial districts include 
leather (Santa Croce), jewellery (Arezzo), textiles (Prato), 
clothing (Empoli), footwear (Segromigno).
The agenda provides for applied research on the specific product 
characteristics, research about the image o f the Tuscany indus­
trial districts in foreign markets, production of a CD and related 
promotion. One of the obstacles to date is the balance between 
the cooperative role within the industrial districts and the com pe­
tition between specific firms.
Source: The Cluster Alliance Newsletter, May 2002, No 2.
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Exhibit 1.5
Reconstructing the identity: The case of the footwear cluster 
in Brazil
The footwear cluster of Sinos Valley (Rio Grande Do Sol) en­
joyed a growth period in the 1970s & 1980s, promoted by North 
American importers. But gradually, the importers became domi­
nant, taking over the distribution system and product develop­
ment —  and the increase in production and exports was not 
matched by the development of entrepreneurial market-oriented 
consciousness. The behavioural standards of Brazilian footwear 
companies were characterised by their submission to North 
American importers and by their inertia with regards to technol­
ogy, product development and distribution. The fragile situation 
was shaken in the early 1990s by tariff reductions in the local 
market, and the entry of Chinese footwear. While the Brazilian 
firms were going bankrupt, the exporting agents left the Valley. 
Once the initial impact of the crisis had passed, Sinos Valley 
showed its capacity to bounce back. The cluster underwent mar­
ket diversification and a radical change in business culture. 
Businesses turned to the Latin American and domestic market, 
and invested in product development, constructed their own 
identity (brand) and made logistical improvements. Other 
initiatives included managerial training and trade promotion, 
including participation at selected international trade fairs, and 
the establishment of a permanent footwear showroom in Miami 
in April 2001. The machinery, equipment and component 
manufacturers have also invested in marketing and promotion 
and recently launched the brand By Brazil. The tanneries are 
thinking about introducing a quality seal.
Source: The Cluster Alliance Newsletter, May 2002, No 29.
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18. A NEW BEHAVIOURAL CODE
Both large and small companies profit from interfirm collabo­
ration. In the early stages of the cluster development, the co­
ordination mode assures a copious exchange of benefits —  as 
those listed in Table 1.5. Once all the parties have already 
reaped the fruits of co-ordination, collaboration standards must 
be raised. That entails a move into more sophisticated relation­
ships such as those centred on co-operation and co-opetition. 
In mapping out the new route, the greatest responsibility goes 
to the major industrial players who are those close to the end- 
users. The incoming efforts to secure a new competitive edge 
bring back to the forefront the key players’ behavioural code.
Table 1.5
Benefits from interfirm co-ordination in the packaging cluster
LARGE COMPANIES
WHAT IS GIVEN TO SMALL COMPANIES
• Market outlets.
• Making use of its values associated with its name.
• Incubation of new market niches.
• Business angel in kind (e.g. incentives in terms of: order, ad­
vice, client introduction, equipment and machinery utilisation, 
minority interest).
• Access to information.
• Transmission of informal, tacit knowledge disseminated 
through face-to-face verbal, uncodified communication.
• Stimuli to innovate within the familiar technologies.
• New applications from existing technologies.
• Learning how to negotiate a relationship.
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SMALL COMPANIES
WHAT IS GIVEN TO LARGE COMPANIES
• Access to outsourcing.
• Collaborative specialisation ( ‘focused factory’).
• Less costly product customisation.
• Flexibility.
• Help to strengthen the product line-up or aid expansion into 
new, otherwise inaccessible markets.
• Diffusion of informal, tacit knowledge disseminated through 
face-to-face verbal, uncodified communication.
• Learning how to negotiate a relationship.
First, they have to turn relationships with suppliers into much 
more collaborative arrangements even by housing their people. 
Through ‘guest employees’ or ‘implants’ —  that is, suppliers’ 
employees working at the clients’site, the leading actors will 
offer suppliers a better understanding of their requirements.
Second, they need to stimulate entrepreneurship among their 
employees and encourage those of them who want to set up 
their own companies. Spin-ees can act as problem solvers and 
help scout for new products for new markets leading compa­
nies cannot scan in-house (Formica, Facchini, Pezzi, 1997).
Third, albeit benefiting from online design and manufacturing, 
wired collaboration has to be implemented to complement 
rather than to be a sub­
stitute for a ‘fine- The overriding concern o f a new be- 
grained information havioural code ought to be that o f 
transfer’ (Uzzi, 1997), encouraging more collaborative ar- 
which entails dissemi- rangements between industrial lead- 
nation of tacit knowl- ers and supplier, stimulating in-
edge that lies outside hou5e entrepreneurship, and invest-
, r 1 1 j  ins in knowledge management.the scope of web-based 6 0
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market ties. Last but not least, industrial leaders have to invest 
in knowledge management to transform personal into organ­
isational knowledge, as is illustrated in Chapter 2, par. 5. This 
transformation is the outcome of unrelenting interactions be­
tween team members that trigger off cognitive conflicts3, 
which, in turn, push participants to change their mental ap­
proach.
19. CLUSTERS IN THE WEB AGE
Five hundred years of market creation has seen the transforma­
tion of the entrepreneurial economy from the once a week vil­
lage markets to the 24-7 global electronic markets. Innovative 
entrepreneurs are making the most of the potential of global 
connections. They are active members of electronic business 
communities, which are “networks of suppliers, distributors, 
commerce providers, and customers that use the Internet and 
other electronic media as platforms for collaboration and com­
petition” (Tapscott, Lowy, Ticoll, 1998: 19).
The digital revolution reduces transaction costs, making un­
economic the size and the vertical integrated organisation of 
the modem industrial corporation. Returning to Ronald 
Coase’s theory of firm, which holds that the main reason why 
firms exists is to minimise transaction costs4, the fact that the
3 For the definition, see Chapter 2 par. 4
4 The costs of using a market (“costs of market transacting” or 
“transaction costs”) have been spotlighted by Ronald Coase, 1991 
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, and a leader of the 
new institutional economics. His seminal works on this branch of 
economic theory are “The Nature of Firm” (1937) and “The Problem 
of Social Cost” (1960). See also “Firm, the Market, and the Law” by 
Ronald Coase (1990).
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Internet reduces these costs means that it also shrinks the 
optimal size of firms. The rules of what has been named the 
“law of diminishing firms” (Downes, Mui, 1998) will be carv­
ing out the form of the new ventures. Within the Internet, the 
key to market dominance is not the size but a bunch of quali­
ties that have much to do with leadership style and value-based 
initiatives. Successful firms have the qualities of being lean 
and swift enough to bring producers and customers closer to­
gether, and build tighter relationships between them.
The Internet has started to redefine cluster-based relationships, 
albeit there are still shades of grey in respect of its real impact 
on clusters. For example:
• Clusters are traditionally like a convoy system, which 
means that companies in the same sector move forwards 
at the speed of the slowest. In the e-economy, will this 
still be true? How
many of them trem- the internet modify the rules o f
ble lest the spread the game, the viability and sustain-
of the Internet will ability o f clusters?
provide little respite
from onslaught of competition?
• Clusters encourage the rapid spread of best practices. 
Can one expect that speed would increase in the e-econ- 
omy? Will therefore best practices by imitation be sus­
tainable? Might their diffusion impede innovation be­
cause “best practices are by and large about efficiency, 
not innovation”? (Horibe, 2002)
• How will the e-economy change the role of social capital 
in producing economic capital? In clusters such as the 
Italian districts social capital comes spontaneously from 
face-to-face informal contacts. Will clusters’ family 
companies have to re-engineer their social capital for­
mation to embrace and invest in wider networks, virtual 
and hybrid?
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19.1. PHYSICAL MARKETPLACES AND 
CONCEPTUAL MARKETSPACES
Paradoxically, the Internet, and its use, both challenges the role 
of space and geography in clusters, and reinforces the value of 
human interaction between customers and suppliers, buyers 
and producers, consumers and sellers in defined spaces. The 
Internet effect is often the creation of a new area of 
collaboration in the fields of buying and selling products and 
services as well as intangible value generation.
An industry cluster is a business community embedded in a 
specific territory where feel and touch are the layers on which 
trust is constructed. The trust so generated is the foundation for 
conducting transactions in markets that are bound by limited, 
physical dimensions. Entrepreneurs, employees, and other 
businesspersons in­
teract with a fixed 
and often small num­
ber of other people in 
close, geographical 
proximity.
Today a new form 
of business commu­
nity is emerging, 
which replaces (or 
makes hybrid) a 
physical marketplace 
with a virtual, conceptual marketspace. The latter is an elec­
tronically created business environment that, therefore, is not 
constrained by location. It has been defined as “a website that 
allows businesses to buy and sell industrial products and ser­
vices using a standard web browser. Buyers can post requests 
for quotes, while suppliers can create online catalogues. Many 
sites have additional features such as industry-specific news, 
auctions, and message boards” (Nairn, 2000). A great variety
New electronic markets will reshape 
the cluster system. Companies that 
evolve an unrivalled ability to 
monitor every movement on their 
web sites will be making the most 
from unrestricted access to connec­
tions world wide. New markets, new 
services and new revenue streams 
will be created. Small firms can find  
niches, which were not previously 
possible. Relationships with custom­
ers and suppliers will be redefined.
PIERO FORMICA 87
of offers (“richness”) and the amplitude of connectivity 
(“reach”) in the marketspace give the participants an unlimited 
capacity to weave relationships by means of ‘experienced’ and 
not only ‘spatial’ proximity, therefore taking advantages of 
new business opportunities beyond the familiar boundaries.
New forms of communication and new means of distribution 
might contribute to an increase in price transparency (e.g., 
online buyers ought to find it easier to discover what sellers are 
charging) and competition, make price comparisons easier 
(e.g., sellers ought to find it easier to ascertain what other sell­
ers are charging), and redefine relationships between custom­
ers and suppliers. However, there are many factors that con­
spire to pose a threat to competition, such as the points listed 
below:
• Cyberspacemen seem inclined to gather. Thus, groups of 
buyers and sellers tend to converge towards online ex­
changes that become dominant. Dominant exchanges 
could lead to collusion practises, such as those of price 
decisions co-ordination and discrimination against rivals.
• Big industrial and retail buyers aggregate their purchas­
ing requirements. US antitrust officials estimate that a 
combined purchasing power more than 20% of a par­
ticular market causes damage to competition in terms of 
creating an oligopsony power that lowers output by 
pushing prices below competitive levels.
• Participation in an online exchange on exclusive terms 
(i.e., not to work with other exchanges) stifles competi­
tion because competitors are locked-out.
• Not only biased online marketplaces can harm competi­
tion. This could also happen through the low-cost and 
high-effective vehicle of collection and use of informa­
tion in the cyberspace.
88 INDUSTRY CLUSTER
19.2. B2B ONLINE TRADING: WILL SMALLER 
SUPPLIERS THROW IN THEIR HAND?
Business-to-business (B2B) online exchanges affect a large 
range of costs. Procurement costs can be shaved through the 
cheapest suppliers that the Internet makes easier to search for, 
and just-in-time exchanges make possible tighter inventory 
control and, hence, low or zero stocks (Table 1.6).
Table 1.6
B2B ways of cutting costs
Reduced procurement costs through the cheapest suppliers that 
the Internet makes easier to search for:
• Dealing with suppliers online could reduce the cost of making 
a car by 14%.
• Expected cost reductions by online purchasing: from 2% in
the coal industry to 40% in electronic components.____________
Cheaper to place an order online._______________________________
Fewer errors in orders and invoicing:
• C isco’s error rate fell to 2% when it switched to online order­
ing, saving the company $ 500 m.
• British Telecom cut the cost of processing a transaction by 
90%._____________________________________________________
Much lower distribution costs for goods and services delivered 
electronically:
• The marginal cost to a bank of a transaction over the Internet 
is a mere cent: 27 cents via a cash machine; 52 cents by 
phone; $ 1.14 by bank teller.________________________________
Better information and just-in-time exchanges make possible 
tighter inventory control and, hence, low or zero stocks:
• Dell Computer’s build-to-order model completely eliminates 
inventories._________________________________________
Source: A Survey of the New Economy, The Economist, 23 Sep­
tember 2000.
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If and to what extent suppliers, namely the smaller ones, might 
suffer from the use of B2B online trading that squeezes effi­
ciency out of the supply chains is a question that raises a range 
of critical issues listed below:
• How many components, parts and modules might be 
conceived as commodity items easily described in an 
online format, so that they are ripe for online trading?
• Are suppliers considering if and how teaming up, like 
many large buyers have already done, to build their own 
marketplaces?
• Suppliers are often so fragmented that they would have 
trouble accumulating enough critical mass to lure sup­
pliers to their site. So, suppliers have little choice but to 
participate in third-party or buyer-driven exchanges.
• Electronic marketplace forces companies supplying 
products to final assemblers to lower their profit mar­
gins.
• Smaller suppliers feel the squeeze, so they’re not sure 
they’re ready to change their businesses over to digital 
markets. Once they put all their products and prices 
online, what seems to upset mostly smaller suppliers is a 
customer-driven process of commoditisation which 
could shave their already razor-thin margins to micro­
scopic levels. They are afraid that online trading turns 
their products into interchangeable commodities that 
buyers could purchase from a number of different com­
panies. It is a bad joke that smaller suppliers have also to 
pay transaction fees in order to get the “privilege” of 
being online (Henig, 2000).
• While suppliers have every reason to be concerned about 
short-term pricing pressure, price will be less of a 
competitive issue in future versions of online trading 
sites. According to Forrester Research, “Suppliers 
should also look to the upside. Their cost of sales drops,
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and their reach increases dramatically with no additional 
marketing costs.”
• Suppliers’ pricing fears are overblown. The essential ar­
gument made is that “buyers cannot ultimately drive 
margins to the point where they eliminate suppliers’ 
margins, because, in that scenario, their suppliers would 
disappear. There will be pricing pressure and suppliers 
will have to adapt, but ultimately the suppliers out there 
are still needed and are going to keep making money”.
• Delivery and quality are big issues too. Industrial busi­
nesses are less inclined than consumers to buy solely on 
price criteria. The right time to get a product and the 
right quality of it is no less important.
• Exchanges will integrate buyers and sellers, but the 
question will be whether the buyers and sellers find the 
exchange more efficient than the link up potential.
• The exchange’s inability to consummate transactions 
online or integrate with back-end systems is a current 
major shortcoming.
Teaming up, leading companies build their own marketspaces. 
As a collective group of large buyers, they exercise a strong, 
short-term pricing pressure on their suppliers, affecting mostly 
those who provide commodity items easily framed in an online 
format. Namely, third-parties smaller suppliers will be suffer­
ing from dropping prices in terms of lower profit margins. Al­
though “suppliers are often so fragmented that they would 
have trouble accumulating enough critical mass to lure suppli­
ers to their site”, analysts say (Landry, 2000), top suppliers can 
oppose buyer-driven exchanges by combining their forces.
In the automotive industry a top suppliers-led consortium has 
been conceived. Likewise, co-makers and collaborative spe­
cialists embedded in clusters are taking steps to change the 
way business is conducted and firms compete in the new digi­
tal markets. For example, in Italy, there are industrial districts
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that have planned and launched vertical portals as far back as 
the late 1990s. These portals are mixed business models —  that 
is, they are neither industrial consortia, which are made up of 
large corporations, nor pure vertical portals made up of 
independent Internet market makers (see Exhibit 1.6).
Exhibit 1.6 
Virtual markets
Companies already holding great market power tend to reinforce 
their position by enhancing virtual markets through industry-led 
consortia that replace stand-alone online efforts. Inside an indus­
try that has consolidated around a few large companies, these 
agree to use a web site for the bulk of their B2B activities, 
thereby creating an industry consortium. This is also known as a 
“vertical portal”, which is a “pyramid-shaped” biased market 
(Kaplan, Sawhney, 2000) for it assembles a few big buyers 
working alongside a fragmented mass of small and midsize busi­
nesses which form different tiers of suppliers.
By contrast, online markets built around independent exchanges 
show fragmentation on both sides of demand and supply. They 
have been labelled “butterfly-shaped” neutral markets that are 
either focused on specific industries (named “pure vertical por­
tals”) or on specific functions and business processes across dif­
ferent industries (“pure functional portals”). Independent 
Internet market makers or online intermediaries create this kind 
of portal within less consolidated industries where there are 
fewer big players commanding an important share of the market. 
With the balance of power split between several competing 
buyers and sellers, all participants share benefits from 
independent, neutral electronic trading. The highest rewards 
ought to materialise in the most fragmented industries, those in 
which no more than 1 to 2% of the market is under the control of 
a single buyer or seller. ___________________________________
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Exhibit 1.6 continued
The unspoken assumption is that liquidity, that is the volume of 
transactions with customer involvement, “depends on the basic 
level of fragmentation underlying each industry from the start. 
The more fragmented the industry, the greater the possibility of 
value creation for all parties involved” (Henig, 2000).
Once a critical mass of buyers and sellers has been reached, 
vertical and functional portals allow buyers and sellers to find 
each other by means of a reduced number of searches and con­
tacts, thereby serving as electronic hubs. Vertical and functional 
hubs are said to be complement each other. In fact, verticals lack 
of functional expertise and functionals do not possess domain 
expertise. For this reason vertical hubs are predicted to form “a 
patchwork of alliances with functional hubs” (Sawhney, Kaplan, 
1999).
There are also portals not involved in sales, acting only as 
providers of various kinds of industry/processes-specific in­
formation in the form of online bulletin boards, online journals, 
chat forums, et cetera, through which good and bad news travel 
quickly world-wide.
A vertical industry portal is a web 
site that provides a gateway or por­
tal to information related to a par­
ticular, specialised industry. The 
portal can also be seen as an inter­
est community web site where peo­
ple share an interest in buying, sell­
ing, or exchanging information 
about that particular industry.
cal engineering begin to emerge as hubs of digital markets.
There are analysts to whom suppliers’ pricing fears seem over­
emphasised. They outline that buyers need suppliers, so suppli­
ers’ margins cannot be squeezed “to the point where suppliers
Vertical portals are 
often the outcome of 
startups fomented by 
family entrepreneurs 
running leading SMEs 
in a district’s specific 
industry (see par. 10 
above). Districts spe­
cialising in mechani-
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would disappear” . But there is even more than the imperative 
of necessity. Price is only one variable in the buying decision- 
process, and industrial businesses, in particular, buy looking at 
a better management of the whole process, which comprises is­
sues such as quality and delivery time. A better supply-chain 
management, enhanced by the Internet’s continuous, rich, 
rapid, free and reciprocal flow of information between compa­
nies and their suppliers, is even more meaningful than reduced 
procurement costs. Therefore, B2B e-commerce can contribute 
to lessen companies’ costs by means of gaining extra effi­
ciency through improved relationships with suppliers in substi­
tution for narrowing suppliers’ profit margins.
The battle of prices might evoke a model of pure exchange 
through the process of online trading. On the other side, qual­
ity and delivery matters call for a model that links buyers and 
sellers. This has the most relevance in the case of strategic 
components and modules providers. Last but not least, a third 
argument focuses on e-trading advantages for suppliers such as 
lower marketing and sales costs. Gains from low-cost access to 
markets might counterbalance the negative pricing pressure 
that prime companies exert on subcontractors.
Overall, the best online exchanges reject the trade-off between 
the foundation of long-established relations companies have 
intertwined with their suppliers and the search for competitive 
prices, thereby recognising how massive is the intrinsic value 
of customisation in their contracts with suppliers. In the online 
world it still sounds virtuous for a company to acquire tools in 
order to build closer relationships with its own suppliers and 
involve them in the company’s business strategies.
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20. CONCLUSIONS: NEW FORMS OF 
CLUSTER ORGANISATION ARE AFOOT
Historic local craft skills or the proximity of highly skilled in­
dividuals in both the business and academic community are the 
seeds of clusters.
A successful cluster Business collaboration is an ever-
grows organically as rising and long-run learning proc-
a system of dynamic ess-
relationships that show
a long-run learning curve of business collaboration. For exam­
ple, in the case of the knitting and clothing industry cluster in 
Carpi, after four decades of development both business indi­
viduals and researchers observe that there are companies 
which, in consequence of a widespread individualistic ethos, 
have not yet overcome the reluctance of opening the business 
to outsiders and accept the idea of sharing experiences with 
them, notably in the case of competitors.
The first and more important form of collaboration is repre­
sented by a set of informal and implicit behavioural rules. 
They are the cornerstones of more advanced and structured 
forms of collaboration. Those behavioural rules are related to 
professional correctness and honesty. According to the opin­
ions expressed by Carpi entrepreneurs, the cluster has suffered 
from a climate of uncertainty and instability fostered by the 
non-observance of behavioural rules such as not imitating or 
counterfeiting the competitors’ models, not exacerbating price 
competition, giving competitors information about the sol­
vency of potential clients, and disclosing the names of com­
petitors who could solve problems the company is not able to 
(Sinatra et al., 1994).
It often happens that the evasion of behavioural rules is the 
consequence of a ‘hit-and-run’ attitude by firms which take a 
short term approach and which are always prompt to sacrifice 
future market gains to short-term profits, disregarding the gen-
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eral interest of the cluster. Instead, what is needed for building 
trust is a modus operandi for which those firms dismiss an ego­
istic and parochial behaviour, perceiving that their own life and 
prosperity is tightly linked to the life and the prosperity of the 
cluster.
Those who cluster round a market are companies endowed 
with the awareness and capability of networking, each of them 
safeguarding his autonomy in the meantime that all partici­
pants enjoy the benefits of being part of the same flow of 
knowledge and information. In the early stages, an entrepre­
neurial culture, which is particularly product biased, sustains a 
buyer market —  a market dominated by price makers who are 
traders outside the cluster. Later on, ‘producing what can be 
sold’ instead of ‘selling what is produced’ turns to be the 
dominant trend instigated by the most competitive companies 
in the cluster. These are the leading primes concentrated on de­
signing and delivering the finished products. Exclusive agents, 
direct retailing, large scale distribution and franchising chains 
become the new channels by which a seller market replace the 
buyer market. The cluster economy departs from the 
disadvantageous stance of price taker to sit on the more 
confortable position of price maker.
Once that industry leaders recognise that the arguments they 
have thought of in the cluster have a much wider applicability, 
then this would made possible the extension of their operations 
focusing them outward on to other areas within the same 
country or cross-border. The delocalization of production first 
and foremost induced by labour-cost advantages can be the 
prelude to the formation of complementary clusters.
In conclusion, industry leaders must be seen to benefit the lo­
cal economy in which they have been investing. Somehow, the 
pivotal role of the original cluster could be ensured if the 
opportunities opened up by the structural realignment of pro­
duction were to become an attractive venture. It requires the
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ability and willpower to constantly upgrade and deploy the in­
dustry cluster’s local resources and infrastructures as a power­
ful first step toward building a knowledge-intensive cluster. 
Otherwise those opportunities will be lost. From the leaders’ 
perspective, behind this evolution is a drive to standardise as 
many parts as possible in the complementary cluster and, at the 
other end, to be rooted on the ground of the knowledge cluster 
whether to conceive new products or adapt existing ones to 
specific needs.
CHAPTER TWO. KNOWLEDGE CLUSTER
The idea that knowledge is 
som ething anyone can acquire  
is recent: fo r  m ost o f  history  
knowledge has been rare and  
secret, and this esoteric heri­
tage, with its dream o f  mastery  
and mystery, sur\>ives in the ja r ­
gon with which every profession  
protects itse lf Knowledge is 
still a serpent eating its own 
tail.
(Theodore Zeldin)
When the fa c ts  change, I change  
my m ind  —  what do you do, 
sir?
(John Maynard Keynes)
1. INTRODUCTION
When we think of clusters most of us still evoke the industrial 
scenario portrayed by companies involved in manufacturing. 
The dominant business model has been that of selling prod­
ucts: cars, food, light bulbs, media, et cetera. Yet a subtle shift
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is occurring, which sets the scene with a promising new item 
on the agenda —  namely that of knowledge clusters (KCs) 
embedded in the knowledge economy. KCs contain another 
perspective of thinking about business, which is similar to 
Thomas Edison’s business model whereby “success is 
achieved by selling to customers ... the fewest number of light 
bulbs ... necessary to supply them with the light they wanted” 
(Wyllie, 2002). Namely, the aim is to provide solutions to cus­
tomers: light, not light bulbs; transport, not cars; nutrition, not 
foods; experience, not media.
According to the Voice of Entovation 100 (E l00 —  see Ex­
hibit 2 .6), one of the most successful networks in the world 
and a leader in the field
of knowledge-based in- Knowledge is a human process 
novation (Knowledge dealing with mental objects, requir- 
Innovation®), “The In- i'lg awareness and intuition. 
dustrial Age relied upon
scarce resources —  land, labor and capital. The Knowledge 
Economy relies upon the asset of human knowledge, which is 
bountiful under the condition that it operates as a multiplier —  
that is, the more it is shared, the more it grows, and the more it 
can be used innovatively. Otherwise, even human knowledge 
remains a scarce and costly asset. The services industry is well 
equipped to capitalize upon the rapid growth potential of 
knowledge-intensive businesses”5.
Prima facie evidence of a divide between industry and knowl­
edge clusters is exhibited in Tables 2.1. and 2.2.
5 For a useful discussion, see Voice of the Entovation 100, 2002a; 
2002b.
Trends in industry and knowledge clusters
Table 2.1
INDUSTRY CLUSTER (IC) KNOWLEDGE CLUSTER (КС)
e Valuing tangibles.
• Trading physical products.
• Optimisation strategies: solving 
problems.
« Economic planning and forecasting.
• Private ownership and controls.
t  Knowledge filtered by single experts.
• Valuing technologies.
• Valuing intangibles.
• Trading ideas and knowledge-based products and services.
• Innovation strategies: seeking opportunities.
• Prospecting future markets, responsiveness to needs and in­
sights.
• Shared ownership and co-opetition (combination of co­
operation and competition).
• Knowledge filtered by knowledge pools.
® Valuing people.
Source: Entovation 100 Voice, www.entovation.com
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Table 2.2
A tentative glossary of the new age of information and access
Age of access —  The age in which connectivity drives toward the 
access of everyone to everyone, everything to everything, and 
everything to everyone.________________________________________
Bionomics —  The merger of biological and economic theory. In 
its more figurative sense, the merger of the world of the made and 
the world of the born._________________________ _____ ___________
Building community —  People investing in sharing content and 
sending messages to each other.________________________________
Coevolution —  Reciprocal evolutionary change in interacting 
species. Coevolution pushes competitors into “obligate co-opera­
tion” . Alliances from co-operation are often asymmetrical for one 
party takes a greater advantage.
Communication —  The basis of culture, which is a process of 
communication among individuals and groups.
Connectivity —  The result of the fusion of computing and com­
munication.
Content —  A mere artefact of ability to communicate.
Cyberspace —  Communication as a destination in its own right, 
no more a pipe between physical locations on the planet. Our cy­
berspace identity is our email signature. Cyberspace is the mall of 
network culture. Cyberspace is naturally anti-sovereign.
Infoeconomy —  An environment in which atoms (products) and 
property of products have been replaced by bits (information) and 
sharing of information. Quicker the transmission of information, 
higher is the value.
Knowledge landscape —  An uneven landscape of empty know- 
nothing interrupted by hills of self-organised knowledge. Knowl­
edge breeds knowledge as well as ignorance breeds ignorance. 
Knowledge processes consist also in mapping the holes of igno­
rance.
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Metering —  Thanks to an information meter, everyone can buy 
what he likes to drink instead of an ocean of information. There­
fore, metering coverts information into a utility.
Net —  Less and less a thing and more and more an environment 
for higher resolution in each other communication. Net tends to 
grow organically —  that is, not according to any person’s con­
scious design, but because it is by nature a collection of individu­
als all making contributions to it.
Netmarket —  On the Net the marketplace is not divided into 
towns and regions, but into affinity groups. Non-commercial 
transactions are developed on the Net to foster a sense commu­
nity.
Netted intelligence —  Networking of human intelligence 
through technology such as interactive multimedia and the so- 
called information highway.
Network —  A factory for information. As the value of a product 
is increased by the amount of knowledge invested in it, the net­
works that engender the knowledge increase in value.
Kelly, 1994; Tapscott, 1995; Taylor,
Knowledge management is about 
the flow o f meaning. It refers to so­
cial communication processes sup­
ported by collaboration technolo­
gies (e.g., the Internet, Intranets, 
wireless devices) to create new 
knowledge and to efficiently re-use 
knowledge in order to obtain and 
maintain competitive advantage 
through improved performance and 
decision-making o f workers.
Source: Brockman, 1997; 
Wacker, 1997.
What really does mark 
the difference between 
ICs and KCs is the 
surge in investments 
for knowledge man­
agement and knowl- 
edge-workers network­
ing experimented by 
the KCs. From the Fif­
ties to the Nineties, 
from Peter Drucker to
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Robert Reich6, knowledge workers and knowledge-intensive 
enterprises have been unceasingly taking over the reins in the 
most advanced economies. The most important means of pro­
duction a knowledge worker holds is his innovative mind. To
Innovation is the outcome o f inter­
actions that are conducive to the 
exchange o f knowledge.
Knowledge Innovation® refers to 
the creation, evolution, exchange 
and application o f new ideas into 
marketable goods and services for  
(1) the success o f an enterprise, (2) 
the vitality o f a nation ’s economy; 
and (3) the advancement o f society.
(Amidon, 2001)
only spring from creative types working in intellectual isola­
tion. More effective than eccentric geniuses can be team inter­
6 In his book “The Practice of M anagement” (1954) Peter Drucker 
alleged that “In the United States... the class of employees that has 
been growing most rapidly in numbers and proportion is that of 
skilled and trained people.” In the “The Age of Discontinuity” 
(1969) the same author affirmed that the “new industries differ from 
the traditional ‘m odern’ industry in that they will employ predomi­
nantly knowledge workers rather than manual workers” . Later in the 
1990s he wrote in his “Management Challenges for the 21st Cen­
tury” (1999): [While the] most valuable assets of a 20th-century 
company were its production equipment [, the] most valuable asset 
of a 21st-century institution, whether business or nonbusiness, will 
be its knowledge workers and their productivity” . Robert B. Reich, 
former U.S. Secretary of Labor, interviewed by www.industryweek. 
com, has observed that “Globalization has clearly shifted the 
balance of competitiveness toward human talents and skills... The 
core of the new enterprise in the 21st century will be talented people 
capable of quickly assimilating new knowledge and learning from 
one another” (Verespej, 1999).
create value and to 
convert into real 
wealth the next good 
idea, knowledge work­
ers need connections 
and communications. 
In KCs, investments 
in networking are in­
tensively made under 
the assumption that 
innovation, even a 
breakthrough, does not
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actions reconciling restless imagination and intuition, on the 
one hand, and perseverance and experience, on the other. Net­
working produces free exchange of ideas, and allows for shar­
ing concepts and connecting theories, methods and techniques, 
which on its own is inadequate.
Advocates of KCs strongly embrace the idea that it is critical 
to create a culture of shared knowledge. The underlying as­
sumption is that “the more the knowledge you give, the more 
you get back”. At ICL, the computer group, the top manage­
ment argues that “there is a relationship between sharing 
knowledge efficiently and giving time back to individuals. 
Creating knowledge needs time for reflection. And the fact of 
sharing, helps knowledge
creation”. At Unilever, Knowledge management is wrongly
the head of knowledge assumed as a simple extension o f in-
management has defined formation management. In fact, the
as “organisational align- former entails major changes not
ment” the observation 0,1^  to technology but, most o f all,
that “the more an organi- w  f ° rP°™te operations and
, , relationships. sation is connected, the
more it can combine insights and knowledge to get creative 
breakthroughs”.
Unilever’s formula for the game is “alignment 50%, processes 
30%, and IT 20%” (Jackson, 1998). All in all, in a networked 
life innovations happen faster and errors are spotted sooner. 
This seems true in the business field as well as in the academic 
arena7. Whichever way one looks at knowledge management, 
its primary issue is that of people management (Exhibit 2.1).
7 See, for instance, how Andrew Wiles has proved Fermat’s last 
theorem, as the story has been told by Singh, 1997.
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Exhibit 2.1
Twenty questions on knowledge in the organisation: Re­
sults from a survey by Ernst and Young
Twenty questions were addressed to executives within a 
broad industry coverage ranging from aerospace to utilities, 
from small businesses to large corporations. Most respon­
dents (87%) described their businesses as “knowledge-inten- 
sive” and named multiple types of knowledge as being criti­
cal to their competitiveness. Topping the list was “knowl­
edge about customers” , followed by “knowledge about best 
practices or effective processes, the com pany’s own com pe­
tencies and capabilities, and its products or services” . Com­
panies were strongly motivated to improving the intra-or- 
ganisational transfer of existing knowledge and “facilitating 
knowledge through culture and incentives” .
Asked what benefits from more active management of 
knowledge their organisations could gain, respondents often 
said “innovation”. 44% rated themselves “good” or “excel­
lent” in generating new knowledge leveraging on people.
Indeed, “an organisation’s knowledge advantage depends 
most on people” —  respondents believe —  as well as “upon 
people they put the emphasis about their organisations’ abil­
ity to compete based on knowledge” (51% of the respon­
dents).
As for the technology tools they believe offer the greatest 
potential for enhancing the knowledge base of their organi­
sations, respondents said “the most initiatives undertaken to 
date involve internet access and intranet, decision support 
tools, data warehouses, groupware, and directories of resi­
dent experts. But the top three efforts were again people-ori­
ented: i.e., “mapping sources of internal expertise; establish­
ing new roles; and creating networks of knowledge 
workers”. “Ultimately-respondents corroborated-knowledge 
management comes down to people management.
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Exhibit 2.1. continued
Yet they “were fairly evenly split on the question of whether 
it would be valuable to create a new knowledge role, such as 
that of a “chief knowledge officer”, to support people- 
related change. For some, the danger was too great that a 
staff position focused on knowledge would simply translate 
into more bureaucracy. “As sometimes happened with 
Quality —  their argument goes —  executives in charge 
might cease to focus ultimate business goals and pursue 
knowledge management for its own sake”.
Respondents were aware of the major role of culture and 
people’s behaviour as the main vehicles for knowledge 
transfer in the organisation. 54% rated “culture” as the num­
ber one impediment to knowledge transfer and 56% 
“changing people’s behaviour” as the biggest difficulty in 
managing knowledge within the organisation. Also ranking 
in the top impediments to knowledge transfer were: 2nd —  
top management’s failure to signal its importance; 3rd —  the 
lack of shared understanding of strategy or business model, 
and the organisational structure; and 5th —  lack of 
ownership of the problem. The report noted “that all of these 
are ‘people’ issues; technology limitations and non­
standardised processes didn’t make it onto the list. This is 
consistent with respondents’ belief that knowledge 
management must be primarily concerned with people 
management” .
Companies expected additional revenue from new ideas 
thanks to their ability to manage knowledge. 34 percent of 
respondents to the survey mentioned “revenue generated by 
new ideas” as the “most useful measurement of knowledge 
performance” in their organisations.
Source: Ernst and Young Center for Business Innovation 
and Business Intelligence (1997), Twenty Questions on 
Knowledge in the Organization — Survey.
106 KNOWLEDGE CLUSTER
2. KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION: THE 
CULTURE DIVIDE BETWEEN INDUSTRY 
AND KNOWLEDGE CLUSTERS
While ICs aggregate companies primarily concerned with the 
storage and communication of facts, news or data (call them 
information), KCs are characterised by knowledge workers 
engaged in the selection, interpretation and representation of 
information, so as to augment the body of knowledge, the pro­
duction and trade of new ideas.
The cultural divide between ICs and KCs becomes evident 
once the difference between the quality of knowledge and that 
of information is revealed (Table 2.3). The latter is an inert re­
source or a static activity of reading, duplicating and broad­
casting news. The former is a purposeful and dynamic process 
of selection and interpretation of information, and of face-to- 
face interactions through which knowledge is continuously 
recreated and meanings are assigned to facts that otherwise 
would remain unin­
telligible. There is no 
information without 
rendering it explicit.
Conversely, there is 
knowledge although 
not explicit (Sveiby,
1997). This “tacit 
knowledge”, as it is 
called, one can gain 
orally by direct ex­
perience, trial and 
error, whereas ex­
plicit knowledge is 
the outcome of formal and systematic learning transmitted in 
formal and compulsory training courses.
Tacit knowledge is a set o f intui­
tions, insights, hunches that are 
gained through the use o f meta­
phors, pictures, or experiences. It is 
subjective, not easily perceivable 
and expressible, below the level o f 
awareness and is therefore difficult 
to communicate. Explicit knowledge 
is formal and systematic, articulated 
in words and numbers, and found in 
manuals, books, databases and files.
(Nonaka, Takeuchi, 1995; Stacey, 
1996; Stewart, 1997)
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Table 2.3
Distinctive attributes of knowledge and information
KNOWLEDGE INFORMATION
• Mental tools that make sense of 
things.
• An evolving set of beliefs about 
the world.
• Knowledge is a crucial 
production factor that changes 
old routines in new ones.
• Knowledge makes mere 
information valuable.
• A message that reduces 
uncertainty.
Dynamic
Dependent on individual
Tacit
Analogue
Must be recreated
Face-to-face communication
Static
Independent of individual
Explicit
Digital
Easy to duplicate 
Easy to broadcast
Source: Leonard, 1998; Sveiby, 1997.
It may be noted that free, unstructured interpersonal relation­
ships are a common trait to ICs and KCs. This process of so­
cialisation, elucidated by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), incites 
the dissemination of tacit knowledge (see box 1 in Table 2.4). 
It can take place if people within the cluster community are en­
dowed with the ability to understand emotions and motivation 
in other individuals
(empathy), and in build- Tacit knowledge is generated by 
ing and managing rela- workers grappling with everyday 
tionships. Whether in ICs problems and passed on in cafete- 
or in KCs people share rias. Employees communicate with-
these attributes. But there 0M асШа11У ,alkinS■
is a substantial difference. (Micklethwait, Wooldridge, 1997:
In ICs socialisation has 142-143)
mainly served the purpose of creating inter-firm collaboration
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and trading links. Albeit in the early stages of IC formation 
and first development that type of socialisation nurtures a gen­
eral entrepreneurial culture, afterwards the same process takes 
a course of action for which its core audience reflects the inter­
ests of existing businesses and no longer the inner emotions 
and enthusiasm of the individuals per se. Because people not 
companies have knowledge, the consequence of a much 
greater voice given to companies is that immense care is de­
voted to passing information around and between organisa­
tions, instead of creating and disseminating new knowledge in 
the cluster. In Nonaka and Takeuchi’s phraseology, one can 
say that it fails the process of transforming personal knowledge 
into organisational knowledge (see Box 2, Table 2.4 and par. 5 
in this Chapter).
Table 2.4
The knowledge-conversion process 
_______ TACIT_________ to EXPLICIT
TACIT
from
EXPLICIT
SOCIALISATION
Free, unstructured interper­
sonal relationships, developed  
by means o f images or figura­
tive language rather than literal 
language.
Knowledge socialisation gen­
erates new, fresh tacit knowl­
edge.
1
EXTERNALISATION
Conversion o f tacit knowledge in:
•  words and numbers
•  scientific formulae
•  codified procedures
•  universal principles 
Conversion from tacit to ex ­
plicit generates organizational 
knowledge.
2
INTERNALISATION
VEHICLES:
•  oral stories
• metaphors
•  documents manuals
3
COMBINATION
N ew  explicit knowledge is 
generated.
4
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“The key to knowledge creation lies in the mobilization and conver­
sion of tacit knowledge” (Nonaka, Takeuchi, 1995: 56)
Source: Adapted from Nonaka, Takeuchi, 1995; see also Stacey: 
457-458.
KCs are characterised by inter-per- 
sonal relations. Not businesses, but 
individuals are the КС players. 
These include entrepreneurs, aspir­
ing enterpreneurs, researchers, in­
vestors, professional service provid­
ers, and local development officials. 
Entrepreneurs and aspiring entre­
preneurs are the К С ’s core audi­
ence.
The goal o f clustering is not to build 
alliances among firms. It is to build 
relationships among people who 
want to change knowledge into in­
novation and derive business value 
from it.
(National Commission on Entrepre­
neurship, 2001)
Building inter-firm 
alliances is not the 
primary goal of KCs 
in which players are 
individuals, not com­
panies. Their main 
aspiration consists in 
stimulating the ad­
vancement of the 
frontiers of knowl­
edge and putting 
fresh knowledge in 
motion by enabling a 
faster transformation 
of novel ideas into 
new ventures based 
on ‘discontinuous’
(as opposed to ‘incre­
mental’), creatively destructive type of changes (Figure 2.1). 
As will be explained in paragraph 4, a desire to gain access to 
expertise, shared ideas and learning from one another pushes 
each individual in the direction of a group of peers or affinity 
group, or community
of knowledge practice. Communities o f practices and 
The latter constitutes knowledge pools forge knowledge 
the basic form of knowl- clusters. 
edge cluster (as that in
Exhibit 2.2). More complex configurations encompass differ­
ent communities of practice clustering round a knowledge pool
no KNOWLEDGE CLUSTER
as well as separate knowledge pools coming together (National 
Commission on Entrepreneurship, 2001a).
values o f  intangibles 
reach the peak
today’s intangibles 
assets valued as 
liabilities
A
choke point
old innovation  
cycle
content o f  
know ledge and 
intellectual 
capital is 
important
A threshold о 
significance f j .*
new c y c le . /  P .
у  tipping point
context, relationships, 
connectivity are important
Resources
Figure 2.1. How a knowledge cluster works on the threshold of sig­
nificance.
Innovation is knowledge in action that translates something origi­
nating in an experiment (that is, invention) into something newly in­
troduced in the marketplace. It leads to changes in the way of doing 
things that are perceived as positive by those, individuals or organi­
sations, who make use of it.
The innovation life cycle is represented by an S-shaped logistic 
curve consisting of the three distinct phases that —  as is has been 
:llustrated, for example, by Howard, Guile, 1992: 12 —  refer, re­
spectively, to: “emergence (the development of the product or ser­
vice, its manufacturing capabilities, and its place in the market), 
growth (where the product family pervades the market), and 
maturity (where the market is saturated and growth slows)”.
George Kozmetsky has observed that “The life cycles o f economic 
goods and services that are digital in form and heavily dependent on 
knowledge are often short, due to intense product development. As 
new and advanced products are launched on the market, the earlier 
generations become obsolete. Typically, the new generation of a 
product embodies not only upgraded technological and marketing 
characteristics, but also a wider array of attributes. Defining a prod­
uct by the vector of services it delivers, the dimensionality of this
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vector increases all the time. Products become more complex” 
(Voice of the Entovation 100, 2002).
The so called “law of tipping point” postulates that the significance 
of a new round of innovation precedes its momentum.
Exhibit 2.2
The Knowledge Management Cluster®
The Knowledge M anagement Cluster is a community of 
practice founded in the San Francisco Bay Area and Silicon 
Valley in 1998. The focus is knowledge management, enter­
prise collaboration and electronic business communities. The 
KM Cluster sponsors and leads popular events in the Bay 
Area and beyond. Membership in the KM Cluster and its on­
line community is free. The KM Cluster is vendor-agnostic 
and receives sponsorship from participants only.
Source: www.kmcluster.com
Unlike ICs, where formal R&D competencies and facilities are 
unusual because SMEs, the major constituency of those clus­
ters, have neither made it a habit to carry on institutional re­
search nor can afford the costs of setting up a formal organisa­
tion for research (Manimala, 2002), the combination of R&D 
explicit knowledge to
In KCs, knowledge sharing that 
occurs horizontally through the 
moulding o f communities o f practice 
helps cultivate an entrepreneurial 
culture in the research environment, 
unleash business opportunities from  
new ideas, and enhance productivity’ 
o f researchers.
generate a new one 
(Box 4, Table 2.4) is 
an activity accom­
plished in KCs. Re­
searchers as provid­
ers of knowledge par­
ticipate to KCs with 
a great demand and
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need for interacting with users of knowledge in order to share 
financial rewards of their work. Usually, this happens through 
the formation of spin-off R&D companies. To these new ven­
tures, which are the outcome of research, they take part as en­
trepreneurs in partnership with proven business people, risk- 
capital investors and supported by professional service provid­
ers.
3. VALUING INTANGIBLE ASSETS
The overall value of the organisation is judged by the product 
of two types of capital —  the “financial” and the “intellectual” 
capital, the latter cov-
Human capital refers to the capa­
bilities o f the individuals required to 
provide solutions to customers.
ering a number of in­
tangible assets under 
the items of human 
capital and structural 
capital. This, in turn, 
is composed of cus­
tomer capital (that is, 
penetration, coverage, 
loyalty and profitabil­
ity of the customer) and organisational capital
Structural capital refers to the or­
ganisational capabilities o f the or­
ganisation to meet market require­
ments.
(Stewart, 1997)
There is an inevitable 
time lag between the 
decline of today’s 
stars hits and the suc­
cess of tomorrow’s 
businesses. Non-tan- 
gible assets show the 
highest values when 
the economy has 
reached the peak of 
the old innovation 
cycle. But this make people
Collection o f  legal rights — brands, 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks 
— research and development pro­
jects, experience, and trained staff, 
contribute to that category known as 
intangible, hidden assets which can­
not be seen in traditional balance 
sheets. The ability o f transforming 
these assets into wealth creating re­
sources is called “intellectual capi­
tal ”.
blind to novelty.
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A tiny vanguard of individuals, who are giving birth to far- 
reaching changes to come, is overshadowed by the majority 
made contemptuous by the current values of human capital, 
marketing skills, patents and brands, and so on —  when all 
these intangible assets are indeed incoming liabilities. So, a 
stubborn complaisance towards the present endowment of in­
tangibles is an impediment to look outward from the business 
environment of today and forward to the future. On the surface 
it seems that the economy has been doing everything right, but
Intellectual Property is a manage­
ment expression describing that 
collection o f legal rights operating 
throughout the World which protect 
and provide ownership fo r  the inno­
vation and reputation achieved by a 
commercial enterprise. By giving 
them negotiable rights, IPR finan­
cially reward innovators. By allow­
ing the avoidance o f competition, 
then the owner o f IPR do not com­
pete in a price driven market.
(Kelly, 1998)
assets ought to be embodied. The КС-targeted context is that 
of communities of practice and their gathering in knowledge 
pools described in the following paragraph. In that context 
knowledge can produce new routines breaking the old ones, 
and intangible assets can help redefine current businesses re­
building themselves completely. KCs can thus operate at the 
“threshold of the significance” where the importance of a new 
round of innovation precedes its momentum (Figure 2.1).
The threshold of significance coincides with the ‘strait of dis­
continuity’ (region A in Figure 2.1) between two innovation 
cycles where past and future coexist in the present. Collective 
actions by participants in communities of practice and knowl-
in depth that mental­
ity is bringing about 
wrong results, thereby 
condemning the coun­
try to its future decline.
By challenging the pre­
vailing thinking that 
perceives the seeds of 
future prosperity in the 
content of intangibles, 
the efforts made in a 
КС environment are 
addressed to the con­
text in which unseen
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edge pools enforce courses of action that consist first in detect­
ing and then taking 
possession of “choke 
points” (the black dot 
in Figure 2.1) at the 
entrance of the strait, 
so as to open up the 
navigation to start-ups 
in technologically pro­
gressive new firms en­
joying fast sustained fast
Choke points are particular busi­
ness activities that control the flow  
o f profits throughout an industry. 
For example, Microsoft's Windows 
and Intel’s microprocessors are 
choke points in the computing 
industry.
(Gadiesh, Gilbert, 1998). 
growth.
In this respect, KCs exhibit an ever-increasing tension between 
the experience curve, which brings to the capitalisation of the 
existing structure of knowledge, information and behaviour, 
and the learning curve, which evokes the need for unlearning 
or discarding knowledge. The former curve boils down to the 
capitalisation of the
The experience curve describes the 
decrease in cost (increase in effi­
ciency) due to continuous changes, 
experience and scale in the manu­
facturing o f  any product.
existing knowledge, 
information and be­
haviour for which 
there is a need of 
predictability (no 
surprises —  that is, 
“low information 
entropy”8). The lat­
ter is about commu-
The learning curve attempts to 
measure the increase in productivity 
induced by discontinuous changes 
(or “innovativeness”).
nicating unexpected
news (unexpected news is welcome —  that is, “high informa­
tion entropy”) (Gilder, 2002: 104-107).
8 “Information entropy measures the content of a message through 
the news or surprise it contains —  the number of unexpected bits” 
(Gilder, 2002).
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In Figure 2.1 the moment when unexpected, radical changes 
suddenly become a
Expenditures in capital goods have been at the forefront of the 
management thinking in the manufacturing sector. Investing in 
numerical control machine tools and other production tech­
nologies, manufacturers have been able to automate internal 
processes and manage supply chains encompassing one lead­
ing company, specialist suppliers and a multitude of subcon­
tractors. Supply chains have been shaped following the “con­
voy mentality” in which command-and-control bureaucracy 
plays the role of warships protecting production and the mer­
chant fleet. Incidentally, ICs have been suffering from that 
kind of “convoy mentality” that triggers off both a second 
guess each other-syndrome and a propensity for plotting not to 
compete on each other’s home tu rf—  which “stifles entrepre­
neurship and keeps markets closed” (Ozawa, 1999).
At the frontline of a КС there are investments in intangibles 
for networking seemingly disparate parts, each of them being a 
contribution to the formation of knowledge pools. Compared 
to ICs, in KCs resources for capital goods investments are in 
direct competition with those for the formation of knowledge 
pools, and the ratio between the two tends to shift in favour of 
the latter (Figure 2.2). In particular, a КС is strongly commit­
ted to invest in human capital as a primary source of innova­
reality is represented 
by a grey dot at the 
exit if the ‘strait of 
discontinuity’. This 
is the moment of 
critical mass or “tip­
ping point” (Glad- 
well, 2000).
... the world o f the Tipping Point is a 
place where the unexpected becomes 
expected, where radical change is 
more than a possibility: it is —  con­
trary to our expectations —  a cer­
tainty.
(Gladwell, 2000)
4. KNOWLEDGE POOLS
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tion and renewal. Investments are directed in order to develop 
the individuals’ emotional as well as technical intelligence. 
The search for networking and socialisation inclines a КС to 
be focused on how people manage themselves and their rela­
tionships with others. Therefore, a КС cultivates what Rob 
Yeung, a business psychologist, has called “soft skills” , such 
as skills in:
• Awareness: Recognising your own strengths and weak­
ness.
• Regulation: Keeping emotions under control.
• Motivation: Developing optimism and personal drive.
• Reading emotions and motivation in other people (em­
pathy).
• Ability to build and manage relationships.
Figure 2.2. Transition from industry to knowledge clusters.
Soft (emotional) and hard (technical) skills plus traditions 
make up the competencies that permit individuals with differ­
ent experiences and/or educational backgrounds to intertwine 
interpersonal relationships within knowledge pools and com­
munities of practice.
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A knowledge pool (KP) is a context in which connectivity and 
conductivity nurture a sense of community. By driving toward 
the access of everyone to everyone, everything to everything 
and everything to everyone, connectivity creates “circles of ex­
changes” and facilitates “journeys into other disciplines or
Knowledge pools are collective net­
worked intelligence o f knowledge 
workers forging relationships to 
prove the power o f their business 
ideas and to stretch out their capa­
bilities.
Knowledge workers spontaneously 
gather in community o f practices 
into which KPs are articulated.
A community o f practice is a con­
stituency o f many different charac­
ters. This community helps to har­
ness the creativity and promote 
cross fertilization o f ideas necessary 
fo r  innovation.
These communities tend to be cross-boundaries in terms of 
geographical and functional borders, and even by including 
people from rival companies (Exhibit 2.3). Investments in di­
gital technologies are stimulated as technical vehicles to or­
chestrate communities and KPs. KPs foster learning alliances 
between business and academia, and make use of the Internet 
and other electronic media to create a continuous knowledge 
and learning environment.
places” (Wheatley, 
1992: 113). From 
these links arise 
affinity groups or 
communities of 
knowledge prac­
tice which consti­
tute a KP. On the 
other hand, con­
ductivity prevents 
information being 
passively stored 
and makes it a 
fluid process which 
is a source of new 
knowledge and 
also an exchange 
of knowledge.
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Exhibit 2.3
Cross-boundaries, cross-functional and cross-rivalry com­
munities of practice
Cross-boundaries and functional community: the case of 
the world’s first geographic society
The seventeenth-century geographer, Father Vincenzo Coro- 
nelli of the Order of Friars Minor in Venice, was the catalyst 
of a community of practice, the Cosmographic Academy of 
the Argonauts, which, under various forms of participation, 
included princes, illustrious savants all over Europe, mer- 
chant-politicians and explorers who were the vanguard of 
European power. Thanks to geographic information obtained 
inside the community, he improved his cartographic and 
printing workshops in the Franciscan convent in Venice.
Cross-rivalry community: the case of the Asian com­
munities in the semiconductor industry
“Asian communities stimulate horizontal thinking by forming 
a community of competitors. In the semiconductor industry, 
competitive advantage depends on the ability to quickly react 
to markets and plan in research and development. Forming a 
community of practice with companies in the industry enables 
them to keep up with constant change in the marketplace. 
However, organisational commitment and intellectual prop­
erty have become major concerns in building communities 
with competitors”.
Source: Wills, 2001: 9-11; Yiu, Li, 2002: 10-11.
KPs cannot be artificially created or designed. Serendipitous 
accidents and spontaneous actions as well give rise to KPs 
whose single members “behave like swarms of bees or flocks 
of birds; aligning with one another and flying in formation for 
a while, then disrupting their course and exploding into mo­
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mentary confusion” (Tapscott, Lowy, Ticoll, 1998: 89 -  Figure
2.3).
Figure 2.3. Alignment and disruption phases of a free, self-organised 
knowledge pool.
Entrepreneurs endowed with creativity, leadership, initiative 
and communication skills stimulate the KP formation (Exhibit
2.4). They may receive assistance offered by knowledge bro­
kers that develop practical applications of the knowledge pool 
approach (Exhibit 2.5). Different types of actors —  from the 
industry to the academic communities, from the public to the 
private sector —  intervene to discover KPs and supporting 
them, so as to enable swiftly merge the disparate parts in a 
self-organising, self-reinforcing manner. By and large, they 
can be articulated into two main categories: policymakers and 
employees of (quasi) governmental agencies, and free agents 
—  both are addressed in Chapter 3.
A l i g n m e n t
\
D i s r u p t i o n
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Exhibit 2.4
Leonardo Del Vecchio: The “king of spectacles”
Leonardo Del Vecchio is the founder of Luxottica Group, the 
world leader in the design, manufacture and distribution of 
prescription frames and sun glasses in the mid- and premium- 
priced categories.
The company was established in 1961 at the foot of the Dolo­
mites, in Agordo, around the industrial district for spectacles. 
Yet the com pany’s imprinting is quite the opposite of those 
firms embedded in industry clusters. The Luxottica’s eco­
nomic performance has not been depended upon the imitative 
competition emphasised by the way of working within ICs, 
but it has relied on innovative competition, particularly of the 
creatively destructive type, emphasised by Schumpeter.
The propensity to run a race in which a big payoff for his 
innovative effort is secured to the winner has been cultivated 
inside the knowledge pool inspired by Del Vecchio. This pool 
recalls the entrepreneurial spirit of the old-style workshop 
rather than the bureaucracy of the industrial company.
Having been educated at the Brera Academy of Art in Milano 
to study drawing and engraving, Del Vecchio’s profile is that 
of the Renaissance man, a blend of artist and artisan, or, in the 
metaphor of a contemporary business leader, Nobuyuki Idei, 
chairman of Sony (see Exhibit 2.8), that o f an “orchestra con­
ductor who is hearing all the instruments, but is listening for 
the overall sound”. So, the founder and his peers in the KP 
share an entrepreneurial mindset that prevails on the business- 
as-usual attitude. This explains why Luxottica has taken deci­
sions that have routed the existing premises in its industry, 
such as:
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Exhibit 2.4 continued
• Vertical integration instead of outsourcing. Luxottica man­
ages all significant components of the eyewear production 
and distribution process. Vertical integration has enabled 
the company to produce quality eyeglasses with the lowest 
production costs and the highest margins in the industry.
• Direct instead of indirect distribution. Luxottica Group is 
not only a first-class manufacturer but also a pro-active 
market maker. Its distribution network is operative in 
major markets worldwide through 29 wholly-owned 
wholesale subsidiaries. A strong presence in the retail 
business has been achieved through successive, forward- 
looking acquisitions: in 1995 the acquisition of 
LensCrafters, the largest optical retail chain in North 
America; in 1999 that of Bausch & Lomb’s sunglass 
business, which includes brands like Ray-Ban® and 
Revo®; in 2001, Sunglass Hut International, a leading 
sunglass retailer with over 1 900 stores worldwide.
• Stock market quotation to raise accountability and image. 
The paternalism, which is a widespread sentiment in the 
family-owned companies, prevents them to become pub­
licly traded companies. The few who decide to be listed in 
the stock market do this to attract risk capital. Luxottica 
has been an early pioneer among the family companies of 
the industrial districts in Italy in going public internation­
ally (listed on the New York Stock Exchange on January 
23, 1990), and not because cash problems but as a matter 
o f accountability and image.
All in all, under the guidance of the Luxottica’s founder, the 
knowledge pool has been the context where knowledge 
development allowed discovering new business paradigms 
and pursuing opportunities that break away from the familiar 
routines.
Source: Luxottica Group, Annual Report 2001; Luca Goldoni, 
A Far-Sighted Man, Gruppo Luxottica, 2000.
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Exhibit 2.5
The knowledge broker’s approach to the formation of 
knowledge pools
Noesis-CMI AB, a Swedish company, has developed knowl­
edge pool applications by exploring different telematic solu­
tions and a range of combination of telematic tools.
Noesis’s solutions help the development process of the 
knowledge pool as “an interaction and knowledge accumula­
tion environment forming the platform for collaborative ini­
tiatives taken all the way from the early-generation stages of 
a knowledge development initiative and to the final stages of 
delivery of generated products: e.g. in form of publications, 
collaborative products, or learning opportunities, and post- 
‘interaction’ continuation of the knowledge updating proc­
esses” .
Source: www.noesis.se/knowledgepool/
Examples of KP-oriented activities include:
• Helping researchers in academia and business to shape 
the future with new, bright ideas. Anecdotal evidences 
can be found in R&D-intensive companies such as the 
US corporation 3M where “scientists are urged to spend 
15% of their time experimenting and investing in the 
area of their own choice” (Collins, 1999: 73).
• Incubation of spin-off companies that encourages people 
from education and business to become more fully en­
gaged in transforming their implicit knowledge and 
formal education into new businesses. KPs formed by 
new entrepreneurs in biotechnologies, life sciences and 
ICT have contributed to the success of KCs in European 
university towns and regions such as Cambridge and
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Oxford, Amsterdam and Groningen, Helsinki and Tam­
pere, etc.
• Designing novel educational institutions like corporate 
and entrepreneurial universities where education is con­
ceived and managed in innovative ways in comparison 
with conventional education provided by academia 
(Donkin, 1999).
• Facilitating the spontaneous aggregation in KPs of a 
large number of participants as investors in fast-growing 
start-ups. KPs of business angels, seed and venture capi­
talists help to transform a workforce- and payroll-based 
economy into an entrepreneurial one that enhances 
business partnership contracts. They create an economy 
which is on the whole more productive and growth-bi­
ased, since the wealth effect generated by a broad par­
ticipation in a successful process of new company crea­
tion raises consumption. The most striking examples are 
the KCs of the new entrepreneurial economy in the US 
around MIT and Boston, Stanford University and Sili­
con Valley.
KPs are a fertile ground for instigating cognitive conflicts, 
which are “energetic, heated, voluble debate[s] about issues, 
solutions, appointments, strategies” (Hunt, 1998). In fact, KPs 
stimulate cognitive conflicts through conscious conversation, 
which is “a transformational change technique that incorpo­
rates deep dialogue skills of reflecting, deep listening, interact­
ing and connecting”. This technique permits us to recognize 
“differences from commonness” and “commonness from dif­
ferences” (Yiu, Li, 2002). In turn, cognitive conflicts by con­
scious conversation creates, among KP members, a sense of 
harmony which is not soporific.
In a КС there is a common belief that “co-operation and har­
mony are both desirable ends”. However even more wide­
spread is the conviction that “excessive harmony becomes
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soporific: critical faculties are lost and innovation disappears' 
(Hunt, 1998).
Hence KPs are 
contexts that back 
both social cohe­
sion and critical 
faculties, which, 
in turn, ignite in­
tellectual disagree­
ment among the 
participants rather 
than personal an­
tagonism that af­
fective conflicts tend to provoke.
In KPs new ideas are encouraged and confronted. The outcome 
of the energy knowledge pools have been generating through 
the collision of ideas is a “creative abrasion” from which 
unusual insights spring (Leonard, 1998). In this respect KPs 
are far different from the usual groups or teams where 
dissenting voices are not tolerated and each participant feels he 
is under an obligation to share the opinion of the majority. 
“Thus, while groups are excellent vehicles to share knowledge 
and get things done, they are not necessarily stellar at coming 
up with the best ideas. They can impose the kind of groupthink 
that discourages innovation” (Horibe, 2002: 19-20). Whereas 
knowledge sharing and innovation are joined together in the 
context of a KP.
Participants in KPs are subject matter experts who are both in­
dividuals from unconventional backgrounds and people who 
come from more traditional disciplines. They are mixed to­
gether in such a way that each layer comes to terms with the 
strengths and weaknesses of the others. Diverse conversations 
between people of different cultural and social background
KPs incorporate the existence o f a 
compromise between individuality 
and group harmony.
In KPs, confrontation through cog­
nitive conflicts generates new entre­
preneurial energy. “Cognitive” is 
that conflict that stimulates intel­
lectual disagreement rather than 
personal antagonism induced by 
“affective” conflicts.
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facilitate the formation of new ideas and prevent the sharing of
Research has suggested that hetero­
geneous groups outperform homo­
geneous groups on tasks requiring 
creativity because o f the availability 
o f a greater variety o f ideas, per­
spectives, and approaches to 
solving problems... Group members 
must also be willing to share their 
novel, controversial, or unique 
ideas.
(Chatman et al., 1998)
amples of KPs made up of flexible teams are shown in Exhibit 
2.6 .
Exhibit 2.6
Examples of knowledge pools: from the 18th century Lu­
nar Society to the 21st century pools
Lunar Society (Uglow, 2002)
• A group of visionary, multi-talented, non-conformist, 
non-academic practical types in the Birmigham of the mid 
18th century who were driven by curiosity in the workings 
of the natural world.
• Members of the Lunar Society were responsible for a 
brain wave of innovation set in motion by the discover of 
oxygen (Joseph Priestley), the fine-tuning of the steam 
engine (James Watt), the modern commercialisation of 
pottery (Josiah Wedgwood).
• Their achievements include classification of fossils, mak­
ing of telescopes, creating sparks of electricity, and so on.
the same knowledge. 
There is not a leader 
who holds absolute 
authority. The domi­
nant configuration 
resembles flexible 
teams as in soccer 
and tennis doubles 
or in a jazz orchestra 
where each player 
performs a specific 
but flexible role. Ex-
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Exhibit 2.6 continued
Entovation ElOO (Amidon, 2002: Chapter 13)
• A social, business intelligence network for global learning 
formed by 100 and plus theorists and practitioners now 
representing around 50 countries. There are thought lead­
ers, CEOs and senior managers, government officials and 
academic researchers. There are experts in performance 
measures, competitive analysis and alliance strategy, as 
well as in computer/communications technology.
• Group perspectives matter more than individual points. 
All members of the team must widen their perspectives to 
include an understanding of each other’s viewpoints. They 
are examples of knowledge in action.
Skandia Future Centers (www.skandiafuturecenter.com)
• A strategic meeting place, a greenhouse for cross-fertilisa­
tion, interaction and exploration of the brain potential.
• A group of five Future Teams selected from Skandia units 
with the mission of exploring five key driving forces of 
the business environment.
Bosch’s Virtual Generic Factory
• An exploratory learning environment where simulations 
and metaphors are used.
• A virtual collaborative communication space based on IT- 
supported collaborative working technology.
• Web-based extranet, including video conferences and on­
line and off-line collaborative tools.
Xerox Palo Alto Research Centre (www.parc.xerox.com)
• Mixes a few anthropologist and artists with computer 
scientists whose work is central to the company.
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Exhibit 2.6 continued
IC2 Institute (www.ic2.org)
• A catalyst for local entrepreneurship and a broker bring­
ing diverse interests together to support the region’s eco­
nomic growth.
• An entrepreneurial-minded organisation that has contrib­
uted to Austin’s economy through new ideas and on-the- 
ground actions including technology transfer programs, 
incubator development, partnerships, network facilitation, 
and the reshaping of the local perception of entrepreneurs 
as essential profession open to those from all walks of 
life.
Fabrica-The Benetton Research and Development Com­
munication Centre (www.benetton.com)
• Supports the creative development of young artist-re- 
searchers from all over the world and different educa­
tional backgrounds.
International University of Entrepreneurship (www.iue-
masters.com/nieuw)
• A knowledge pool approach to the partecipation of learn­
ers to the formation of learning opportunities.
5. THE PROCESS OF KNOWLEDGE 
CREATION
Knowledge creation and organisational knowledge creation are 
the means of “breaking away [companies] from the past and 
moving them into new and untried territories of opportunity” 
(Nonaka, Takeuchi, 1995: 4).
Companies belonging to ICs are used to making things. There­
fore, their trading activity is mainly one of exporting and im­
porting atoms (i.e., physical objects). Producing more hard­
ware than software, more machines and apparel than informa­
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tion, companies hang on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
their carriers to deliver atoms (Negroponte, 1995).
People who coalesce in KCs are key players in generating a 
new kind of business organisation: the “knowledge-creating 
company”. This company adopts ways of working traditionally 
associated with education. By absorbing intellectual capital 
and, thereby, moving its barycentre from material to intangible 
processes, the knowledge-creating company (KCC) resembles 
a training and research
Learning is the increase in the 
amount o f response rules that are 
the result either o f existing premises 
or o f new ones.
institute which learns 
and encourages learning 
in its people (Handy, 
1995), but of a genera­
tive rather than an adap­
tive type. In the words 
of Nonaka, Takeuchi
Generative learning increases the 
amount o f pro-active responses op­
posed to reactive-responses.
(1995: 44), the first kind
of learning “is establishing new premises (i.e., paradigms, 
schemata, mental tools, or perspectives) to override the exist­
ing ones”, which are influenced by past experience.
Because an organisation cannot create knowledge on its own, 
KCCs encourage the
initiative of their peo­
ple and provide a 
shared context (say, 
community of prac­
tice and KP) in which 
individuals can inter­
act with each other. 
“Team members —
Organisational knowledge creation 
is the [generative-] learning com­
pan ies’ ability to create new knowl­
edge through systems, routines, data 
within an organisation which are 
only imperfectly understood by any 
individual member.
(Kay, 1995)
argue Nonaka and
Takeuchi —  create new points of view through dialogue and 
discussion. This dialogue can involve considerable conflict and 
disagreement, but it is precisely such conflict that pushes 
employees to question existing premises and to make sense of
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their experience in a new way. This kind of interaction facili­
tates the transformation of personal knowledge into organisa­
tional knowledge”, which is new knowledge KCCs employ in 
order to reconfigure their business relationships according to 
the market needs, so as to conceive commercially valuable in­
novations. (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4. Transformation of personal into organisational knowl­
edge.
Source: Adapted from Nonaka, Takeuchi, 1995.
In view of the above, the KCC’s work environment is a living 
organism rather than a machine for processing information, 
within which intensive and laborious interactions among team 
members allow each individual to learn from others as well as 
to acquire knowledge from outside. In such a way knowledge 
is created, and organisational knowledge creation stems from 
the conversion of tacit into explicit knowledge (Nonaka, Ta­
keuchi, 1995).
6. COMMERCIALISATION OF KNOWLEDGE
Debra Amidon, a pioneer in the field of knowledge manage­
ment, has defined innovation as “knowledge in action” and has
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simplified the innova- Knowledge is the content and inno-
tion process into vation is the process whereby we put
knowledge creation, knowledge to work.
knowledge conversion (Amidon, 2001) 
and knowledge com­
mercialisation.
Knowledge creation and conversion enable KCCs to assign 
meaning to data and thereby generate ideas to sell in the mar­
ketplace. Knowledge is
transmitted to markets Marketable knowledge is the ulti-
through a variety of mate organisational capability.
ideas embodied in reci- (Reid 2002-4)  
pes, formulas and tech­
niques whose common denominator is their endless capacity to 
rearrange physical objects from low to high value configura­
tions (Exhibit 2.7). There are different types of knowledge 
markets like those listed below:
• Know-how: skills in managing practical processes, 
which means selling the knowledge of how information 
must be processed.
• Know-what: knowledge about facts —  that is, what sort 
of information is needed.
• Know-why: explanatory science —  that is, why a given 
type of information is needed.
• Know-where: where information can be founded to 
achieve a specific result.
• Know-when: by what time information is needed.
• Know-who: knowledge about socially related under­
standings (van der Speck, Spijkervet, 1997; Reid, 2001: 
5).
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Exhibit 2.7
Examples of transformation of things from low to high
value configurations
• From silicon used primarily to make glass to its use as a 
crucial component in microchips and optical fibers.
• From wood-intensive campfires to clean, efficient natural 
gas to cook food.
• From heavy earthenware pots to ultra thin plastics and 
lightweight aluminium cans.
Source: Bailey, 2000.
Knowledge commercialisation presents four main characteris­
tics. The first is that the producer of knowledge unlike the 
manufacturer of a physical product still keeps it once knowl­
edge has been surrendered in exchange for money. This raises 
two points:
• From one point of view, knowledge goods are, in the 
economic termonology, “nonrival”, that is they can be 
used by their ven­
dors and buyers 
simultaneously.
“Knowledge —  as 
knowledge experts 
say —  is not given 
up in exchange 
for money in the 
same way as a 
cream cake. You 
can’t eat your cake and have it, but you can sell your 
knowledge and keep it” (Hampdem-Tumer, Trom­
penaars, 1994). Whereas, things made up by mass or en­
ergy are “rival” in that they cannot be used by two or 
more persons at once (Bailey, 2000).
Paul Römer, the founding-father o f  
the new growth theory, divides the 
economy into ideas or “nonrival” 
goods, which can be stored in a bit 
string, and things or “rival” goods 
with mass, or energy. For example, 
cars are rival goods; recipes, fo r­
mulas and techniques used to rear­
range things are nonrival goods.
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• From another point of view, knowledge is not a limited- 
resource market like agriculture, mining and bulk goods, 
whereby a fixed-resource constraint is put on their trad­
ing. Knowledge markets are not affected by a short sup­
ply of ideas, being infinite the potential for finding new 
ones.
The second aspect is that, compared to physical products, the 
exploratory phase of knowledge-creation —  think about the 
design and tooling of a new chip, a new drug, or a new gene 
therapy —  is very expensive because it needs a big initial in­
vestment, but the production cost of copy in terms of knowl­
edge-intensive prod­
ucts or services be- Knowledge is a near-endless-re- 
comes cheaper and source market, not subdued to the 
cheaper, almost nil. iron law o f scarsity and diminishing 
Therefore, knowl- returns. 
edge-based businesses
benefit from increasing returns, or decreasing costs (Exhibit 
2.8)9. As the market grows, returns can increase enormously.
9 Since there are many cases of increasing returns that seem irre­
versible, economists have been inclined to call them “downward 
shifts of the supply curve rather than increasing returns” (Kindleber- 
ger, 1963: 101).
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Exhibit 2.8
Sony’s chairman on the law of increasing returns
The most striking examples of benefits reaped from increasing 
returns are those KCs that are at the crossroad of industries 
like personal computers, consumers electronics, information, 
telecom, music and films, education. The statement of Sony’s 
Chairman herein quoted is a case in point. But the same law is 
applicable to other KCs that encompass industries ranging 
from apparel and sweaters (e.g. KCs around Benetton in 
Treviso, Italy) and personal care to pharmaceutical producers 
and health services (e.g. KCs around Karolinska hospital in 
Stockholm).
Nobuyuki Idei, Chairman of Sony, says:
“The law governing the manufacturing industry is a law of di­
minishing returns. That is, at some point it costs more to pro­
duce and sell the next widget than you can justify economi­
cally.
But technology has created exceptions. The most obvious is 
digital content such as software, where the marginal cost of 
producing the next copy of the product is near zero. That phe­
nomenon brings about a process known as “increasing re­
turns.” Microsoft has most famously proved this to be true, 
but it applies to any popular software platform.
There’s also an exception in the manufacturing business. With 
semiconductors, including memory chips and microproces­
sors, the cost of creating a new chip design and factory is 
enormous but the cost of making each chip after the first is 
small”.
Source: Nobuyuki Idei, 2000.
Third, producers have the power to charge high enough prices 
to pay for the exploratory phase (Klein, 1996). In fact, knowl­
edge markets are somewhat removed from the competitive end
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of the scale that measures if and how great an influence pro­
ducers can exert on prices. These markets are characterised by 
imperfect, or monopolistic competition (Robinson, 1960: 222- 
245) —  that is, a contextual presence of elements of competi­
tion and monopoly, which are intermingled in a degree that 
varies widely, depending on both the heterogeneity of what is 
on offer by the monopolistic competitors and the preference 
customers show for one firm over another. Indeed, heterogene­
ity is a distinctive feature of knowledge markets. In most of 
these, competitors are completely differentiated once they cre­
ate ideas that modify the functions performed by finite re­
sources so as to make available to the potential buyers a 
broader spectrum of possible solutions.
Fourth, imperfection of competition upstream, at the stages of 
knowledge-creation and production, fosters more competition 
downstream at the point of distribution. End-users can profit 
not only from the availability of more choices and a wider va­
riety of outlets that enable them to spend their money some­
where else, but also from significant price reductions which 
competing vendors can sustain from increasing market growth.
7. INDUSTRY CLUSTER AND 
KNOWLEDGE CLUSTER MODELS 
OF ENTREPRENEURIAL MOTION
As John Milton-Smith (2000), an academic member of the 
International Forum of Entrepreneurship10, suggests, entrepre­
neurship has a broader meaning. It is, he argues, “a description
10 The International Forum of Entrepreneurship is an international 
network of academics, practitioners and businesspeople conceived 
and promoted by the Enterprise Research and Development Centre 
at the Business School at the University of Central England in Bir­
mingham, UK.
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of certain behaviours, skill and attributes which corelate 
closely with innovation and dealing with situations involving 
high levels of uncertainty, competitiveness and complexity. 
Entrepreneurs do not necessarily conduct an independent busi­
ness, but they do create new value or new organisational capa­
bility. Whereas corporate-style managers and bureaucrats —  
the sort of people you find in traditional big businesses, gov­
ernment agencies and universities —  are primarily concerned 
with function, position, power, territory and status, the entre­
preneur is typically characterised by creativity, enterprise and 
growth”.
An entrepreneur is an independent agent who adopts a set of 
rules, consistent with a ‘search-and-satisfying’ type of behav­
iour, in order to reach goals such as growth and profitability of 
his or her company. In doing this, the entrepreneur is driven by 
curiosity and an instinct for exploration —  a combination in 
which intentional action and the faculty of making lucky and 
unexpected finds by accident sit side by side. Somehow, 
entrepreneurs are the incarnation in the real world of the 
characters of a fairy story, “The Three Princes of Serendip” 11, 
who “were always making discoveries, by accidents and sagac­
ity, of things they were not in quest o f ’. They accept that 
everything is a matter of degree —  that is, they “expect every 
‘well-formed’ statement to be not true or false, but true more 
or less or false somewhat” . In other words, they believe that 
“A and not-A holds to any degree” (Kosko, 1994). By the way, 
this logic, which is of Buddhist origin and has been defined as 
“multivalent” or “fuzzy”, in contrast to Aristotle’s “bivalent” 
logic, marks the most distant frontier between entrepreneurs 
and those scientists, mostly from the Western culture, who
11 Serendip is an ancient name of Ceylon. It seems that the word 
serendipity was coined by Horace Walpole, who formed it on the 
title of that fairy story (The Wordsworth Dictionary of Phrase and 
Fable: 981).
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deem that fuzzy logic is wrong and pernicious, notwithstand­
ing the number of innovations that originated from it.
Therefore, to find their own way, entrepreneurs look for many 
windows and take quick decisions, albeit sometime they need 
to move slowly towards their target. Eventually, they have to 
see which way the wind is blowing.
Small businesses have been depicted as the epitome of entre­
preneurship, and entrepreneurial communities have been de­
fined as those communities in which small business founders 
have formed a free, self-catalysing network whose members 
act like a flock of birds, aligning with one another and flying in 
formation, as shown in Figure 2.5 Indeed, in these com­
munities (often also referred to as “industry clusters”) entre­
preneurial moves can be identified that resemble the motion of 
a flock of birds flying, as described in the model created by 
Craig Reynolds and revived by Gary W. Flake (Flake, 1999).
The routine entrepreneurs:
• convoy mentality;
• fully sheltered;
• the view is blocked by the neighbors.
7
avoiding 
flying 
too close 
to others
copy
near
neighbors
move towards 
center of 
perceived 
neighbors
attempt to 
maintain 
clear 
view
Figure 2.5. Industry cluster-type model of entrepreneurial motion. 
Source: Adapted from Flake, 1999.
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Figure 2.5 shows how the model works for small businesses in 
the IC context. In the figure this context is portrayed as a flock 
of birds. The bird framed in black represents a new, small 
business founder. His or her movements are articulated in four 
sequential steps:
•  Step 1 is the differentiation movement. As each bird 
avoids flying too close to another in the flock in order to 
reduce the chance of a mid-air collision, so the new 
founder attempts to make his or her business distinct 
from the others in the cluster.
•  Step 2 is concerned with copying or imitation. After a 
successful start-up phase, the new company’s founder 
conforms to the group’s convoy mentality. Replicating 
the movements of the neighbours, the entrepreneur now 
follows the general direction of the group. The prevail­
ing pattern of competition is that of the imitative compe­
tition close to perfect competition, which requires a 
large number of firms in an industry. Overall, the out­
come of the small business is a bounded performance in 
terms of limited growth prospects, albeit occurring with 
a lasting profitability —  which is however judged as a 
successful accomplishment or even a “cause for celebra­
tion” .
• A move towards the centre constitutes Step 3. Protec­
tion reinforces the imitation move. A defensive perspec­
tive incites the small business founder to take position at 
the centre of the perceived cluster/flock where there is 
the least exposure to external threats. However, in taking 
this shelter, his or her view is obstructed by neighbours. 
Deprived of a range of vision, the entrepreneur will lose 
the capacity for differentiation that requires lateral 
movements. This prompts the small business founder to 
move to:
•  Step 4  in which he or she attempts to maintain a clear 
view of future prospects.
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These entrepreneurial movements explain why most businesses 
start and remain small, even after many years of trading. For 
them, the growth period never occurs, or else it comes too 
slowly and too late, sometimes even as a precursor to the death 
of the business.
The IC is a living system in which a company can survive, 
fitting its actions to the cluster’s average behaviour and estab­
lished practices. But there is a trade off between pursuing a 
comfortable state of equilibrium, which maintains the inde­
pendence of the founder’s small company and provides eco­
nomic support for his or her family, and enhancing the foun­
der’s entrepreneurial capacity and entrepreneurial opportuni­
ties. Dumping down both of them is the price paid for self- 
preservation and maintaining this unimaginative approach and 
the status quo. Therefore, the small business does not trans­
form into growth company.
There are, in contrast, small businesses that from the start enter 
into a rapid high-growth phase and others that ‘morph’ into 
growth companies. These are the “Entrepreneurial Growth 
Companies” (EGCs). The fertile ground for their incubation, 
start-up and development is that of the КС. Figure 2.6 shows 
the main differences between the entrepreneurial movement of 
high-growth businesses 
in KCs and that of tra­
ditional small firms in 
ICs. Whereas Table 2.5 
gauges the importance 
placed on new and 
emerging entrepreneu­
rial companies in terms 
of new jobs and innovation they generate.
KCs fuel the new entrepreneurial 
economy —  that is the formation o f  
fast-growing start-up companies in 
every economic sector from high 
tech to manufacturing. These are the 
main engines o f wealth and job  
creation.
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Figure 2.6. Knowledge cluster-type model of entrepreneurial motion 
(top) compared to industry cluster-type.
Table 2.5
The importance of new and emerging entrepreneurial growth 
companies: The “two-thirds” change agents
Small entrepreneurial companies cover a small proportion 
(5-15% ) of all U.S. businesses. Yet data collected over the last 
20 years show that these companies:
• Create two-thirds of net new jobs.
• Are responsible for more than two-thirds of the innovation in 
the economy (and 95% of all radical innovations created since 
World W ar II).
• Account for two-thirds of the differences in economic growth 
rates among industrialized nations._________________________
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• Regularly collaborate with other companies. Overall, fifty-six 
percent of fast-growth companies worked collaboratively du­
ring the past three years. Twenty-nine percent of the collabo­
rations focused on new product development, while 37% 
sought to improve existing products. These partnerships were 
not one-time affairs.
Source: National Commission on Entrepreneurship, 2002c, 2002d; 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers’s survey of Am erica’s fastest growing 
companies (http://www.barometersurveys.com/).
For high-growth business, the following steps are discernible:
• Step 1. Audacity. “To win a lottery you need to buy a 
ticket” . Entrepreneurship is a small business “with a 
lottery ticket attached” —  reports the National Commis­
sion on Entrepreneurship, quoting Amar Bhide, who has 
written seminal papers on the origin and evolution of 
EGCs. EGC founders have bold and ambitious aims. 
Identifying business opportunities different from those 
already available in the market is not enough. Compared 
with small business founders, their vision is much more 
audacious. EGC founders aspire to create companies 
whose course of growth is well-defined from the begin­
ning —  often at an annual rate of 15 to 20%. Therefore, 
they capitalise on opportunities convertible into market­
able products and services that offer potential productiv­
ity gains higher than those selected by small business 
founders (National Commission on Entrepreneurship, 
2001b). The prevailing pattern of competition is that of 
the innovative competition resembling a race in which 
the winner takes all not because he obtains a decisive 
advantage, being, eventually, the first-mover in the 
game, but because he can deliver a plainly superior 
product (Liebowitz, 2002).
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• Step 2. Leadership rather than experience in their 
fields marks a difference. In pursuing their audacious 
goals, EGC founders cannot act as followers who imi­
tate close neighbours. To run fast and win they have to 
be forerunners. This does not necessarily mean that they 
have to be experienced experts in their fields nor that 
their companies must be based on breakthrough tech-
Entrepreneurs with little expertise 
in their fields have started many of 
the most successful entrepreneurial 
companies.
EGCs often are not the ones that 
first make the great discovery. 
Rather, they tend to make smaller 
innovations in products or proc­
esses and then perform exceedingly 
well. As companies fund research 
and make discoveries, they tend to 
develop breakthrough technologies.
(National Commission on Entrepre­
neurship, 2001a)
by the motivation to share, whereby collaborating with 
other firms instead of going it alone becomes the es­
sence of their business —  as found in a new survey of 
America’s fastest growing companies from Pricewater- 
house Coopers, which estimates that collaboration has 
generated bottom line benefits, accounting for nearly a 
quarter of current revenue (Table 2.7).
• Steps 3 and 4. Surfing the edge o f  chaos. EGC founders 
create and manage tension between order and chaos. 
The success of growth companies is dependent on a 
ceaseless process of revitalization that allows for fluid, 
open boundaries and new connections. Between the
nologies. The clar­
ity of leadership is 
their distinctive­
ness. In contrast 
to small business 
founders, who are 
catalysed by a 
cluster, entrepre­
neurs in EGCs 
head for new 
cluster formation 
and are thus cata­
lysts of small 
business growth 
and development. 
They are driven
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equilibrium of an orderly cluster and the disequilibrium 
caused by a fundamental disturbance that explodes in 
disruption, surfing the edge of chaos maybe uncomfort­
able but necessary for fast-growing new businesses.
In the remaining paragraphs we will seek to unfold the argu­
ments that contribute to making a КС environment suitable in 
the formation of EGCs.
8. ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE DOMAIN
Entrepreneurship is the process by which knowledge inputs are 
changed into knowledge outputs —  i.e., into novel combina­
tions of factors of production in order to offer new solutions to 
customers in the mar­
ketplace. This process An entrepreneur's passion fo r  what 
requires passion, com- he or she does is at the heart o f the 
petencies, and a pow- entrepreneurial process.
erful skill to sell (Ex- (S m ilo re ta l, 2001; Smilor, 2001a) 
hibit 2.9).
The imperative of selling conflicts with the traits of talented 
scientists, researchers, graduates and students. An abundance 
of talented people does not automatically produce a high-per- 
"orming knowledge-based business community. World-class 
researchers are not often world-class entrepreneurs.
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Exhibit 2.9
Selling: A powerful skill that every entrepreneur has to 
have
“Really great entrepreneurs argues Ray Smilor, President of 
the Foundation for Enterprise Development, a La Jolla, Cali­
fornia —  first sell themselves to investors and others, then 
they sell the concept of their company to employees, then 
they sell their product or service to customers. And really 
[great] entrepreneurs begin to see selling not as this hated 
skill, but as a skill that’s essential to their success and the 
success of their company. A way to make selling less painful 
is to see it for what it really is. You’re not forcing something 
on a person that they don’t want; you’re helping somebody 
buy what they really need. So the first step is to change your 
frame of mind about the skill of selling. Second, I think it’s 
important [to be an] exceptional listener —  to take time to 
listen to what the other party has to say, to what their genuine 
need is, to what the problem is. Then shape a response that 
solves the problem or meets the need. Third, I think [you 
need to] actually practice selling —  get out there and get 
better at listening, responding and probing —  those kinds of 
things make this most hated skill become quite natural”.
Source: Ray Smilor interviewed by Joelle Wolstein, “Why 
you do what you do as an entrepreneur —  and why we need 
you”, Entrepreneurs.com, 07 June 2001.
To encourage entrepreneurship in the knowledge domain, it 
makes sense investing both in raising entrepreneurial education 
among individuals with a scientific background as well as 
among people with a managerial and humanistic background, 
and melding these groups together in order to engender knowl­
edge-based start-ups. From the self-employed to people work­
ing within organisations there is a diverse range of individuals 
displaying entrepreneurial attributes. Disparate factors feed the
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process of knowledge-based company creation. A list of this 
factors would include:
• Cultural roots, heritage, knowledge, skills, and experi­
ence enjoyed by individuals. They hold a greater value 
than capital equipment.
• Entrepreneurial spirit among youth, enhanced by an 
entrepreneurial education and the process of learning 
about how running a business at a young age.
• Students and graduates from business and technology 
schools, from science and art faculties, who are prepared 
to cooperate in the setting up of EGCs.
• Business agent that catalyse KPs. They allow a better 
matching between scientists and technologists with 
product and process ideas, and managers, financial and 
marketing specialists able to commercialize those ideas. 
Moreover, business agents are focused on marketing and 
sales, and, therefore, they maintain daily contacts with 
growing businesses.
• Mental tools for exercises in market foresight. For in­
stance, time to-market techniques and market-focused 
technology audit 
of research ac­
tivities in order 
to seize the win­
dow of opportu­
nity. As experts 
say, “Coming too 
early the spin-off 
burns too much 
cash. Coming too late others have already taken up mar­
ket positions”.
• Partnerships between would-be entrepreneurs and estab­
lished companies as “launching customers” (Exhibit
2.10). In particular, thanks to links with companies
Market foresight is the ability o f dis­
covering future markets by devel­
oping sustainable future visions and 
not merely projecting forw ard fo re­
casts. Whereas market watch is the 
ability o f matching innovative solu­
tions with problems detected in the 
actual markets.
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operating in different industries, start-ups can take a 
broader view of what they are going to have to learn —  
which frequently come from outside its own industry. 
There are evidences that a good management of in-clus­
ter and cross-cluster alliances raises the start-up survival 
rate up to 90% after five years.
Exhibit 2.10
The Dutch Twinning Scheme
One example of how high-innovative start-ups have access 
to external business partners is the Dutch Ministry of Eco­
nomic Affair’s Twinning Scheme, a mission for stimulating 
people to become entrepreneurs in the field of ICT and help­
ing them grow their companies to become world-class.
Twinning means launching start-ups that are not isolated but 
networked to Dutch and American industrialists in KCs, 
with a proven track record in the ICT industry. Leading ICT 
entrepreneurs across the world shape a Twinning Network 
that offers starters the best coaching and support available. 
The Twinning Network partners support starters with 
knowledge, contacts, experience, and help also write 
business plans.
The business idea has to meet four basic entry criteria:
1. It must be an ICT related idea (e.g., related to Content 
and Software, Communications/TV and Services, Public 
Network Equipment, Components or User Equipment).
2. It should be innovative (e.g., a new product/service, a 
new application of an existing product/service, oi a com­
bination of these).
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Exhibit 2.10 continued
3. One example of how high-innovative start-ups have ac­
cess to external business partners is the Dutch M inistry of 
Economic Affair’s Twinning Scheme, a mission for 
stimulating people to become entrepreneurs in the field 
of ICT and helping them grow their companies to 
become world-class.
4. Twinning means launching start-ups that are not isolated 
but networked to Dutch and American industrialists in 
KCs, with a proven track record in the ICT industry. 
Leading ICT entrepreneurs across the world shape a 
Twinning Network that offers starters the best coaching 
and support available. The Twinning Network partners 
support starters with knowledge, contacts, experience, 
and help also write business plans.
5. The product or service must be exportable, with the po­
tential for high growth in international markets.
6. The company needs to be a start-up (that is, in the 
process of developing or commercialising its product/ 
service).
The evaluation process takes 5 -7  weeks. Twinning Network 
partners and other renowned ICT experts are the business 
plans assessors. An interview with the candidate does assess 
his capabilities and commitment. Partners and experts within 
the Twinning Network sign a confidentiality agreement with 
the candidate.
Twinning centres offer housing and coaching (through the 
Twinning Network) to the start-ups admitted to the scheme. 
The Twinning Centres have also close links with universi­
ties, research institutes, and local ICT businesses. Rents are 
around market level, and typical duration of stay is between 
2 -3  vears.
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Exhibit 2.10 continued
All parties involved are embedded in Twinning Virtual Com­
munity, a KP that is an Internet meeting place for entrepre­
neurs, financiers, support organisations and coaches. It offers 
the opportunity to join in discussion forums on ICT related is­
sues and to apply for Twinning support. The Twinning Start 
Fund and the Twinning Growth Fund provide finance to the 
starters. Twinning Start Fund is a seed fund that provides 
convertible loans or equity to ICT start-ups. Twinning 
Growth Fund со-invests in ICT companies in the growth 
phase alongside private sector capital firms.
• Networks made up of business firms experienced in 
market foresight, local seed capital funds and wealthy 
individuals (“business angels”). This type of collabora­
tion increases both the amounts of funds to develop a 
sufficiently large portfolio of pre-start-up organisations 
and the ability to transform inventions into marketable 
innovations. The thicker the networks, the richer the op­
portunities the new businesses can exploit.
9. THE TECHNOLOGY ENTREPRENEUR
The entrepreneur who typifies the knowledge-based entrepre­
neurship is the technology entrepreneur, or technopreneur. He 
or she is, usually but not always, a scientist or researcher, who, 
being accustomed to work with industry, combines research, 
creativity, entrepreneurship, and willingness to take calculated 
risks.
“The word ‘technopreneur’ states Milton-Smith, is of recent 
origin. It was probably first used in Singapore in the early to 
mid-1990s as a way of highlighting the need to generate more 
entrepreneurship in the technology sector, as opposed to the
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A technopreneur is a person who 
effectively brings together research 
talent, venture capital, new business 
concepts and management skill in 
order to create commercially suc­
cessful technological innovations or, 
alternatively, uses technology to ef­
fectively leverage innovations.
(Milton-Smith, 2002)
more traditional areas 
in which entrepreneurs 
operate, such as prop­
erty development, re­
tailing and trade. There 
was certainly a wide­
spread view that tech­
nological entrepreneur­
ship in Asia —  not just 
Singapore —  had lagged
behind Europe and the United States of America” . Thus, in re­
cognising the need to spur technopreneurs, the Malaysian gov­
ernment launched the Technopreneur Development Flagship 
programme in November 2001, and the Technopreneurs Asso­
ciation of Malaysia was established (Exhibit 2.11).
Exhibit 2.11
Excerpts from the Technopreneurs Association of Malay­
sia
Definitions of “technopreneur” and “digital economy”
• “Technopreneur” means a person who uses the application 
of digital technology to industrial or commercial objec­
tives or one who organizes, operates, and assumes the risk 
for a business venture in the Digital Economy.
• “Digital Economy” is an economy based on the digitisa­
tion of information and the respective information and 
communications infrastructure including the technology 
therein involved.
Categories of membership
• A “Member” refers to Technopreneurs and individuals 
who are directly involved in the Digital Economy and a 
fee-paying member of the Association.
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Exhibit 2.11 continued
• An “Associate M ember” refers to all Individuals who are 
indirectly involved or interested in the promotion of the 
Digital Economy and the local Technopreneurial industry 
and includes Venture Capitalists, Investors, Educationists, 
Government or Semi-Government personnel, personnel of 
Non-Governmental bodies and other interested parties as 
determined by the Council from time to time.
• An “Honorary Member” means Individuals who have 
made a significant contribution to the Digital Economy, 
leaders of the Information and Communications Technol­
ogy and the Technology industry as well as those whose 
experience and guidance have promoted the local Techno­
preneurial spirit.
• A “Student M ember” means registered students of Institu­
tions of Higher Learning pursuing a Diploma, Degree or 
Postgraduate qualification related to the Digital Economy.
Among the aims for which the Association is established,
there are:
• To provide an organised and unified voice and to advance 
the interests and well being of local Technopreneurs.
• To provide means for considering questions affecting 
Technopreneurs and to initiate, watch over, petition and 
take whatever action as may seem desirable in relation to 
legislative or other measures affecting Technopreneurs 
and the Digital Economy.
• To establish a liaison and to co-operate with government 
departments and educational and other appropriate insti­
tutions or bodies both national and otherwise concerned 
with or interested in the development of Technopreneurs.
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Exhibit 2.11 continued 
Mentor Program
The Mentor Program is designed to give participants the op­
portunity to receive guidance and advice from a pre-assigned 
‘m entor’ for a period of one year. For the purpose of this 
program, a year will consist of 4 group meetings with the 
mentor and will be heretofore classified as “a cycle” and will 
last approximately 10-12 months. Mentors will be requested 
to attend meetings and give guidance and advice to partici­
pants on the specific functional area to which they are 
charged. Mentors may also provide guidance and advice 
through responses to the e-mail or discussion board queries 
of the participants in their assigned group.
Source: www.technopreneurs.net.my
What does technopreneurship really mean? To answer this 
question the characteristics of the founders of technology- 
based firms (TBFs) must be analysed. They appear to be:
• Familiarity with the academic world.
• Seizing opportunities for launching start-ups in techno­
logically progressive new firms enjoying sustained fast 
growth, mostly in the fields of ICT, electronics, com­
puters and software, biotechnology, life sciences, and 
environmental technologies.
• A technical-biased culture pushing their ventures into a 
tiny niche market where the survival rate is low.
• Lack of a business vision and inadequate knowledge of 
competitive forces in the market.
Findings such as those exhibited in Table 2.6 corroborate the 
traits sketched above.
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Table 2.6
Technology entrepreneurship in the software industry of 
Campania region, Italy
• Conditions for start-up.
Technology discontinuity and high market growth rate.
• Type of founder.
Academics, graduate, individual with academic experience.
• Culture of the entrepreneur.
Technical.
• Type of market.
Niche.
• Survival rate.
Low.
• Conditions for survival and growth.
Acquisition of managerial competencies.
• Conditions for escaping the niche boundaries.
Relationships with large firms and reinforcing relationships with
the technical environment.
Source: Adapted from Bellini, Zollo, 1997.
Besides, a survey, which was made in the field of ICT start-ups 
under the umbrella of the Dutch Twinning Scheme (Exhibit
2.10), suggests that TBFs suffer from a marketing and sales 
gap (Table 2.7) that hampers the transformation of innovative 
technology into marketable innovation. This concern has been 
highlighted by a focus group project carried out in Europe by 
the International Association of Science Parks (IASP). Support 
to marketing and sales, not research activities, heads the list of 
the attributes that motivate TBFs to remain in a science park 
(IASP, 1998). The importance of the ‘ecology’ of the business 
environment in which these companies are situated thereby 
increases considerably.
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Table 2.7
Needs for marketing and sales services relative to technology 
services perceived by potential entrepreneurs, starters and 
growers (needs for technology services = 100)
Potential
entrepreneurs Starters
Growers
Perceived needs 230 175 154
Needs not met 470 200
Source: Netherlands’s ICT Twinning Centres and Investment Funds, 
Booz-Allen & Hamilton and Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Hence the conditions for survival and growth of technology- 
based entrepreneurship are heavily influenced by the techno- 
preneur’s attainment of managerial competencies, his or her 
networking capability in the business environment and, in 
particular, the development of both market relationships and 
embedded ties (i.e., close or special relationships) with large 
companies.
Geoffrey Moore (1999), Chairman of the Chasm Group and a 
venture partner at Mohr, Davidow Ventures, has drawn up a 
model that has much to say about forward signals that help 
technopreneurs to bridge the gap or “chasm” between early 
adopters of a new-brand technology and pragmatic buyers in 
order to reach the lucrative mainstream market (Figure 2.7).
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Figure 2.7. M oore’s model of technology adoption life cycle.
Source: Adapted from Moore, 1999.
Technology-based start-ups strive to create high-tech products 
tied to the spirit and culture of their potential buyers. So, the 
solutions they offer have to be not only functional and conven­
ient, but also stylish 
and attractive. In do­
ing so, they need 
early adopters gain­
ing experience from 
those solutions. Since 
most novel technolo­
gies —  Moore argues
—  can offer only par­
tial solutions, a new market, he further states, can be disclosed 
only by enthusiasts or visionary customers —  that is, by early 
adopters ready to accept a very high pain in exchange for a 
very high gain provoked by an innovative but imperfect re­
sponse to their requirements. Early adopters overcome “self­
Technopreneurs’ products must be 
functional material objects and they 
must appeal to the human spirit.
In this sense, one can say that techo- 
preneurs operate in a culture in­
dustry.
(Moritani,1982)
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incompatibility”, as Liebwotitz (2002) has defined that kind of 
lock-in dependence which arises from the products or services 
already in use. Self-incompatibility arises in consequence of 
both the costs of learning how to use a new product and the 
difficulty of using it alongside other products the adopters al­
ready own. On the other hand, they are not affected by the “ex­
ternal incompatibility” —  that is, by the fact that in buying the 
innovative product they make a choice incompatible with the 
preferences of the majority of consumers. The latter prefer to 
continue with the most familiar product because the rival does 
not look much better in terms of advantages and disadvantages 
that its use entails.
In contrast to those “visionary customers”, who are keen to 
make a quantum leap forward, pragmatic buyers constitute the 
early majority looking
ing for such an improve- “Visionary custom ers” and “prag- 
ment in the new product m atists” are comparable to light- 
that makes it a complete house keepers who, by means of 
solution through which Sain (green light) and discomfort
they can get a very high (red liZh,) innovf ^  Pr°ducts and
, ■! rr ■ л services cause them, transmit sig- gain while suttering only , , . 0°  nals to technopreneurs navigating in
a modest d.stress. The technology markets.
vendor, who fails to get
the remaining x  percent in order to deliver a whole product, 
will be falling into an abyss. Technopreneurs, therefore, have 
to be very attentive in decoding the signals transmitted by the 
pragmatic buyers “who look to each other for guidance during 
the chasm phase”: if “no one like them is adopting, so they too 
hold back” —  Moore maintains. Correctly interpreting those 
signals means that technopreneurs have been focusing on a 
niche of pragmatists as a chasm-crossing mechanism.
Once in the mainstream market, those technology-based start­
ups committed to make available a painless adoption with a 
high gain, can capture the benefits of the market take-off: what 
Moore calls the “tornado of an hypergrowth phase at triple­
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digit rates for several years”. Finally, the innovative product or 
service being completely successful (a “must-have” item), the 
tornado’s vortex will change into the calm of a mass-adoption 
market: a mature phase that rewards customers with a pair of 
very modest gains and no discomfort.
Many vessels are expected to be in trouble navigating in such 
dangerous waters. Not only the bulk of new ventures fall into a 
chasm trap. Even those crossing the chasm can hit the sand­
banks. W hat they offer might appear attractive to would-be 
customers but not still a must. Overall, a small gain will accrue 
to buyers in exchange for modest pain. In a “dead zone” com­
panies cannot survive. Either they endeavour to change their 
current course or go out of business.
Today’s technopreneurs resemble a modem day Candide in 
search of the best-of-all possible worlds. They place emphasis 
on the upsurge of markets that compensate buyers with very 
high gain and no distress. How many technology-based start­
ups will be keeping or breaking their promises depends on the 
mode of navigation in the dangerous waters vividly traced in 
M oore’s model.
10. CREATIVITY IN BUSINESS
Innovation is not about contrivances or artifices that replace 
human intelligence and creativity. “The more I look at human 
beings —  Mike Cooley has asserted — , the more impressed I 
become with the vast bands of intelligence they can use” 
(Cooley, 1987).
Creativity has been defined as “imaginative processes with 
outcomes that are original and of value” (Withehead, Wright, 
2002). Creativity in business has to do with the generation of 
new ideas that are converted into economic activity. Therefore, 
creative thinking needs to be supported by a strong culture of 
commercialisation. Once a new thought has been developed, it
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must be validated, then a prototype offering has to be created, 
the competitive environment assessed, the offering tested, 
feedback used to refine the offering, a business plan tightly 
constructed and executed when the new entrepreneur is ready 
to seek outside investors (see Table 2.16 in this Chapter).
A complementary perspective is displayed in the title of a 
famous lecture by Akio Morita, the Sony’s founder, at the 
Royal Society in London, in 1992: ‘S ’ [Science] does not equal 
*T’ [Technology] and ‘T ’ does not equal 7 \  Morita spoke 
eloquently about the difference: “just having innovative 
technology —  he argued —  is not enough to claim true 
innovation”. True innovation is made up of three key elements 
which Morita call the “three creativities” : creativity in technol­
ogy, and creativity in product planning and marketing as well.
10.1. CREATIVITY
Contrary to the common belief, creativity in technology, or 
technological clairvoy­
ance, is far from ena- Technology, even a good one, does 
bling technology entre- not sell itself. 
preneurs to succeed.
“Creativity in product planning —  argued Morita in that lec­
ture —  is so important, though many do not seem to recognise 
this... What difference does it make how fantastic and innova­
tive your technology
is if you do not have Innovation may not be particularly
the ability to design profound in a technological sense
a useful, attractive, —  indeed, it often relies on off-the-
‘user-friendly’ prod- shelf components.
uct? Videotape re- (Christensen, 1997)
cording technology
was first introduced to the consumer market in 1965, but the 
home video market was not born until 1975. That was when 
innovative product planners took the tape out of the reels and
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put it into a convenient Betamax cassette for home use. Crea­
tivity in marketing also cannot be overlooked. Again, if you 
have great technology and even a great product, you will only 
find success if the market is ‘ready’ to welcome your product”. 
Borrowing an example from Sony’s history, Morita made ref­
erence to the case of the Walkman. He submitted that “many 
have called it an innovative marvel, but where is the technol­
ogy? [All components to make it were already available on the 
shelves]. Frankly, it did not contain any breakthrough technol­
ogy. Its success was built on product planning and marketing” 
(Morita, 1992).
So, however dazzling the technology may prove to be, address­
ing the right window of opportunity into the marketplace will 
be the dynamo powering technology entrepreneurs to interna­
tional pre-eminence. By implication, the technopreneur must 
be endowed with per­
ception of the signifi- The progress in business knowledge 
cance and nature of is relevant as much as developments 
events before they o f science and technology. 
have occurred, care
in providing for the future and the ability to look forward: in 
one word, he needs foresight. Technopreneurs who are lacking 
in such foresight are “Men who learn only through suffering”
—  as Demosthenes warned in his work On the Trierarchic 
Crown.
The technopreneur’s modus operandi consists precisely in 
combining the M orita’s “three creativities” . How it can happen 
is represented in Figure 2.8 where four different situations 
emerge from the intensity of both the technology impact and 
the market impact caused by a given innovation on the com­
pany to which it is coupled. In turn, the company is articulated 
in 6 regions of business knowledge: i.e., the core competence 
or domain expertise (i.e., what the company is good at —  see 
region 1), known unknowns (region 2) and unknown un­
knowns (region 3) near the core competence, knowledge of the
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current competitors (region 4), knowledge of outsiders as po­
tential invaders (region 5), and perception of original technolo­
gies from today’s new scientific discoveries that can turn into 
tomorrow’s markets (region 6).
Figure 2.8. A conceptual map to discern creativity in business.
MI: market impact; TI: technology impact; L: low impact; H: high 
impact. C: creativity —  high market impact and high technology im­
pact. CL: clearvoyance (far-seeing) —  high technology impact and 
low market impact. T: time-to-market —  high market impact and 
low technology impact. R: routine —  low market impact and low 
technology impact.
1: core competence or domain expertise; 2: known unknowns; 3: un­
known unknowns; 4: today’s competitors; 5: potential invaders; 6: 
‘technology islands’.
Creativity occurs when A disruptive innovation is an inno- 
both technology impact vation that sweeps away the tradi- 
jYiarket impact are tional conipetito? s whose products
high (see quadrant ‘C ’ or services are hit ЬУ "reversible
T- o\ T obsolescence.in Figure 2.8). In one
respect, the introduc­
tion of disruptive innovation that comes from creativity 
breaks the rules that have been governing region 4 and, from
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another point of view, pre-empts attacks from outsiders in 
region 5. Thus creativity inflicts major changes on the core 
competence or even induces the abandonment of what the 
company until then thought it was good at.
10.2. CLAIRVOYANCE
Unlike creativity, clairvoyance (quadrant ‘C L’ in Figure 2.8) is
Clairvoyance exhales a flavour o f 
science. Creativity secretes a busi­
ness touch o f geniality. ‘Pure’ 
scientists and researchers yearn to 
go beyond the utmost limits o f the 
current knowledge domain. They 
have a long-term commitment to 
solve problems which appear im- 
possibile.
Technopreneurs are willing to make 
the customers aware o f new com­
mercial opportunities that stretch 
beyond their current requirements.
day’s world of knowledge. Their free (from money-making) 
exercise of creativity helps establish pioneer settlements at the 
extreme borders of the business world. These are ‘technology 
islands’ (region 6 in Figure 2.8) whose time is not yet ripe for 
their commercial exploitation. That KCs are about business 
and not science explains why they are focused on technopre­
neurs rather than on far-sighted personalities.
There is a subtle point at issue that descends from clairvoy­
ance —  that is, how research is to be exploited. If industry is 
considered a customer that seeks specific deliverables, then 
exploitation implies applied research contracts with industry. 
In turn, this means that the transfer process is a onetime 
handout process from the research originator and supplier (re-
a distinctive trait of 
‘pure’ scientists and 
researchers who look 
ahead, beyond the 
frontier of the known 
domain. A prevailing 
sentiment of a ‘mani­
fest destiny’ nurtured 
by a gambling spirit 
and a rugged indi­
vidualism urge them 
to traverse the Pillar 
of Hercules beyond 
the frontier of the to-
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search centres and 
their laboratories) 
to the developer 
(industrial client). 
Eventually, a ‘lu­
bricant’ in the form
Pure research is discovery; basic 
research is the understanding o f the 
mechanism o f discovery; applied  
research is the investigation o f the 
economic utilisation o f discovery, 
and development is the exploitation 
o f discovery.
of a broker or inter­
face might speed
up the transfer process (Mitra, Formica, 1997: 22). Conversely, 
if industry is considered a ‘patron’ demanding excellence, 
motivations to re­
search transfer (Та- Transfer o f research means transfer 
ble 2 .8) become o f new technologies (technology 
more important than transfer), transfer o f  information to
Key principles of ‘motivation’ to the transfer of research
• The lubrication of the transfer channel is not capable by itself 
to accelerate the process in the absence of driving forces. The 
process is driven by the demand rather than the supply.
• The demand of innovative products and services is the driving 
force for entrepreneurs to invest in research: a general criterion 
should be to pull the innovation rather than to push it.
• To accelerate the transfer, it is necessary that the receivers be 
strongly motivated and in close contact with their markets. 
They must also be capable of assimilating the research they re­
ceive. A good educational and training system (here) is a high- 
priority.
modalities. The aim 
is to do research in 
areas of interest to
markets (information transfer), 
r o f younger specialised per- 
(personnel transfer).
business (i.e., ‘applicable’ research).
Table 2.8
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• The cost of introducing a new technology is far greater than the 
transfer price of it, and is connected to the changes of the firm ’s 
organisational structures and strategic assets that usually come 
together with the adoption of a new technology.
Source: Adapted from Nicolõ, 1996.
Companies would be ready to invest to acquire insight and 
understanding of research once their capacity to assimilate ad­
vances in research were reinforced by entering into meaningful 
dialogue with research institutions. The linear model of trans­
ferring with its underlying law of unidirectional causality is 
replaced by the law of circular causality. Non-linear feedback 
loops link research to industrial innovation. A spiral model 
with a reverse flow from industry to research (Figure 2.9) en­
hances the performance of the latter12 —  which contributes in 
turn to amplify the virtuous cycle (Etzkowitz, 1996).
Invention teams are knowledge 
pools, whose participants are accus­
tomed to working together by fo l­
lowing a Faraday-style behaviour, 
fo r  which “applied goals also tackle 
the basics ”.
coalesce in ‘invention teams’. Each team looks like a research 
enterprise the ‘product’ of which is a specific project with a
In the context of a 
market-driven trans­
fer process (Exhibit 
2 .12), researchers, 
business strategists 
and patent experts
12 According to Etzkowitz, 1996, “survey data showing that academ­
ics with industrial connections publish more than their peers lacking 
such connections, indirectly support this thesis” .
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Research An literative, self-reinforcing effect, 
helix-shaped, occurs between industrial 
innovation and academic research
\
Industrial
innovation
Industrial innovation opens up 
new basic research questions
Figure 2.9. Circular causality in the research domain.
limited lifetime (say, five years), unlike the bureaucracy of the 
conventional, age old research institutes and laboratories where 
research projects often drag on for decades. At the end of the 
period, the project is discontinued and a new one with an 
entirely fresh team will take its place.
Exhibit 2.12
The Baden Württemberg market-driven transfer process
Transfer is primarily a market-driven process of specific pro­
jects. Business motivation for transfer is the key element of 
the process.
The educational and training system of training is an effective 
provider of highly skilled industrial workers. The region is en­
dowed with first rate educational, R&D (private and public) 
and technological infrastructures: 9 universities; 23 technical 
schools (Fachhochschulen); 14 Max Plank Institutes; 14 
Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft Institutes; the Steinbeis Foundation 
with 160 Technology Transfer Centres; 6 university founda­
tions; 87 researchers out of 10 000 inhabitants in BW.
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Exhibit 2.12 continued
The regional economy is reinforced by a set of general (infra­
structural) and specific (technological) Land government poli­
cies. A variety of institutions operate for the promotion, assis­
tance and supply of services to SMEs.
Large and small firms realise that to “maintain their own 
autonomy in the system they must accept their dependence on 
the system”. Co-operative and competitive relationships de­
pend on the firm ’s awareness of the limits of its proprietary 
know-how and are backed by practises of mutual respect and 
trust.
Out of about 2 500 people involved in the Steinbeis Founda­
tion, only a small part are employed directly by the Foudation 
and on a full-time base. 90% of them are engaged in connec­
tion with specific research contracts and specific technology 
transfer projects. The focus on the market allows the financial 
autonomy of the Foundation (93% of the budget is covered by 
market revenues).
10.3. TIME-TO-MARKET AND ROUTINE
Technopreneurs uncover 
fresh resources either in 
(e.g., human capi­
tal —  that is, knowl­
edge and competen­
cies to provide solu­
tions for customers). 
Time-to-market and 
routine help current 
businesses release 
resources to be em­
ployed in new ven-
new business developments that need 
money (e.g., risk capital) or in kind
Time-to-market encompasses the no­
tion o f going the pace in the intro­
duction o f product or service inno­
vation improvements to the market­
place. Routine is the ability to work 
with method to gain in efficiency. 
Compared to routine, time-to-mar­
ket can have a larger effect on profit 
than on product cost.
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tures. In fact, by the action of monitoring gaps that are known 
(e.g., articulated user needs) and discovering unknown draw­
backs (such as, the behavioural needs of potential customers), 
time-to-market contributes to go more quickly and more effec­
tively to markets with product or service innovation improve­
ments resulting from ready-to-use technologies (see quadrant 
‘T ’ and regions 2 and 3 in Figure 2.8).
Routine, on the other hand, enables constant advancements 
through continuous improvements upon existing models (see 
quadrant ‘R’and region 1). Unlike ICs whose business players 
thrive to make their 
core competencies 
shiny, КС players 
are engaged in sof­
tening them so as 
they can embrace 
creativity in busi­
ness. Time-to-mar­
ket and routine are 
the threads that connect efforts ICs make to get success from 
advancements within the core competencies to the resolution 
with which KCs carry on the building of a new business order.
11. MATCHING ENTREPRENEURIAL 
CAPACITY AND OPPORTUNITIES
Entrepreneurship flourishes at the crossroads where entrepre­
neurial capacity meets entrepreneurial opportunities. To take 
advantage of an opportunity (that is, to transform a possibility 
into a business reality), individual commitment and capability 
are primary conditions. Commitment implies motivation, and 
capability calls for entrepreneurial attributes. Therefore, the 
entrepreneurial capacity embraces motivations and attributes, 
as shown in Table 2.9.
Improvement is not innovation.
Improvement is about the ameliora­
tion o f the status quo; innovation is 
about the disruption o f the current 
state-of-the-art, doing something in 
an entirely different way.
(Horibe, 2002)
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Table 2.9
Entrepreneurial capacity
Motivations
• Capacity to think for oneself.
• Self-confidence.
• Sense of autonomy, independence and risk-taking.
• Intense emotions.
Entrepreneurial attributes
• Clarity of leadership.
• Openness and inquisitiveness that stimulates innovation and 
learning.
• Creation of new value or organisational capability.
• Flexibility to change.
• Relationship building skills.
• Ability to convince others (employees, individual investors, 
suppliers, and landlords) to share start-up risks.
Should the availability of entrepreneurial capacity exceed 
opportunities, unfulfilled expectations would discourage an 
otherwise positive attitude towards entrepreneurship. Simi­
larly, entrepreneurial opportunities in excess of capacity will 
not generate commercial outcomes. Both imbalances depress 
the level of entrepreneurial activity. Consequently, the growth 
of entrepreneurship is the product of a three-pronged strategy:
• developing entrepreneurial capacity;
• cultivating and detecting entrepreneurial opportunities;
• and raising the level of equilibrium between entrepre­
neurial capacity and opportunities from the creation of 
small firms to that of entrepreneurial growth companies 
(Figure 2.10).
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Entrepreneurial opportunities (EO )
Figure 2.10. Matching entrepreneurial capacity and entrepreneurial 
opportunities.
1 —  small business creation; 2 —  entrepreneurial growth compa­
nies.
Instrumental in the improvement of entrepreneurial activity, in 
terms of the level as well as the quality of entrepreneurship, is 
the adoption of a business development methodology (BDM) 
that drives entrepreneurial capability and opportunities towards 
the desired target. The BDM is a knowledge tool that keeps 
ideas flowing into rapidly growing start-ups. The methodology 
is designed to provide for a tight linkage between entre­
preneurial capacity and entrepreneurial opportunities.
Entrepreneurship can be represented as a puzzle whose main 
pieces are training and education, research, application, pro­
duction, marketing and sales. Whereas each one of the actors 
involved in it seems to master a single piece of activity, the 
BDM embraces the entrepreneurial landscape as a whole. In 
particular, the methodology explores intensity and quality of 
interdependence among the different communities of practice 
and knowledge pools that populate a knowledge cluster and
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extracts the value of the whole in addition to the operations of 
individual parts (Figure 2.11). This activity is scarcely con­
ceivable in ICs where the business community and the aca­
demic world are not aware of their respective advances.
patents \̂ J\ licences procedures
COMPETING  
TECHNOLOGIES AND 
PRODl
"sales, services 
export
COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE 
KNOWLEDGE POOLS
perception of 
potential 
markets
market
creation
design 
and И 
test
prototyping
and
production
market
distribution
sales
Figure 2.11. Business development methodology.
12. EDUCATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
In comparison with ICs, KCs have a different perception of 
advances in the universities and other higher education institu­
tions. IC business communities confine their interest to se­
lected professors or researchers as providers of services for 
which SMEs bid. The blatant disregard toward the academic 
institution per se is due to the presence of invisible walls sur­
rounding the university. In particular, ‘job for life’ (tenure) at 
the university is incompatible with the competitive environ­
ment at company level, and the academia’s ‘dionysian’ (exis­
tential) culture conflicts with the role or the task culture of the 
firm (Handy, 1995).
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The players in ICs are privately owned, often family-run small 
businesses and family-controlled groups, and are governed by 
the rule of the authority and delegation under the jurisdiction 
of the leader. Conversely, in the realm of education —  as 
Charles Handy has noted —  the individual is not subordinate 
to the organisation, “the organisation exists to help the individ­
ual achieve his purpose., [and] ’’the manager governs with the 
consent of the governed, and not with the delegated authority 
of the ow ners... Where you can manage only by consent, 
every individual has the right to veto, so that co-ordinated 
effort becomes a matter of endless negotiation” (Handy, 1995: 
32- 33).
In contrast, КС communities are formed by individuals who 
see themselves as knowledge workers whose common pur­
pose, as suggested earlier in these pages, is to change knowl­
edge into innovation and derive business value from it. This is 
the reason why, compared to ICs, the КС ‘groups of equals’ 
governed by the same rules perceive amazing changes in soci­
ety in consequence of the advances in the educational sector. 
They notice that this sector is one of the most dynamic areas in 
business and are pledged to turn the mere task of providing 
services to business organisations into a more ambitious and 
fulfilling mission: namely, that of treating education as the new 
fast-growing industry of the 21st century.
A 40% increase in student numbers in tertiary education is ex­
pected over the current decade. The traditional 18-24 year-old 
students, who traditionally have been the primary focus of col­
leges and universities, no longer represent the majority in the 
education market. The future belongs to the non-traditional 
working adult students. The explosion of online distance edu­
cation enables organisations to foster an ‘anytime, anywhere’ 
learning scenario. Students who choose to study and live 
abroad are rapidly increasing. Across OECD countries there 
are about 1.5 million foreign students, 44% of them from Asia
PIERO FORMICA 169
and 31% from Europe (Exhibit 2.13). Although education is 
still on the whole publicly funded, private spending is increas­
ingly important and now accounts for, on average, 9% of ini­
tial educational funds.
Exhibit 2.13
International mobility of tertiary education students, ac­
cording to OECD
Amidst a general trend towards freely circulating capital, 
goods and people, individuals are also looking more closely 
at foreign institutions for tertiary education. In 2000, accord­
ing to available data, 1.6 million foreign students were en­
rolled in tertiary-level institutions outside their country of 
origin. Of these, 1.5 million were studying in OECD coun­
tries, an increase of 14% compared with two years previ­
ously, with numbers of students from other OECD countries 
rising at around the same rate as numbers of students from 
outside the OECD.
China accounted for the largest share of foreign students 
studying in OECD countries, with 7.1% of the total. Among 
OECD countries, students from Japan and Korea comprised 
the largest groups, at 4.6% and 3.9% respectively, followed 
by Greece (3.6%), Germany (3.5%), France (3.4%) and Italy 
(2.7%). India was the second largest non-OECD provider of 
foreign students after China, with 3.4% of the total, followed 
by Morocco (2.7%) and Malaysia (2.4%).
A handful of host countries has capitalised on this interest in 
cross-border educational services, with the U.S. hosting 28% 
of these foreign students, followed by the U.K. with 14%. 
Germany, France and Australia were also high on the list of 
destinations for foreign students.
Source: University Education Produces Measurably High 
Returns fo r  Students, According to OECD , OECD News 
release, 29 October 2002.
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A better educated population is expected to have a positive im­
pact on entrepreneurship. Today’s customers, more demanding 
than those of the past, call for customised and knowledge- 
intensive products and services. The development of such 
products, in terms both of technology and marketing, require 
entrepreneurial people with a higher degree of education and 
training. Thus education, in particular tertiary education, plays 
a key role in fostering entrepreneurship. Indeed, statistical evi­
dence suggests that the greater a country’s investment in terti­
ary education, the higher the rate of new firm formation. Entre­
preneurial economies —  that is, those with a high rate of new 
company formation —  exhibit better macroeconomic per­
formance (see Global Entrepreneurship Monitor —  http:// 
www.ncoe.org/research/index.html).
Yet, there is a disconnection between the current trend in edu­
cation and the state-of-the-art of education and training neces­
sary for raising awareness of entrepreneurship and preparing 
aspiring entrepreneurs. Business schools all over Europe, 
North America and Asia report an acute shortage of academics 
who are capable of teaching entrepreneurship (Reynolds, Hay, 
Camp, 1999). This deficit seems even more critical in the light 
of the barriers raised by widely held misconceptions about 
entrepreneurship that permeate society and government.
The educational system has to be oriented toward “doing” 
more than “thinking”. Knowledge has to be converted into so­
lutions that benefit customers in the marketplace, and scientific 
and technological education should include management 
training to enhance the commercialisation of new develop­
ments.
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13. CRAFTING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
ROLE
It is often claimed that ‘entrepreneurs are bom, not made’. 
However, education is critical if the appropriate level of 
knowledge and competencies required to perform the entrepre­
neurial role is to be attained. This does not mean that the 
would-be entrepreneur has to be an experienced expert in one 
specific field. He or she ought to be confronted with the types 
of issues the entrepreneur encounters daily. Instead of being 
taught about and around separate pieces of a business puzzle, 
the would-be entrepreneur needs to acquire the total under­
standing of entrepreneurship.
A good idea is only the starting point of a process that converts 
the idea into practice. Learning how ideas are created, how 
unexpected opportunities are grasped, applied and commer­
cialised, and how a company is established, enables the would- 
be entrepreneur to turn ideas into marketable products and 
services by means of a viable enterprise.
“I do, therefore I am” and “every paper I write, every thought I 
have, I’m thinking about my business” are basic principles to 
be applied to the learning process for crafting the entrepreneu­
rial role. Giving students first-hand and high-touch experience 
in creating and running a business is the sound translation of 
those principles. In terms of the student’s success or failure, 
what happens in his business from a practical point of view 
becomes far more important than what happens in the class­
room from a conceptual perspective.
In this paragraph, what follows is a short description of how 
entrepreneurship is instigated in the diverse context of ICs and 
KCs.
In Chapter 1 we have portrayed the IC configuration as a dense 
fabric of SMEs emerging from a long-lasting, spontaneous 
phenomenon of new business creation by employees leaving
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their employers to set up their own companies for opening up 
new market segments within the same technology domain. The 
spin-ее is a former employee of a mother-company (the spin­
ner) where he has been covering for years specialised functions 
of a supplier-type. The new entrepreneur’s family and his old- 
boy network act as business angels. So does the mother- 
company, providing ‘in kind’ support in terms of order, advice, 
client introduction, equipment and machinery utilisation, and a 
minority stake in the new firm.
The potential of co-operation embodied in this practice of out­
sourcing has made the ‘spinner-spinee’ relationship a friendly 
vehicle for technology transfer along the supply chain. Be­
sides, spin-ees have contributed to raise the parent company’s 
awareness of its own deficiencies (that is, known and unknown 
unknows in the regions 2 and 3 of Figure 2.8).
Local communities, especially those in close proximity to ICs 
and in business relations with them, barely endowed with an 
entrepreneurial culture and whose entrepreneurial mesh is 
sparse, have been trying hard to gain a foothold on the eco- 
nomic-growth ladder by encouraging this kind of company for­
mation. By the mid-1990s, a forerunner of this movement has 
been the community of Faenza in Italy, a town of 54 000 in­
habitants situated 30 miles east from Bologna, where the town 
council launched a programme for entrepreneurship, termed 
“programmed spin-offs” (Exhibit 2.14). Parties involved in 
setting up and implementing the programme were the City 
Council, locally-rooted SMEs, a vocational training centre and 
a commercial bank. Their contributions to the programme and 
mutual relationships are detailed in Figure 2.12.
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Exhibit 2.14
Inducement to entrepreneurship: The case of the commu­
nity of Faenza in Italy
The town has an outstanding tradition in the production of 
glazed earthenware since the Renaissance, and the ceramics 
sector is still one of the vital hubs of the economic and cul­
tural life of her community. In this sector the local economic 
fabric is characterised by micro firms (very small handicraft 
workshops that normally employ one or two people) engaged 
in goods-in-process for third parties. The increasing demand 
for specialised services (such as the production of special 
handmade decorations for ceramic tiles) on the part of the 
ceramics industry is largely satisfied by SMEs located in the 
industrial district of Sassuolo (about 65 miles from Faenza), 
which is the biggest world producer of ceramic tiles. Benefits 
accrued from the work developed by the Faenza micro phase- 
firms are mostly retained by the Sassuolo leading primes. 
Moreover, the growth process of Faenza micro and small 
firms is hampered by the lack of a cohesive industrial fabric 
in terms of upstream and downstream suppliers, as well as in 
terms of horizontal collaboration.
This unsatisfactory state-of-the-art has suggested the Faenza 
City Council to design and implement a programme for 
boosting entrepreneurship. At the core of the strategy there 
has been a process of technology transfer from existing 
companies to start-ups founded by new and young 
entrepreneurs who come out from “programmed spin-offs”, 
which, in turn, are the outlet of an entrepreneurial course 
based on vocational training.
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Figure 2.12. Instigating entrepreneurship by means of policy inter­
vention in the IC context: The case of the community of Faenza in 
Italy.
That few companies have been created and all inside the small- 
business typology is attributable to the culture of the 
institutions involved. These institutions are the incumbents 
who suffers from a sort of ‘community anorexia’ that prevents 
them from ‘eating’ food for thought alien to their collected 
experience, which resides at the top of the community’s es­
tablishment. In other words, the ‘tyranny of seniority’ we have 
been referring to in
Chapter 1 strangles Entrepreneurship is usually ignited 
the rise and spread of by a bottom-up imagination rather
broader and fresher than a top-down experience.
insights of newcomers.
It is only a matter of time before the incumbents become 
obstacles to creative effort. Therefore, the local community is 
unable to forge business entrepreneurism on the anvil of 
innovative solutions that would profoundly affect entire 
industries such as education and banks. An equally compelling 
argument derives from the observation that in the IC context 
vocational training centres and local banks are good at grap­
pling with everyday problems of the existing companies. Col­
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laborative programmes, conducive to entrepreneurship, lie out­
side their primary scope. Although they take part in those pro­
grammes, their contribution mirrors both the collected experi­
ence already pointed out and the dead weight which lies heavy 
on their day to day business.
By comparison, in the КС context new forms of collective 
imagination and in­
telligence develop, 
based on knowl­
edge pools, which 
think up innovative 
solutions for breed­
ing a new generation of entrepreneurs first and foremost as 
founders of fast-growing enterprises. Whole new genres of ex­
periences referable to KCs are illustrated in a few examples 
below.
In the Foundation Management Experience (FME) Program at
the Babson College each participant is assigned to “a small
group of their peers and given $ 3 000 in start-up capital to run
a business. The group gets together and thinks about what
product or service they can provide that will be profitable.
They write job descriptions, develop a business plan, create 
1
marketing strategies” .
In Europe, the University of Twente has been a pioneer in 
conceiving and developing entrepreneurship education. At its 
Centre of Innovative Entrepreneurship, graduates are trained 
how to become entrepreneurs. University research groups offer 
a part-time position for one year to a graduate who has to 
develop a business plan in order to be accepted for a place on 
the programme. The would-be entrepreneur works half time
Collective imagination and intelli­
gence rather than collected experi­
ence succeed in building an entre­
preneurial community.
13 The National Commission on Entrepreneurship, NCOE Update, 
10 July 2001, No 34.
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for the research group on contracted research projects and for 
the remainder he is free to develop his product or service, or to 
work on first orders from clients. On the other hand, an experi­
enced entrepreneur (“mentor”) is asked to support the new en­
trepreneur, during the first year, in management issues. This 
service is provided free of charge. After the first year the men­
tor tends to stay with the entrepreneur on a consultancy basis. 
The new entrepreneurs change the results of their scientific re­
search at the university site into applicable technologies and 
marketable products or services.
Peer group promotion forms part of the practice in entrepre­
neurial skills developed at the UK ’s University of Nottingham 
Institute for Enterprise and Innovation (UNIEI). UNIEI is en­
gaged in entrepreneurship projects that require students to 
work in small groups (normally 3 per group) affiliated to a 
company with a real problem that requires a solution. The 
group may work at the company or remain at the University. 
The company provides the necessary access to the information 
required to address the problem and establishes an in-house 
supervisor. The outcome of this activity is a report written by 
the team and a presentation of its findings.
In the case of the Master in Entrepreneurship at the Interna­
tional University of Entrepreneurship (IUE) in Amsterdam, the 
student group is turned into an international learning network. 
A worldwide range of educational and business partners en­
dows the programme with the image of a collegiate community 
of practice. This is a learning network of cross-functional 
expertise.
The OECD says that “talent is disseminated most easily 
through the physical movement of people... the international 
mobility of students is crucial in deciding which countries are 
most likely to take advantage of new ideas” . The international 
mobility of talented youngsters helps countries, regions and 
other territorial communities to close their productivity gap
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The loss o f talented youngsters and 
highly qualified workers is currently 
a most important phenomenon that 
could provoke lasting economic re­
percussions in the countries affected 
by a brain drain.
universal nature of such development also reduces the risk of a 
talent drain from less developed economies, a potential prob­
lem for those economies (OECD, 2002).
Following the OECD’s recommendation, the IUE encourages 
its students, with their different national and cultural back­
grounds, to move from one ‘learning location’ to another in the 
network, adding the value of the whole to the tasks pursued at 
the partnership sites. In each location, local professors do most 
of the teaching to ensure both an understanding of the local 
culture and customisation of the programmes. Thanks to mo­
bility within the network, informal circles of exchange are 
formed. These circles are sources of creativity and the cross­
fertilisation of ideas. Almost every piece of information the 
participant needs to start his or her own business can be ob­
tained from the network.
International networks with regional hubs are at the heart of 
the strategy pursued by the Enterprise Research and Develop­
ment Centre (ERDC) of the University of Central England in 
Birmingham, UK. The ERDC’s role as a regional hub is “sup­
ported by extensive stakeholding relationships and partner­
ships with government and industry” . Within this framework, 
the ERDC has designed an Entrepreneurship Development 
Project Model that addresses “three key stages of the develop­
ment of entrepreneurship practice —  detection and ideas gen­
eration, codification and rationalisation’, and delivery and im­
plementation” (Mitra, Matlay, 2000).
In Israel, the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, the 
country’s oldest university, established in 1924, and principal
since it promotes 
entrepreneurship-led 
innovation, thereby 
creating ‘nations of 
entrepreneurs’ (Lii- 
kanen, 2001). The
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institute for engineering sciences, gives birth to campus com­
panies (“Technion companies”) in co-operation with strategic 
industrial partners and venture capitalists around the world. 
The Institute might retain a (major) stake in the firms for a 
while. Once nurtured, the start-ups are sold.
As a final example, New Zealand’s Waikato Management 
School has launched an ‘active’ business venture programme 
for “building a real company in real time”. In collaboration 
with existing companies, teams of Waikato MBA students de­
sign and develop new spin-off business ventures. Students and 
staff hold a minority equity share in the new venture and have 
a seat on its board.
and public research
bodies, that design and manage activities (such as those listed 
in Table 2.10) necessary to build a new enterprise economy. In 
so doing, they behave in such a way as their counterparts did 
more than nine centuries earlier when, in the year 1088, the 
major educational innovation of the second millennium, known 
as “an academic university” was founded in Bologna. Indeed, 
those activities resulted in the creation of innovative 
organisations for education, termed “entrepreneurial universi-
14. ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITIES
There are knowledge 
pools, formed by in­
dividuals from the 
business community, 
universities, higher 
education institutions
There is one underestimated ingre­
dient in the recipe fo r  the success o f  
innovation strategies —  that is the 
innovation o f the agents who stimu­
late innovation. Universities have a 
crucial role to play in this process.
ties” .
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Table 2.10
Activities generated by knowledge pools to build 
a new enterprise economy
Elaboration of programs that meet the needs of the knowledge 
cluster community, with emphasis placed on the retention and 
placement of college graduates, and on the sharing of information 
about prospective jobs to students. Examples are:
• Defining the range of professional competencies and skills for 
managing the innovation process.
• Shaping innovative approaches for vocational education (pro­
grams need to be state-of-the-art and responsive to industry in 
the region).
• Developing educational curricula to train students and prepare 
graduates to exploit their own patents and to set up their own 
business.
• Developing monographic courses addressed to technicians, 
front-line and top managers.
• Acting as ‘professional professors’, thereby bringing into the 
education environment brains from industrial and consultant 
backgrounds to strengthen the quality taught programs through 
the integration of them with academics._______________________
Promotion of spin-off companies by students, graduates, profes­
sors, researchers, and other people:
• Firms set up by the teaching or research staff of university, who 
wish to exploit commercially the results of research conducted 
in academic environments.
• Firms founded by graduates and students to exploit commer­
cially the results of research in which they have been involved 
at the institution.
• Firms run by persons from outside the university, who decide to 
exploit commercially the results of academic research.__________
Commercialisation of technology or a particular kind of knowl- 
edge, precursor to technology.__________________________________
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Links with markets that give rise to demands of innovative prod­
ucts or services, which means empowering ‘m arket-led’ instead
of ‘supply-led’ technology transfer.____________________________
Managing intellectual property rights without undue proprietary 
restrictions on the dissemination of information.
Better-educated individuals in the field of entrepreneurial ca­
pacity increase the potential to start new businesses. Invest­
ment in tertiary education ought to be diverted towards innova­
tive educational institutions that allow people to acquire skills 
they need to recognise and pursue business opportunities. The 
entrepreneurial universities are the most advanced forms of 
educational institutions embarking upon a new wave of teach­
ing and learning methodologies in the field of entrepreneur­
ship. Besides, these institutions harvest, in the marketplace, the 
fruits of university research, capitalise on business develop­
ment thanks to the know how of professors, researchers, 
graduates and students, and provokes new company formation 
in the knowledge-based industries.
According to David Blunkett, the United Kingdom’s former 
Secretary of State for Education, “In the knowledge economy, 
entrepreneurial universities will be as important as entrepre­
neurial businesses.” In fact, to address the phenomenon of en­
trepreneurship and accelerate its pace, the most dynamic 
economies are producing innovative types of social and busi­
ness models for advanced education.
14.1. THE ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN
The entrepreneurial university can be defined as a fluid net­
work of inter-linked agents performing specific activities and 
drawing strength and vitality from one another (Table 2.11). 
They can also be ‘unbundled’ or ‘disaggregated’ from one an­
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other. This means that the entrepreneurial university is a self­
organisation —  that is, “a spontaneous formation of interest 
groups and coalition around specific issues, communication 
about those issues, co-operation and the formation of consen­
sus on and commitment to a response to those issues”. The or­
ganisation embraces the attribute of an adaptive system whose 
agents change rules of conduct as the system evolves (Stacey, 
1996: 333).
Table 2.11
Agents of the entrepreneurial university
Degree Granting Bodies (DGBs): small and flexible administra­
tive bodies which deliver degrees and set degree requirements 
and core courses. One DGB can take on as many or as few stu­
dents and faculty as thought viable. Their main activities are:
• Student orientation: competence oriented rather than diploma- 
oriented.
• Certificates and degrees.
• Non-credit programmes.
• Caree counseling.
Faculty companies, which are independent contractors looking 
for DGBs to sanction their teaching. They might find more than 
one DGB to do this. Their main activities are:
• Lecturing and researching.
• Mentoring and tutoring.
• Academic counseling.
Facility companies, which make available labs, equipment, li­
braries, and classrooms. Their clients might be several DGBs. 
Incubator companies, engaged in nurturing start-ups from gradu­
ates and researchers in co-operation with strategic industrial part­
ners and seed capitalists around the world._______________________
Source: Adapted from Seely Brown, Duguid, 1996.
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The self-organised network allows the entrepreneurial univer­
sity to identify both the different markets or clients that they 
are serving and the different ways of connecting with and con­
tributing to those markets or clients.
Information and communication technologies are important 
adjuncts to the network as they contribute to cut down co-ordi­
nation costs. But technology is neither a substitute for campus 
life nor for the entrepreneurial university as a community of 
scholars (including students and staff)14. Indeed, the university 
ecology produces a collegiate effect between current and past 
students. It is expected that past students will continue to take 
part in the activities of the network by means of ‘learning con­
tracts’ signed by themselves as individuals or by their 
employers. A further vehicle for keeping them all in touch with 
the evolution of activities is the ex-alumni committee.
This type of university is the ‘natural’ partner for companies 
and people capable of recognising the potential of that market. 
Large corporations have already tackled the new business, in­
vesting in those education ventures called “corporate universi­
ties”. Ideas and plans conceived for establishing entrepreneu­
rial universities nowadays bring together even small and me­
dium sized companies from diverse sectors to broaden their 
understanding of the entrepreneurial economy.
14.2. CORPORATE UNIVERSITIES
A distinction must be made between entrepreneurial universi­
ties and corporate universities. In the educational landscape,
14 As for online courses, educational technology specialists worry 
about the quality of the teacher-student relationship when long-dis­
tance education increases. On the other hand, a widely held belief is 
that computer facilities better than classrooms help customise indi­
vidually tailored curricula. (Pescovitz, 1996)
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the former emerge from Entrepreneurial universities are em- 
the activity of knowl- bedded in the entrepreneurial econ- 
edge pools in the area omy; corporate universities, in the 
of the entrepreneurial managed economy. 
economy, while big companies have been creating the latter 
with the mission to offer in-house a continual knowledge and 
learning cycle for their employees. This can be viewed as the 
growing recognition by many large organisations that, on one 
hand, the power of knowledge and learning is a fundamental 
driver of strategic changes while, on the other, world-class 
corporate universities can have a big impact on the exercise of 
that power (Prince, Beaver, 2002).
Over last two decades, large bureaucratic corporations have 
launched their universities —  nowadays they are almost a 
thousand of them alone in the United States. It is important to 
note that the term ‘corporate university’ embraces a diverse 
range of organisations with and without the word university in 
their title. A neutral definition is that of “an on-site learning 
initiative integrating credit and non-credit programs that are 
linked to organizational missions and goals” (Wells, Barley,
1998). For example, Tapscott reports that McDonald’s Ham­
burger University “pro­
vides credit-level edu- There are corporate universities 
cation to more than that perform training functions and
10 000 employees per others acting as agent “for the ma- 
year. In 1995 alone, nagement of change through [their] 
more than 700 000 role in facilitating knowledge
McDonald’s employ- management practices and opera,-
. r ing the organisation’s learningees received some form 0 , „ 0 . . °. . agenda . The latter aspire to the
of structured training... rQ̂ e 0j  world-class corporate uni- 
Employee education is versities. 
not growing 100%
faster than academia, <Prince- Beaver' 200I: 21> 
but 100 times —  or 10 000% faster” (Tapscott, 1995: 200).
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Corporate education initiatives (see Exhibit 2.15 the Infosys’s 
Corporate Learning Initiative) strive to align corporate learning 
to business strategies, develop strategic learning alliances with 
external providers, create a learning environment through 
technology, develop and implement innovative marketing and 
branding techniques.
Exhibit 2.15
The Infosys’s Leadership Institute
“Infosys Technologies Ltd, a Bangalore-based company, is a 
world leader in consulting and information technology ser­
vices.
“At the cornerstone of Infosys’ Corporate Learning initiative 
is the Infosys Leadership Institute located in Mysore.
“The Leadership Institute was established to help manage 
Infosys’ growth, prepare Infosys employees (“Infoscions”) to 
face the complexities of the rapidly changing marketplace 
and bring about a paradigm shift in the work culture by 
instilling leadership qualities.
“Other components of the Corporate Learning Initiative are 
the Education & Research and Learning & Development de­
partments, which, along with the Leadership Institute, enable 
the present and future leaders of Infosys to achieve the com­
pany’s vision and strategy”.
“Infosys exemplifies best practices in corporate learning, in­
corporating the organization’s strategic goals into the learn­
ing infrastructure, and creating a learning environment that is 
aligned to and improves business performance. Infosys Cor­
porate Learning leverages talent and leadership, maximizing 
through learning, value to their stakeholders —  customers, 
community, board of directors, employees” (official praise 
from the Corporate University Xchange Excellence Award 
for 2002 received by Infosys Technologies Ltd).
Source: Infosys Press Release, 7 June 2002.
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Throughout its long life cycle the academic 
claimed to have a mo­
nopoly of knowledge.
But in the meantime 
the business commu­
nity has realised that, 
from a historical stand­
point, the oldfashioned 
universities and schools 
were failing to provide 
industry with the skills 
it needs, and, from a 
business view, that 
higher and further education is a rising market, with even more 
demanding customers since ICT infostructures became avail­
able.
In “A Survey of Universities” The Economist, 4 October 1997, 
it is suggested that the fashion for companies to establish their 
own universities “symbolises... the growing elision between 
the presumed jobs of the university (basic research, general 
education) and that of the company (applied research, job- 
specific training). McDonald, Motorola, Sun, Microsystems, 
Hewlett-Packard, Unipart, British Aerospace are only some of 
a many initiatives large companies are devoting to business 
education through corporate universities”.
Yet corporate universities do not underrate the role in both 
education and creation of new knowledge played by the aca­
demic institutions and, therefore, they are interested in comple­
mentary forms of evolution with them. According to a survey 
quoted by Financial Times, 16 March 1998, a growing number 
of corporate universities seem keen to develop complementary 
relationships with academia (Exhibit 2.16). Partnerships with 
accredited higher education institutions have been developing
A renowned institution such as the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technol­
ogy has recognised that the rela­
tionship between university and in­
dustry should not be based on the 
view that the university is the cen­
tral source of knowledge, but on the 
conviction that the new knowledge 
and discoveries occur throughout 
society, and that the movement is 
never unidirectional.
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mostly in business administration, computer science, engineer­
ing and finance.
Exhibit 2.16
Complementary relationships between corporate univer­
sities and academia
“Our [corporate university] role is to be a bridge between the 
academic world and the business world. It is more and more 
important for companies to get a fresh infusion of knowledge 
to manage the permanent transfer of academic knowledge 
into the company” (Michael Heuser, Head of Lufthansa 
School on Business in Frankfurt).
“Corporate universities not only have access to the business 
schools with which they work, but also can tap into the 
wealth of experience and knowledge inside the corporation
—  knowledge which is up to the minute and relevant” (Steve 
Trehern, Vice-president of Unysis University).
“The greatest asset of corporate universities is the daily ac­
cess they have to senior leadership that allows them to align 
education programmes with the com pany’s shifting strategic 
goals... Some corporations have joined with top business 
schools to create blended corporate degree programmes that 
offer the best of both world: a high-quality, accredited MBA 
programme and customised course projects that let employ­
ees do real work, not homework” (Thomas Moore, Dean of 
the executive education at Babson College).
Source: Business Education. Financial Times Survey, 25 
March 2002.
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14.3. CULTURAL ROOTS OF THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY
The twelfth-century term for a university was Studium  —  a 
community of learning for students where all were welcome. 
The university of the Middle Ages was a student-run institu­
tion. Consumer-students collected fees, paid salaries, issued 
the working rules,
determined the con- In the Medieval university, students
tent of the curricu- were the main protagonists in their
lum and decided own knowledge development proc-
how much time had ess-
to be spent on each
topic. Contracts between students and professors were based 
on the criteria of outcome measurement rather than on atten­
dance. Committees of students monitored the teachers’ profes­
sional conduct. The idea behind these rules was that the stu­
dents were serious about learning. The professors did not work 
for a board of trustees, as they do in modem universities, but 
for the students. If they were not meeting the students’ needs, 
they were dismissed.
Throughout the Middle Ages, international mobility and ex­
changes of teachers and scholars were a common future of 
those collegiate societies. Learning was not separated from 
learners by artificial borders. The university community and 
the handicraft economy were interwoven, each having much to 
learn from the another. A transnational and collaborative con­
text favoured entrepreneurship, and innovative businesses were 
created that replaced traditional forms of arts and crafts.
Entrepreneurial universities are today’s version of the medie­
val collegiate society. They may be seen as “academic impre­
sarios” whose mission is to achieve a brand identity (Exhibit 
2.17) by bringing together the best content specialists (out-
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Standing academics and practitioners), junior teachers acting as 
“educational consultants”, and students (Hague, 1991).
Exhibit 2.17
The case of an “academic impresario” designing a brand 
identity policy: The Futurewave Institute in Perth, West­
ern Australia
The Futurewave Institute is an entrepreneurial university 
founded by private organisations based in Perth, Western 
Australia. The Institute aims at filling the gap in learning, 
from traditional systems to market requirements.
Brand background
• Concentrating on inspiring, educating and training for en­
trepreneurship and innovation in business.
• Segmented into three wide categories —  starting with the 
young at high school level, those that aspire to learn more 
at a tertiary level and those who are already in the work­
force.
Brand attributes
• Professional Focused —  bringing together discipline and 
knowledge, in a framework that is focused on professional 
development within a global network or challenging indi­
viduals.
• Alignment —  clear and concise way to maximise business 
potential. It is proactive and creative in approach, and 
fresh and customised in its outcome, through a collabora­
tive and dynamic network.
• Momentum —  building the continuous need for innova­
tion. A pragmatic environment enabling students to com­
pete in the global marketplace.
• Inspiration —  a revolution in new thinking that will shape 
individuals and institutions to build and motivate cultural 
change towards entrepreneurship.
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Exhibit 2.17 continued
Hero product brands
• Futurewave Creators
• Corporate entrepreneurs (as defined in Chapter 1, par. 
11)
• M entorship/In-house training
• Part-time/vocational study
• Events/seminars/speaker programme
• Futurewave Leaders
• University entrepreneurs
• Full-time study
• Part-time/vocational study
• Events/seminars/speaker programme
• Futurewave Champions
• High School young entrepreneurs
• Part-time/vocational study
• Events/seminars/speaker programme
Market brands
A network of Futurewave Institutes in the Asia-Pacific region 
and partnerships with other entrepreneurial universities 
worldwide.
Source: Enterprise IG, Brand & Identity Consultants, 2002.
14.4. A WORLDWIDE NETWORK
An entrepreneurial university fosters interaction and network­
ing in the same way that firms are expected to do, and in the 
same way that inventors such as Watt and Edison did, with sci­
entists, economists, financiers, and other stakeholders and ex­
perts in the community.
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The brand-owning 
entrepreneurial uni­
versity operates in 
close co-operation 
with an external
Education and training at entrepre­
neurial universities such as the In­
ternational University of Entrepre­
neurship are customised to bring to 
their partners a global formula and 
a global brand.
worldwide network
of alliance partners (academic institutions, business firms, e- 
technology enablers, tailored groups of consumer-students, and 
so on) with whom it forms a Value-Added Community —  
VAC (Means, Schneider, 2000). The VAC experiments with 
innovative forms of education in and for entrepreneurship, 
attracting a new generation of students —  the clerici vagantes 
of modem times —  who leave their own countries with the 
intention of being away for a couple of years or more. Usually, 
they return home having already implemented their entrepre­
neurial projects with the VAC’s educational institutions and 
companies abroad where they have studied.
The university cities of the Middle Age used to harbour for a 
while students from other communities. Each of them played 
to his or her strengths, rather than ape the host university city. 
Along the route the clerici vagantes were pollinators of new 
ideas and projects that made the university cities wealthy. 
Nowadays a circuit of native missionaires like those in the 
Middle Age is a fertile ground for ‘glocal’ communities where 
the local dimension turns into a local and global dimension. 
One of the most striking examples of the formation of glocal 
communities is the circuit of students that links Mumbai and 
Bangalore with London, Boston and California (Figure 2.13). 
Twinning entrepreneurial projects cultivated at the university 
sites within the circuit open up the door to successful entrepre­
neurial-friendly environments that, in turn, foster new and 
emerging high-growth business communities.
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BOSTON
................“LONDON-........................
The circuit of native missionaiers of 
the ‘global’ communities
^Oxford у
CALIFORNIA
27 per cent of . 1
4 000 high Salamanca ^
tech businesses — --
founded between The circuit of clerici vagantes of the university
Figure 2.13. Student mobility in the Middle Age and in the today’s 
‘global’ dimension.
Entrepreneurial universities, then, design and manage global 
networks, onsite and online, which are created and developed 
by means of worldwide alliances with learning partners and 
business organisations that link student-centred learning to on- 
the-job activities. In such a co-operative environment partici­
pants can cultivate new business ideas and turn them into com­
mercial realities. Par­
ticipants can move Diversity makes the power of differ- 
from one learning lo- ence. It creates an inter-cultural
, , • of emigration and separation.paragraph, and, in J 6
each location, the diversity and ethnic mix of both the student 
population and the faculty members play an important part in 
reducing the risk of a brain drain from developing countries 
and regions.
1991 and 1996 
were established 
by Indians and 
Chinese.
cities in the Middle Age
BANGALORE
HYDERABAD
MUMBAI
cation to another, as 
noted in the previous
context of mobility and integration 
rather than a multi-cultural context
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In the 1990s, this has been a vast phenomenon that has mainly 
affected the emerging economies, with the United States hav­
ing benefited heav­
ily from this mi­
gration, as is high­
lighted in Exhibit 
2.18. By contrast, 
the mobility rather 
than the migration 
of high-powered 
intellectual assets 
stimulates the in­
ternational trans­
fer of ideas from 
the university to the marketplace and fosters international col­
laboration between academics and business people.
The network is an international platform for the mobility of the 
higher education communities of practice. These communities 
bring together in cross-functional teams, academics and prac­
titioners from around the world. The integration of thinkers 
from industrial and consultant backgrounds with their aca­
demic counterparts strengthens the quality of educational pro­
grammes. Each partner adds value to the network, but the real 
value of it is greater than the sum of the individual parts. What 
makes the difference is a synergistic collaborative process in­
volving people with complementary competencies, which re­
sults in a symbiotic learning network (Amidon, 2001).
Open boundaries, education without 
borders, new connections, both 
physical and virtual journeys into 
other places and disciplines: all 
these are ingredients that foster new 
ideas.
Thanks to mobility within the net­
work, informal exchanges take 
shape that are sources of creativity 
and cross-fertilization of ideas.
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Exhibit 2.18
United States: The epicentre of the global talent drain
In the United States, students mainly of India and China ori­
gin, nowadays represent almost one third of the high-growth 
companies mapping America’s entrepreneurial landscape.
“In the 1990s, roughly 650 000 people from emerging mar­
kets migrated to the United States on professional-employ- 
ment visas. Over 40% of the foreign-born adults in the 
United States have at least some college education, thereby 
making that country the epicenter of the global talent drain. 
Foreign-born workers now make up 20% of all employees in 
the US. About 30% of the 1998 graduating class of the 
famed Indian Institute of Technology —  and a staggering 
80% of the graduates in computer science —  headed for 
graduate schools or jobs in the United States. Some 80% of 
foreign doctoral students in science and engineering plan to 
stay there after graduation —  an increase of 50% in 1985” .
Source: Devan, Tewari, 2001.
14.5. THE PROCESS OF NEW BUSINESS 
CREATION
Aligning learning to entrepreneurial opportunities triggers the 
process of new business creation. From this perspective, entre­
preneurial universities implant entrepreneurship cells into the 
body of academic culture in order to achieve an economic re­
turn from the amount of knowledge generated through research 
projects, empowered teams of teachers, students and business 
people, face-to-face and electronic relationships, and net­
worked enterprises emerging from academic spin-off activity. 
In so doing, entrepreneurial universities encourage students to
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think unconventionally and produce the new type of educated 
risk-taking individual needed in entrepreneurial economies.
Activity on the two complementary fronts of entrepreneurial 
capability and entrepreneurial opportunities is critical for rais­
ing the level and composition of entrepreneurship from that 
which is mostly marked by small business creation (as featured 
in the industry cluster-type model of entrepreneurial motion) to 
that in which EGCs (as featured in the knowledge cluster-type 
model of entrepreneurial motion) display increasing 
prominence (see Figure 2.10).
In view of the above, the entrepreneurial university gives a re­
sponse to the following key questions which the academic fails 
to address:
• How do faculty staff, graduates and students become 
aware of business ownership?
• How does this awareness move on to interest?
• How, why and over what period of time does interest 
translate into action?
• What makes some academics consider entrepreneurship 
as an option, and how do they pursue this option?
• What forms of enterprise do they establish?
• Do they prefer working as individuals or as teams?
• What is the nature of the relationship between the aca­
demic and his or her institution?
• How to help combine technical skills with the ability to 
handle complex organisational issues of starting and 
managing a business?
The nature of these questions pushes the entrepreneurial uni­
versity to pursue actions aimed at demolishing the cultural bar­
riers that are major impediments to the success of academic en­
trepreneurs. What these barriers are is shown in Table 2.12 
where findings from a case study referred to a Southern Italian 
university are illustrated.
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Table 2.12
Cultural barriers for academic spin-offs: 
The case of the University of Salerno in Italy
Orientation of research groups towards industrial 
applications is considered not very important. Patents are a 
minor output of research groups.
Output of research groups
medium low high
Scientific publications 100 0 0
Patents 9 39 52
Research groups lack of a business vision.
Business vision of 
research groups
medium low high
Knowledge of competitive 
forces of the market
3 32 65
Exploitation of innovative ideas does not fit into the scenario 
of expected benefits from business relationships.
Benefits from relationships 
with SMEs
major minor no
Research funding 60 30 10
Exploiting innovative 
ideas
21 12 67
Joint commercialisation of R&D results is not a driver for 
technology transfer from research groups to business firms.
Efficiency of different methods 
for technology transfer
very
efficient
fairly
efficient
not
efficient
Training of SME person­
nel
55 35 10
Joint commercialisation of 
R&D results
3 9 88
Source: Bellini, Zollo, 1997.
196 KNOWLEDGE CLUSTER
Through permitting all spin-off providers and developers 
among academic, business and other independent parties to 
have full access to the building of a new enterprise economy, 
the entrepreneurial university, embedded in a КС, marks a 
turning point in respect of the old-fashioned, industrial com­
munities that have only been capable of building fragmented 
and isolated proprietary pieces of the spin-off mechanism. In­
tegration and communication replace fragmentation and isola­
tion. The entrepreneurial university is the open environment 
where all parties can freely intervene to adjust and upgrade that 
mechanism over a period of time.
The process from creative idea generation to full commerciali­
sation is articulated in two consecutive phases. First, there is 
the pre-incubation phase (Figure 2.14), bridging the gap be­
tween the disparate cultures that must be integrated in view of 
gearing perceived opportunities more closely to the market­
place. Through action learning and team-based pre-start-ups, 
pre-incubation leads the way in ensuring that talented students 
learn how to change their ideas and projects into business 
processes for devel­
oping a new product, The entrepreneurial university re- 
exploiting existing sponds to John Kay's principle of 
know-how and ac- obliquity, which states that in an en-
cessing others’ tech­
nology or skills. The 
emphasis shifts from 
conventional aca­
demic excellence to 
the acquisition of 
creative and practi­
cal skills by moti­
vated individuals 
who could create 
their own compa-
vironment where success and sur­
vival depend on our relationships 
with our environment, and where 
our understanding of these relation­
ships is very incomplete, we rarely 
prosper by pursuing our objectives 
too directly.
(Kay, 1998)
The pre-incubation phase is a sort of 
oblique approach to the spin-off 
generation.
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nies from the business practices they have been dealing with in 
the learning network. Exhibit 2.19 describes the case of the 
Cisco’s Networking Academy Program.
Pre-incubation is followed by the incubation phase, embedded 
in a business milieu where large endowments of intellectual 
assets and a wide range of specialised physical infrastructures 
are available (Figure 2.14).
Entrepreneurial
university
Formal lectures 
♦-------------
Action learning:
Students participate 
in action learning 
teams by leveraging 
on deposits o f  per­
ceived business op­
portunities.
Team-based
pre-start-ups
Projects recruitment in 
advance of student enrolment
Business
Environment
Hands-on guidance 
Counselling 
Training
Projects-related 
laboratories
Professional support services 
marketing foresight
Experiences 
in new business 
creation
TWORKED 
ÄRT-UPS
Zero and seed funds 
j Commercialisation
Figure 2.14. The process of new business creation at the entrepre­
neurial university.
By spreading knowledge about entrepreneurship throughout 
the academic and the business environments, the entrepreneu­
rial university enables communities of like-minded potential 
entrepreneurs to come together anytime, anywhere. Moreover, 
the launch of start-ups, which are not isolated but networked to 
industrialists with a proven track record in their industry (see 
the Dutch Twinning Scheme in Exhibit 2.10), is facilitated by 
the university’s role as architect of key business relationships.
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Exhibit 2.19
The Cisco’s Networking Academy Program
The Cisco’s Networking Academy Program. A partnership 
between Cisco (the worldwide leader in networking for the 
Internet) and education, business, government, and commu­
nity organizations around the world. The Networking Acad­
emy curriculum centers on teaching students to design, build, 
and maintain computer networks. The Program prepares stu­
dents for the 21st Century workplace, while serving as a valu­
able model for e-learning. Students, faculty and administra­
tors discuss their programmes and experiences. Although 
every Networking Academy offers a standard curriculum, 
each school can tailor its program to meet the needs of its 
population, infrastructure, and goals for the future.
Source: h ttp://w w w .cisco.com /w arp/public/779/edu/ 
academ y/...
Students combine the theoretical part of their studies with a 
real project, designed for a company. In the case of post­
graduate courses, while the academic universities still rely on 
students independ­
ently from business 
projects, the entre­
preneurial univer­
sity first looks for 
projects inside com­
panies and then re­
cruits young gradu­
ates as “project managers” for their implementation.
During the second half of the 1990s, the Steinbeis Foundation 
in Stuttgart has been successfully experimenting a prototype of 
this model. The Foundation introduces the would-be project 
manager (who is a graduate in engineering or natural science)
A ‘high-touch ’ approach in terms of 
real business experience allows 
each and every participant to un­
dergo something of a personal 
transformation from a student or 
graduate into an aspiring entrepre­
neur.
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to the company. If the company accepts the person for the 
project, a contract between the graduate and the Foundation is 
signed. The Foundation itself signs a contract with the com­
pany, is responsible for the results and provides the coaching 
for the project-manager. The company pays for the project and 
the project manager gets a reduced salary for his work from the 
Foundation. The programme lasts 10 months. In this period the 
project manager prepares the project for the company in about 
1 300 hours of work. Concurrently, he gets 12 blocks of 
seminars in different areas of the international management. 
The amount of money the company saves has been estimated 
in the range of 20-30 per cent if compared with the cost of an 
engineer in a permanent job and much more in relation to the 
hiring of a junior management consultant (Table 2.13).
Table 2.13
Project cost for the firm. Cost comparison with permanent 
employee in the firm and with junior management consultant 
(cost of engineer in permanent job = 100)
Project Engineer in Junior manager
manager permanent job consultant
(1) (2) (3)
Total cost 70 100 180
Cost per hour 80 100 210
(1) and (3) project cost; (2) recruitment cost, salary, additional 
salary costs.
Source: Steinbeis Foundation.
A second type of model, expounded in Exhibit 2.20, is the 
educational programme designed by the International Univer­
sity of Entrepreneurship and implemented in collaboration 
with academic universities, other higher education institutions 
and even the learners. The programme is anchored to the con-
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viction that being an entrepreneur is “a way of life made up of 
an obsessive vision-making, a touch of craziness, a pathologi­
cal optimism, and the ability to stand out from the crowd” —  
as has been pointed out by Anita Roddick, the founder of The 
Body Shop (Roddick, 2002: 7). All these attributes are subjects 
that cannot be taught. Thus, the programme is centred around 
“the development of the capacity of students to ‘feel’ entrepre­
neurship“ (Gibb, 2002: 137) and how learning is fostered by 
generative rather than adaptive experience (see paragraph 5 in 
this Chapter) in a wide variety of perspectives.
Exhibit 2.20
Business to business in reality: Education by business 
projects. From science to applications and markets.
Master in entrepreneurship: a joint programme between 
the International University of Entrepreneurship and 
the University of Tartu.
The Master:
• Stimulates entrepreneurial capacity.
• Couples together entrepreneurial capacity and entrepre­
neurial opportunities.
• Enrols students from all faculties, not only —  as usually 
happens —  from business schools and economics.
• Links companies and students.
• Makes risk capital available to students with solid ideas 
to start up a firm of their own.
• Provides students with an incubator-like facility.
The M aster’s degree is an interdisciplinary business educa­
tion and project-based curriculum that raises students’ 
awareness of entrepreneurship as an alternative career 
choice among many options. The curriculum aims at en­
hancing the entrepreneurial role vis-ä-vis managerial, pro­
fessional and technical functions.
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Exhibit 2.20 continued
A student-centred learning setting tightly connected to oper­
ating businesses provides much of the material and the 
faculty for participants to become literate in entrepreneur­
ship and more enterprising.
Students learn how to deal with situations involving high 
levels of uncertainty, complexity and competitiveness. On 
the one hand, this could eventually result in developing a 
good start-up. On the other hand, students will definitively 
improve their employability as businesspeople capable of 
recognising and developing new opportunities inside exist­
ing organisations.
Students combine the theoretical part of their qualification 
with business projects. A business-projects portfolio feeds 
the training process, and students are involved in it through 
a programme for internships that give them hands-on 
experience in an entrepreneurial environment. The IUE 
founder, a knowledge pool of the Zernike Group BV, 
provides the initial source of business projects, thanks to its 
expertise in international marketing and commercialisation 
of innovative products and services.
Availability of start-up financing is secured by a cluster of 
organisations that includes business firms with expertise in 
starting and growing new companies, zero-stage and seed 
capital funds, informal investors and incubators.
The International University of Entrepreneurship does not 
worry about age. The population of students, enrolled in accor­
dance with the upstream recruitment of business projects, is 
selected in terms of quality rather than age. University students 
and graduates are only one target for advanced entrepreneur­
ship education. The IUE also offers entrepreneurship education 
to the working adult between 25 and 44 years old. This is the
202 KNOWLEDGE CLUSTER
demographic group most likely to start a new business (Na­
tional Commission
on Entrepreneurship, Schoolchildren will be inculcated 
2002a). Moreover, with the kind of attitude and skills 
since in the educa- that will be essential for the budding
tion system it is un- entrepreneur.
popular to teach the (Excerpted from the Smart School
characteristics of en- Flagship long-term plan of the
trepreneurship, the Malaysian government)
IUE is holding courses
designed for teenagers so as to offer them insights about the 
entrepreneur in his or her real-life business. This will help 
them in all career fields besides that of running a company. 
Furthermore, the IUE does not restrict its activities to creating 
new entrepreneurs but also to bringing to a much higher level 
of performance those involved with business.
In summary, entrepreneurial universities are intellectual infra­
structures that lead
to the formation of The entrepreneurial university
new ventures which throws up novel insights into the
do not remain small education market.
businesses for long.
They offer innovative learning settings and hands-on experi­
ences inside operating businesses, thereby encouraging more 
people to become literate in entrepreneurship. Project-based 
curricula and collaborative partnerships with the private sector 
yield academic and extracurricular programmes that pay for 
themselves.
In addition, as catalysts of a pool of interests toward which 
agents in the market and investors with specialised expertise in 
starting and developing new companies tend to converge, en­
trepreneurial universities make start up businesses more likely 
to succeed. Risk capital is made available to students with 
sound ideas to start up a firm of their own.
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That entrepreneurs are ‘bom, not made’ is a common view. 
The claim of entrepreneurial universities is that people who are 
taught about entrepreneurship are more likely to build on new 
companies and to take advantage of entrepreneurial opportu­
nities.
In the introduction to a previous book (Mitra, Formica, 1997: 
20) we have observed that “The university is the symbolic mi­
lieu of ‘creators’: intrate spectatoteres exite creatores (those 
who enter as spectators exit as creators) is the inscription 
found at the entrance to one of the Italian universities”. Those 
who enter creators exit as entrepreneurs might be the comple­
mentary motto of the entrepreneurial university.
A transitional sequence (or divergence) between learning 
(first) and (then) working has marked the life of many an in­
dustrial worker for whom the academic university has contrib­
uted to shape a ‘once-and-for-all’ career plan. The synchroni­
sation (or convergence) of work and learning is the very fea­
ture of today’s knowledge worker for whom the entrepreneu­
rial university is the agent that speeds up the metabolism of his 
or her knowledge body throughout his life. And since lifelong 
learning paves the way to a promising business market for edu­
cation, the entrepreneurial university becomes one of the lead­
ing industries of the new enterprise economy.
The dividing line be­
tween the entrepre­
neurial university and 
the academic one is 
far from clear. In 
practice, the former 
as a complementary 
institution might re­
vitalise the declining 
life cycle of the latter,
The entrepreneurial university 
makes the academic university more 
valuable for the customers (stu­
dents, parents, government, donors, 
and companies). A complementary 
relationship would help enlarge the 
market for education, being custom­
ers attracted to buy additional ser­
vices to those provided by academic 
institutions.
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should its role grow in popularity within the academic commu­
nity. A lasting collaboration requires both institutions to reach, 
through totally different routes, the same conclusion and com­
plement suggestions about how the role of education as a mo­
tor for the entrepreneurial economy ought to be expanded. Al­
though it is commonplace to emphasise collaboration enabling 
incumbent academic institutions to be more entrepreneurial, 
for the time being both complementary relationships and com­
petition between the new entrant (i.e., the entrepreneurial uni­
versity) and the incumbent (the academic university) are likely 
to be displayed.
15. ANGEL INVESTORS AND SEED 
CAPITALISTS
Experience has proven that quite a number of projects remain 
forever buried in research, commercially promising technolo­
gies often get stuck in an early stage, and many of the those 
firms that are growth-oriented fails in their early lives because 
they cannot cross the
so called “valley of Important innovations are lost due
death” or “no man’s to the lack of management support,
land”, due to the lack a proper market approach and risk-
of a proper market bearing capital.
approach and risk-bearing capital.
Traditional finance companies (banks, etc.) are not keen on 
providing capital in the pre-start up phase of highly innovative 
businesses. Start-up funds bridge this gap in an efficient and 
business-like way. The main objective of the funds is to create 
technological and innovative industrial businesses by provid­
ing risk-bearing capital and management support. Funds will 
operate exclusively as seed capital organisations which partici­
pate in the start-up company and also provide intensive man­
agement support, thus increasing the potential for the success
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of the new enterprise. Furthermore, the intensive support gives 
rise to a positive effect on the return on investment.
Communities of practice shaped by seed capitalists (Exhibit 
2.21) and informal or ‘angel’ investors (Exhibit 2.22) as well, 
who first and foremost invest in people, coalesce in KPs where 
they can spontaneously and transparently interact with comple­
mentary experts and potential entrepreneurs. That in the same 
pool come together all the actors whose expertise is needed to 
start growth-oriented firms, this yields benefits in terms of:
• Supporting potential entrepreneurs to draw up business 
plans and business strategies in the field of market 
analysis, feasibility studies, financial planning, commer­
cial contacts, recruitment of additional management, and 
so on.
• Financing technical development of new products or 
product-prototypes.
• Providing advice and support in bringing new products 
or product prototypes into a commissioning phase.
• Involving professionals and businessmen who are mem­
bers of knowledge pools abroad so they can act as spear­
heads for the new born companies to enter foreign mar­
kets.
• Providing risk capital, advice and support in bringing 
the business idea to a stage at which it will be an inter­
esting subject for investment by a venture capital or­
ganisation (this process is illustrated in Figure 2.15).
• Making available an incubator-type organisation 
equipped to host growth-oriented start-ups.
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Exhibit 2.21
Creation and management of seed capital funds for high- 
growth start-ups: The case of the TIFAN fund and the 
Zernike Group in the Netherlands
Technologie-en Industriefonds voor Amsterdam en Noord- 
Holland (TIFAN) B.V. is one of the seed capital funds that 
were initiated by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(MEA) in order to provide early stage (start-up) capital to 
high-technology starters. TIFAN was set-up as a public-pri­
vate partnership of the following organisations: Rabobank 
Nederland and local operating Rabobanks in Noord-Holland; 
Cities of Amsterdam, Den Helder, Alkmaar and Hoorn; Uni­
versity of Amsterdam; Province of Noord-Holland; HEIs of 
Amsterdam and Alkmaar; and Zernike Group.
The main objective of TIFAN is to create technological and 
innovative industrial businesses, related to the know-how 
areas in the province of Noord-Holland by providing risk 
bearing capital and management support. The fund exclu­
sively operates as a capital provider for starting companies 
and companies less than 3.5 years old. In exchange for the 
capital injection, TIFAN obtains a minority share in the 
company. After a number of years when the company is 
growing and developing, and no longer dependent on seed 
capital because it has become an object of interest for regular 
capital (e.g. VC, bank), the shares of the company are sold. 
As TIFAN is a revolving fund, profit will flow back into the 
fund in order for other starters to benefit from it. A Board of 
Directors, consisting of seven representatives of the partici­
pating organisations takes decisions on investments. The 
total fund capital of TIFAN B.V. is € 9 million.
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Exhibit 2.21 continued
To manage the TIFAN funds the Ministry of Economic af­
fairs appointed the Zernike Group. The Zernike Group, a 
Dutch based company, is an international company in the 
field of risk-bearing capital, technology transfer, facility 
management, patenting and licensing, engineering, and 
consultancy (accounting, financing, marketing and sales). 
The Zernike Group has over € 177 million in start-up funds 
under its congtrol. It is an active co-investor with RaboBank, 
AEGON, and ABN-Amro, and the international venture capi­
tal industry. The Group is a shareholder in different compa­
nies in the field of technology and technology transfer.
The development of Zernike Group was initiated in 1992 by 
the management of the Zernike Science Park in the Nether­
lands. In 1983, the University of Groningen, regional authori­
ties and the Ministry of Economic Affairs created a comer- 
cial/academic organisation in the form of a science park in 
order to synergies science and business. Over the years, the 
development of the Zernike Science Park led to many new 
ideas on the commercialising of scientific development. As a 
result, the activities of the Science Park changed signify- 
cantly, offering seed capital via the Zernike Seed Fund, Hi­
Tech. Ventures and Z-Finance as well as a methodology for 
protecting and selling developments, commercial marketing 
and sales of high-tech products, a department for accounting 
and tax support, and business accommodation. These changes 
were made to achieve a main goal, which is to become self- 
sufficient by carrying out activities in technology transfer 
that are comercially worthwhile. In 1992, the management 
founded a private company, the Zernike Group B.V.
Source: www.zernikegroup.com
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Exhibit 2.22
The case of the US community of angel investors
Angel investors are individuals, often former entrepreneurs, 
who invest in growing companies for a variety of reasons, 
ranging from fun to making a high return on investments to 
an interest in mentoring new firms. In addition to providing 
funds, they provide advice, counsel, and contacts to new en­
trepreneurs. Typical angel investments fall in the range of 
$ 50 000 to $ 500 000 per transaction. These relatively small 
increments put together are substantsial. In 2000, the Univer­
sity of New Hampshire’s Center for Venture Research esti­
mated that 50 000 companies in the US received approxi­
mately $ 40 billion in angel funding. Until the venture capi­
tal boom of 1999-2001, angel investing regularly outpaced 
the total investments of all venture capital firms put together.
The average size of an angel investment between $ 50 000 
and $ 500 000 falls in a range that fills an important niche in 
private equity markets. Entrepreneurs regularly report that 
obtaining funding in the range between $ 100 000 and $ 2 -3  
million can be quite difficult. These amounts are often too 
small to interest venture capital firms or banks, but are too 
large to be generated via friends, family and other personal 
contacts. Thus, angels play a critical role in nurturing entre­
preneurship.
Traditional business angels worked alone or in small unor­
ganized groups. Today, many regions of the US boast organ­
ized angel groups that have become a key component in the 
private capital markets. These formal groups may actually 
serve to encourage more angel investment. By reducing ex­
posure and formalizing the investment review process, for­
mal angel groups may serve to encourage more people to 
consider investing.
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Exhibit 2.22 continued
As organized groups have emerged, they have also taken on 
more diverse orientations. Angel groups targeting women or 
ethnic minorities are also growing. Angel networks also ap­
pear to be sprouting in rural areas, and other regions outside 
of the traditional technology hot spots.
Formal procedures and industry “best practices” have accom­
panied the rise of the business angel groups. Most of the 
groups seem to use similar investment screening procedures. 
At the same time, groups still utilize a wide range of organ­
izational and legal structures.
Source: Excerpts from National Commission on Entrepren- 
eruship, 2002b.
A broad spectrum of business angels, seed capitalists, and 
householders who make transactions in the financial market is 
beneficial in two ways. It helps transform a workforce- and 
payroll-based economy into an entrepreneurial one that en­
hances business partnership contracts. Second, it makes the 
economy as a whole more productive and growth-biased, since 
the wealth effect generated by a broad participation in fast- 
growing start-ups encourages consumption.
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Figure 2.15. Financiers of the entrepreneurial growth companies. 
Stages
Seed —  incubation; concept to be proven and developed.
Start-up —  product developed; initial marketing takes place.
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Informal investors and seed capitalists provide strong support to 
management, which drops heavily in the later stages (see the dotted 
line).
Seed funds bridge the gap between informal investors and the ven­
ture capital industry.
16. CONCLUSIONS: KNOWLEDGE CLUSTERS 
AS ENGINES OF NEWBORN 
SOPHISTICATED ENTERPRISES
Whether or not a society is entrepreneurial depends in part on 
the legitimacy, and esteem accorded to those who pursue the 
entrepreneurial route. Communities in which entrepreneurship 
can thrive create more jobs and wealth. Entrepreneurship fo­
ments the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction 
through which the new replaces the old. New opportunities are 
perceived, capitalised and converted into marketable products 
or services.
Fresh competition in the free market economy and narrowing 
down of the international borders will significantly influence 
new company formation and the underlying models of entre­
preneurial motion. Ample opportunities for creativity and inno­
vation are driving the move towards the formation of small 
businesses that, from the start, enter into a fast and high- 
growth phase —  the so-called “entrepreneurial growth compa­
nies”.
In this chapter we 
have examined the en­
trepreneurial stance 
that typifies knowledge 
clusters. Knowledge 
pools and communities 
of practice that make 
up KCs are entrepreneurial in their attitude, their members are 
or can turn into entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurial patterns
Knowledge clusters shows a three­
fold entrepreneurial trait: their or­
ganisation is entrepreneurial, their 
members seize entrepreneurial op­
portunities and entrepreneurial pat­
terns mould their reciprocal rela­
tions.
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shape the interaction between them. On the whole, KCs envis­
age a new enterprise economy based on fast-growing start-ups.
It is in the КС context that widely held myths and misconcep­
tions about entrepreneurship throughout society and policy­
makers are challenged. We have already commented on myths 
such as those whereby most entrepreneurial companies are 
based on breakthrough technologies and their founders are ex­
perienced experts in their fields (see par. 7 in this Chapter). 
Other myths concern the high level of risk that presents a new 
undertaking, the importance of the business plan and the reli­
ance on venture capital (Table 2.14).
Table 2.14
Risk, business plan and venture capital:
Three myths about entrepreneurship
Uncalculated risk: Entrepreneurs take wild, uncalculated risks to 
start their companies. In reality, many entrepreneurs, when they 
start out do not have much to lose, and they have an uncanny 
ability to convince others —  employees, individual investors,
suppliers, and landlords —  to share their start-up risks.___________
Well-conceived plan: Entrepreneurs have a well-researched, 
well-conceived strategic plan when they start their companies. 
What enables most entrepreneurs to be successful in their new 
ventures is their flexibility to change. Starting a new business is 
like jumping from rock to rock up a stream rather than building a 
bridge from a blueprint. Companies develop tightly constructed 
business plans when they are ready to seek outside investments. 
Dependence on venture capital: All entrepreneurs rely on ven­
ture capital to fund their businesses. Venture capital companies 
only fund a very small number of businesses each year —  about 
four thousand overall. Most entrepreneurs start with their own 
money and money from friends and family, and only look to 
venture capital when they need to capitalise on their successes,
usually in the later stages of growth.____________________________
Source: National Commission on Entrepreneurship, 2001b.
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As for uncalculated risk, spontaneous inter-personal relations, 
which are specific of cross-boundary knowledge pools and 
communities of practice, encourage the new entrepreneur to be 
guided by his or her well-developed sense of the need to use 
outside resources, be they human, technological or financial.
As for the business plan and the funding needed to manage the 
challenge of fast growth, the real problem is not the depend­
ence on venture capital, but the availability of those options 
both in terms of risk capital and management support that are 
represented by informal investors and seed capitalists —  in 
addition to a conducive macroeconomic framework (for the 
latter, see in Exhibit 2.23 the measure for tax relaxation in 
favour of fast-growing businesses conceived by the US legisla­
tor).
Exhibit 2.23
The U.S. BRIDGE Act
Introduced by U.S. Reps. Jim DeMint (R-SC), Brian Baird 
(D-WA), and a bipartisan list of co-sponsors, the BRIDGE 
Act seeks to help entrepreneurs grow during a period many 
call the “valley of death” or “no m an’s land”.
Fast-growing firms face major challenges in terms of manag 
cash flow. When first starting out, an entrepreneur takes 
earnings (profits) and reinvests them back into the business. 
If the firm starts growing rapidly, these revenues can be 
insufficient to allow the entrepreneur to hire new people, 
make capital investments, create new marketing channels, 
and the like.
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Exhibit 2.23 continued
Seeking outside funding is the typical response to this quan­
dary. But finding this money is difficult and often impossi­
ble. New entrepreneurs generally need small amounts of 
funding (somewhere between $ 250 000 and $ 1 million). 
Few venture capital funds provide this sort of funding, and 
most banks require collateral or a more extensive track re­
cord than the new entrepreneur can provide. The result is 
“No M an’s Land” —  that is, the entrepreneur is capable of 
expanding his or her business, but is unable to amass the 
funding needed to do it.
The BRIDGE Act seeks to address this challenge by allow­
ing tax deferrals by fast-growing businesses. Specifically, 
the proposal focuses on small firms with less than $ 10 
million in gross receipts and with revenues growing at a rate 
10% higher than the average of the previous two years. 
Firms in this category will be able to defer up to $ 250 000 
of federal income tax liability for two years. Eligible 
companies would then have a four-year time frame to pay 
the deferred amount, plus interest.
Source: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery 
/z?dl07:h.r.03062
ICs are a fertile ground for small businesses, which fight for 
their financial self-sufficiency rather than being focussed on 
growth. For example, in its entrepreneurship assessment re­
ferred to Italy, where most of the entrepreneurial population 
has been incubated in and nurtured by the industrial districts, 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Minniti, 1999) has re­
marked:
• Self-sufficiency —  that is, the owner-manager of a small 
business is inclined to be financially and managerially 
self-sufficient, having little or no recourse to external re­
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sources. A self-imposed limit to growth discourages the 
development of growth-oriented firms.
• The paucity of financing options for entrepreneurs and 
the consequent financial fragility of their firms.
• Their dependence on the banking industry and the heavy 
use of short-term debt.
• The creation of many small local banks and the develop­
ment of close customer relationships, which do not in­
clude the provision of capital in the pre-start-up phase of 
highly innovative businesses.
Conversely, KCs serve the broader purpose of cultivating 
growth-oriented new ventures. Nascent entrepreneurs focus­
sing more on growth and less on self-sufficiency can tap into 
the wealth of “animal spirits” and their experience inside 
knowledge clusters. There is a simple reason why this can 
happen. The opinions of the individuals who, on their own ca­
pacity, participate in knowledge pools and communities of 
practice carry more weight than the views of the organisations 
to which they belong. Creativity in business is stimulated by 
investment decisions whereby the received wisdom of corpo­
rate principles of rational calculation is counterbalanced by the 
capability of the “animal spirits” to seize mere ideas. “If the 
animal spirits —  Keynes noticed in his General Theory —  are 
dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters... enterprise 
will fade and die”, and nascent entrepreneurs will be disheart­
ened in the motivation to exploit their own specific talents and 
ideas in new areas of industry.
CHAPTER THREE. CLUSTER POLICY
The best people and resources 
are usually invested in an a t­
tempt to defend the old. A public  
policy issue that concerns me is 
that th ere’s always a con­
stituency fo r  the old, but there ’s 
not such a vocal and well-or­
ganized constituency fo r  the 
new.
(James Utterback)
We see the opening o f  a Pan­
d o ra ’s box which, once opened, 
cannot be shut again.
(John Kay)
1. INTRODUCTION
Growth is not the result of a master strategic plan but the prod­
uct of the spontaneous co-evolution of technology, the physical 
and social environment and economic institutions. Yet policy­
makers have held and still hold sceptical view about the vision 
of the cluster economy as an atomistic one in which basic
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decisions are made in an impersonal market and the pursuit of 
self-interest produces 
the greatest social 
good. Policymakers’ 
understanding is that 
in self-government 
of clusters there are 
blanks, which have to 
be filled by government.
Cluster formation and development —  their argument goes —  
involves some inheritance and serendipity, but requires pur­
poseful action. Thus, the role of government and state institu­
tions lie in determining the initial phases of the cluster building 
process and shaping its evolution.
In their effort to examine why clusters should be part of an 
overall regional economic strategy, policymakers have been at­
tuned to the recommendations of both intergovernmental or­
ganisations like the OECD with its Local Economic and Em­
ployment Development Programme (LEED) and prestigious 
national think-tanks as the DATAR in France, which argue 
that local or regional authorities have a duty to co-ordinate 
cluster activities. Local/regional authorities should play the 
role of catalyst. They ought to raise awareness among busi­
nesses for the need to co-operate, as well as compiling basic 
data about the industrial sector concerned and detecting prob­
lems to be solved through collective action. Depending on re­
gional culture, those authorities can also play a role as initia­
tors of the process by promoting meetings between the various 
partners and by guaranteeing or even financing the initiative.
Within the cluster economy, a fertile ground for public inter­
vention encompasses, among other things:
• Those firms, mostly micro and small enterprises, which 
are not organised to handle compliance or govern itself.
In general, local and regional au­
thorities with the power to shape 
policies regard the cluster as a 
small child who needs a tutor, 
leader and educator until such a 
time as he/she is capable of acting 
on his/her own.
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• Wealthy and contented mature clusters enjoying the 
fruits of labours past but reluctant to innovate.
• Grown-up clusters that need to be expanded beyond na­
tional borders.
• Potential or embryonic clusters.
Industrial self-discipline tempered by governmental partner­
ship is the fundamental theory underlying public intervention. 
A fair measure of state economic interventionism should play 
an important role in the
evolution of the cluster Public authorities have been lobby- 
as a non-individualistic ing hard in favour of the orthodoxy 
market economy qr that government is the centre of 
communitarian society, good economic performance. 
based on mutual trust,
spontaneous sociability and co-operative relationships within a 
constellation of small enterprises. Under a regime of laissez 
faire, to be forced out of business is the danger that small firms 
often cannot avoid. To achieve economic emancipation, their 
principals ought to perform the role of dynamic entrepreneurs 
on a scale larger than that of the local and even the national 
economy. Expansions of market would require the creation of 
technical and commercial openings.
Crucial to the delivery of this vision and these roles is the crea­
tion of effective instruments of business-govemment collabo­
ration. Intermediate institutions are needed which sit between 
the laissez faire and the commanded economy, neither con­
trolled by any specific group nor directed by government. This 
is an Agency-based public-private partnership or, in the com­
mon parlance, a “quasi-govemmental development Agency”, 
which sees co-operation, not benign neglect as the better or­
ganising principle to achieve economic dynamism balanced by 
social and environmental responsibility.
Integrating associational activities, industry, trade and profes­
sional associations, unions, consortia of firms, et cetera mould
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the Agency, enhancing the concept and practice of a co-opera­
tive, collectivist democracy in which public interest adds up to 
the aggregate of these pressure group interests. In this domain 
the Agency claims to
play the role of ‘hub The Agency provides the cluster’s
actor’ or ‘meta-man- governance structure.
ager’, whose mission
is that of co-ordinating inter-organisational processes and ac­
tivities mainly addressed to boost innovation and competitive­
ness, and managing as well both tangible and intangible assets 
(Carbonara, Mitra, 2001).
The Agency should enable firms to achieve their aims. By and 
large, the Agency’s activities embraces advocacy (i.e., a voice 
at the table of all regional administrative structures), input into 
policy formulation (from regions to centre and within regions), 
support and help in bidding for funds from all sources, incuba­
tion of projects, technical advice.
This chapter deals with the subject of quasi-govemmental 
Agencies designed to foster cluster-based development as pro­
viders of business services. We give some thought as to why 
and how this particular type of para-governmental organisation 
(from now on referred to as the “Agency” or “Agency model”) 
is influenced by or even depends upon ideologues and organ­
ised economic interest groups, indirectly manoeuvred by gov­
ernment officials —  all claiming to determine what values 
ought to be shared in the cluster. The main conclusion is that 
the Agency model is by far the less effective means available 
to policymakers who would be willing to induce governmental 
partnership both as a vehicle to reinforce existing clusters and 
an important factor in cluster building.
Prospects for success are limited in the case of government 
approaches that rely on programmes run by government agen­
cies. Active public intervention that gives power to these
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agencies to act for the creation and development of clusters 
means that it is the gov-
Public intervention for clusters de­
mands a light touch. Government 
should encourage private leadership 
rather than relying on government 
agencies with a mandate for cluster 
creation and development.
owners and managers who bring their vision and commitment 
into the arena (Exhibit 3.1). If there is a role for interventionist 
policies in coping with the challenges of the cluster economy, 
it is that of giving a much greater voice to free agents such as 
those facilitating intermediaries positioned in the marketplace 
who compete among themselves to meet the cluster needs.
emment that “steers and 
rows”. Instead, clusters 
requires private leader­
ship responsibilities from 
civic entre^ eneurs. 
These are the business
Exhibit 3.1
A civic entrepreneur: Fred Terman
Fred Terman is the epitome of the civic entrepreneur. The 
“random” catalytic event he produced gave birth to the inno­
vative cluster of ICT companies in the Silicon Valley. 
Terman was Dean of Stanford University’s Department of 
Electrical Engineering, and had a vision of close industry- 
university partnerships. He convinced Dr. William Shockley, 
the inventor of the electronic transistor, to establish in the 
new Stanford Industrial Park, with a brains trust of young 
engineers from MIT etc. But eight of the brightest were 
frustrated and alienated by Shockley’s caustic personality, 
and left to form Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation —  Intel 
and Motorola, are descendants of Fairchild.
Source: The Clustering Alliance Newsletter, May 2002, No 
29.
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It has been advocated that cluster-based local economic de­
velopment requires a cluster facilitator funded by an economic 
development Agency (Exhibit 3.2). The weak point of this 
move is how to forestall the risk that the facilitator would 
break away from the marketplace and move into full-swing 
business-politics.
Exhibit 3.2
The cluster facilitator
According to Cluster Navigators Ltd, a New Zealand firm 
that provides consultancy and training on cluster-based local 
economic development, the cluster facilitator “is a corner­
stone in cluster development, with a long term role” .
“The facilitator is usually funded, particularly in the early 
stages, by an economic development agency. The role in­
cludes building a private-sector led leadership group for the 
cluster, and supporting task forces/project teams. It is impor­
tant that the facilitator empowers others, partly so a portfolio 
of early initiatives is developed”.
“Through an in-depth knowledge of the key stakeholders 
within the cluster, the facilitator adds value through estab­
lishing linkages at the network, supply chain and cluster 
levels” .
“The facilitator needs to be comfortable with leading from 
behind. The role is essentially that of a relationship builder, 
not an analyst, removing the isolation of many cluster stake­
holders”.
Source: LED News, The Competitiveness Institute, Septem­
ber 2002.
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2. BLOOMING, WITHERING AND THE 
RETURN OF THE AGENCY MODEL: 
THE US EXPERIENCE, 1933-2002
Early in the decade of depression President Franklin Roosevelt 
urged innovative solutions to lift the country out of the depths 
of the Great Depression. The TVA (Tennessee Valley Author­
ity) Act and the National Industrial Recovery Act signed by 
Roosevelt, respectively, on 18 May and 16 June, 1933, were 
two of the New Deal’s most innovative ideas. In particular, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, envisaged by the President as “a 
corporation clothed with the power of government but pos­
sessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise”, 
was a totally new kind of Agency from which later on, in other 
countries and different circumstances, public authorities drew 
inspiration.
Roosevelt’s model of Agency inaugurated the age of adminis­
trative processes replacing the market in order to secure effi­
ciency and protect both producers and consumers (Hawley, 
1966). The New Deal’s policy sought to prevent “excessive 
competition”. To stop prices falling, controls were brought in, 
alongside other new and avowedly anti-business regulations. 
Corporate welfare was assumed to be the outcome of the pano­
ply of government-approved business agreements sponsored 
by a number of business organisations and endowed with sub­
sidies.
A distinctive trait of TVA was the extensive power exercised 
by local interest groups that fix the agenda and determine the 
taking-decision process of the TVA’s programmes (Selznick, 
1966). In this respect the TVA acted as a precursor or path­
finder of the post-war interest groups led type of agencies.
Four decades later, in the summer of 1977, and in totally dif­
ferent conditions, “David Packard asked a number of his fel­
low CEOs to join him in creating a proactive voice for Silicon
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Valley businesses. The result was the formation of the Silicon 
Valley Manufacturing Group, which has successfully tackled 
some of the toughest challenges facing high-tech employers 
and their employees”15 (www.svmg.org).
Similar to the Roosevelt’s Agency, the Packard’s Group 
searched for innovative solutions to issues like transportation, 
housing, education, and the environment. But far from Pack­
ard’s mind was the vision of a non-market alternative type of 
Agency. Even if the Manufacturing Group was “founded on 
the premise that local employers should be actively involved in 
working with government to find innovative solutions”16, the 
Group is a lively sign of a new industrial self-policing. It is the 
market rather than an administrative process that drags the cart 
of the economy. The Group has proved that cluster develop­
ment in Silicon Valley as well as in other communities of the 
USA can be successfully driven by industrial leaders. The 
States and regional authorities provide only indirect assistance 
for education, housing, transport and telecommunication infra­
structures, and environment.
15 “As of January 2001, the Manufacturing Group is proud to repre­
sent 190 of Silicon Valley’s most respected employers who provide 
nearly 275 000 local jobs. Membership is open to high-tech firms 
and supporting industries such as software, systems, manufacturing, 
financial services, accounting, transportation, health care, defence, 
communications, education and utilities” (www.svmg.org).
16 The Group has established a Government Relations Committee 
whose goal is “to provide member companies with opportunities to 
meet and establish positive relationships with local, state and federal 
public policy leaders, and to review and advocate on select tax, fi­
nance, expenditure and performance policies of government Agen­
cies. In addition, the Committee educates member company repre­
sentatives about public policy issues, processes and systems” 
(www.svmg.org).
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It took twenty or more years to complete the road of self-gov­
ernment. In 1998, after only two decades since Packard paved 
the way for a market option to the Agency model, 78 Silicon 
Valley entrepreneurs signed a “Declaration of Independence” 
in order to be free from subsidies. As one of the Declaration’s 
authors, T. J. Rodgers (Cypress Semiconductor CEO), puts it: 
“Each year the US government gives away nearly US $ 65 bil­
lion in corporate subsidies —  handouts that arrive in the form 
of tax breaks, export incentives, and pork-barrel contracts. 
These policies only harm competitiveness and increase taxes. 
Politicians are destructive people. They give us their money, 
then take it away in taxes as well as our freedom in the mar­
ketplace. That’s the game.” (Wired, August 1998: 87).
The Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurs realised that the Agency 
model backed by government subsidies as a form of “corporate 
welfare” was a device through which money would have been 
taken from their left hand and returned to their right hand, but 
with much dead weight loss along the way. In other words, 
they got a full understanding of Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s fa­
mous statement that “The art of taxation consists in so pluck­
ing the goose as to obtain the largest number of feathers with 
the least possible amount of hissing”.
In all the time that has passed since the Roosevelt’s Agency 
model was created, an increasing effort has gone into examin­
ing abuse of discretion by Agencies. What has been pointed 
out is that lines between legislation and execution are not clear. 
Agencies operating under clear congressional guidance are not 
necessarily more competent and reliable than free agents that 
are governed by comparatively open-ended market guidance. 
“The essential problem of regulation, which amounts to a con­
stitutional problem, is that the Agencies act without a spending 
constraint” —  as Christopher DeMuth of American Enterprise 
Institute aptly stated in the case of the Environmental Protec­
tion Agency (DeMuth, 1999).
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Since the late 1970s, Congress and the federal government had 
largely avoided creating any new regional development body. 
By that time, the TVA was among the few holdovers from pre­
vious interest in regional development strategies. During the 
Clinton administration, A1 Gore addressed this matter saying 
that the agencies will have to “justify why they should con­
tinue to exist at all”17. In America, by the end 1990s Gore’s 
view was backed by politicians from all persuasions. Thus, 
instance after instance, the age of consent with a fair, stand­
alone Agency-mother seemed to be turning to a sad ending.
Even so, in the past few years there has been strong support for 
the creation of new regional development organisations has 
come from federal economic development officials. What has 
caused the change of the policy framework —  reports the Na­
tional Commission on Entrepreneurship —  is “the recognition 
that regions are the key unit of the 21st century economy... 
Most businesses understand that economic strength and pros­
perity are generated at the regional level”. Regional develop­
ment authorities are seen as the most effective response to the 
regional economy’s priority needs of providing business ser­
vices and technical assistance, encouraging private sector in­
vestment, and fostering entrepreneurship (National Commis­
sion on Entrepreneurship, 2002c).
3. THE DREAM OF A FAIR, STAND ALONE 
AGENCY-MOTHER: THE EUROPEAN 
EXPERIENCE
In Western Europe, the follow-up to the successful way clus­
ters had been doing things within their communities was that 
policymakers were becoming increasingly sympathetic to the 
view that steps had to be taken to supplement clusters. They
17 Quoted from Micklethwait, Wooldridge, 1997: 319.
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held to be axiomatic that from a ‘no-government’ stance clus­
ters had to move neither to ‘big’ nor to ‘small’ government, 
but to a ‘clever’ and ‘effective’ one. Which meant that a super­
visory role in upgrading clusters (and even in their formation) 
had to be assigned to public bodies within the cluster commu­
nities, as it is the case of regional governments and similar in­
stitutions poised between the state and the market.
From that policy-specific ideology stemmed the idea of an 
economic development Agency as a joint public-private under­
taking that lies between those institutions and the individual 
firm. The Agency’s role is that of the implementer of pro­
grammes and policies on clusters designed by the policymak­
ers in an effort to pro­
mote competitiveness, What is termed the “Agency model” 
raise awareness of the is a division of labour between the 
importance of relation- policy-making activities by public 
ships among various officials within the governmental of- 
industries and foster fices and their implementation by 
more efficient and the Agency’s employees. 
streamlined economic development programmes and policies.
A cluster —  the argument of the interventionists went on —  is 
an atomistic economy where excessive competition hinders ef­
ficiency and therefore undermines profitable operations. Even 
though in the cluster environment the business culture is told to 
be more communitarian than individualistic, atomistic private 
producers cannot appropriate the external economies to which 
clustering gives rise. Conversely, within the Agency they 
could benefit from each other mutual support. In this respect, 
the Agency’s principle borrows from the balanced growth 
doctrine of which it is a variant that says that undertaking 
jointly n projects “any one of them would be more profitable 
than the same project undertaken in isolation” (Hirschman, 
1958: 55).
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The interventionists perceived a cluster as a collective good to 
be protected by making explicit agreements between compa­
nies. Responsibility for provoking and enforcing those agree­
ments lies with the Agency, which is the actor that creates a 
reasonable order in the cluster. In absence of this authority, 
self-interest would produce actions that might well be rational 
from the point of view of the individual company but could 
damage the cluster community. This view shows that the inter­
ventionists believed in a sort of control over a decentralized 
decision-making process to be vested in the Agency’s hands.
Rooted in a common culture, social proximity or understand­
ing, and often in a common political background, the Agency 
ought to aim at creating a shared discipline among local actors 
and building consensus around the mutual interest of compet­
ing firms in the market. Companies operating in the same or 
related businesses cluster would have learnt how to collaborate 
(in a broad range of ways, from co-ordination to co-opetition) 
in a network of mutually supportive activities. The increasing 
complexity of the enterprise requires more knowledge for in­
telligent decision, and more specialised information ought to 
be shared within clusters. Small, specialist family-owned com­
panies need to main­
tain close ties with The ideal agency resembles a “so- 
the market, develop cial entrepreneur” that builds a 
new relations and be ‘constitution ’ for business confi- 
ensured that they are denee. Its foundations are built on 
abreast of technologi- co-operation not competition.
cal advances. The in­
terventionists pointed to the Agency as the creative hand to af­
ford all these tasks. Like a fairy godmother, the Agency should 
have been the repositories of received wisdom, charged with 
the task of strengthening the cluster economy and engaged in 
teaching small entrepreneurs how to carry out their businesses 
more easily and productively.
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In practice, the Agency would have released business and 
technology development services to assist SMEs embedded in 
local clusters. Stimuli to innovation and local development 
through direct commitment and involvement of the private 
sector in the Agency’s board of directors, promotion and con­
struction of networks for mutual exchange of information be­
tween SMEs, networking with comparable agencies outside its 
own constituency: all these activities the Agency would have 
conceived and implemented thanks to the public authorities’ 
strong interest in pooling resources to be turned in favour of 
the Agency. Indeed, the interventionists’ auspices were that the 
Agency could have become the consummate body eligible for 
co-financing under various European, national and regional 
programmes. By tapping into the aid money these programmes 
would have received, the Agency should have been capable of 
increasing demand for services paid by the use of public funds.
This type of Agency turns into a matter of practical politics 
amongst those national and regional governments, mostly 
those ruled by centre-left parties. These players firmly believe 
that the formation of these Agencies is the first step in instigat­
ing growth through a mix of ‘central’ Keynesian macroeco­
nomics and ‘regional’ interventionist microeconomic policies. 
They assume that liberal market-economy mechanisms are in­
effective in inducing growth. Rather than arguing in terms of 
“the government does not know any better than enterprises 
what should be done about the economy. If firms were allowed 
to decide, they would find direction”, centre-leftist thinking is 
that “economics tell us that whenever the market fails, the gov­
ernment should step in to eliminate that failure”. The robust­
ness of government is opposed to the fragility of markets (Pos- 
ner, 1995: 413). Over the removal of obstacles to the exercise 
of choices by individual firms, lefting politicians prefer speak­
ing about intervention on their behalf. In the Hirschman’s 
terminology (Hirschman, 1958: 202), to “permissive se­
quences” those parties prefer “compulsive” ones, which are the
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outcome of their active leadership by means of co-ordinate 
market-economy mechanisms18.
A  broad range of countries has already put in place policies to 
promote local clusters either to encourage local economic de­
velopment or to ease the transition to a market economy. For 
the most part, tailoring economic policies to exploit local capa­
bilities is a task pursued by regional and city authorities who 
deem their institutions flexible enough to be better able than 
national government to ensure that development policy is 
adapted to local needs.
In the early 80s the forerunner of this movement was one of 
the most advanced regions in Europe, namely Emilia-Romagna 
(Table 3.1). Its left-wing public decision-makers saw new 
opportunities in devolved government that established new 
tasks at the local
level. Back in the Militant leftist wanted a system of
1970s, public policy "petty capitalism”, or small-scale
pundits had reckoned private enterprise, where associa-
that priority should tional activities were the social
be assigned to make manifestation of a spirit o f collabo-
the region’s compa- mtion amon% this kind 0f f ,mL 
nies more suitable to
IS A co-ordinate market economy “has a set of interlocking policies 
and institutions, which include long term relationships between 
companies and providers of capital, extensive collaboration between 
employers in the same industry, especially in standard-setting, voca­
tional training and pre-competitive research, and a commitment by 
companies to equip their workers with firm-specific and industry- 
specific skills. Liberal market economies, by contrast, rely on 
market mechanism to regulate relations between companies and 
their workers, between users and providers of capital and between 
companies and their suppliers” (Hall, Soskice, 2001).
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reinforce the dynamism of the local economy by reciprocal 
collaborative relationships.
Table 3.1
Emilia-Romagna: The economic structure of a cluster-region
• A population of 4 million and over 300 000 businesses.
• Enviable geographical position at the center of Italy’s most 
productive area, with close links to the main European mar­
kets.
• Its standard of living is among the highest in Italy.
• Thousands of small and medium-sized companies.
• A dense network of small and very small artisan-type compa­
nies.
• With a company for every 10 inhabitants, regional levels of 
entrepreneurship are among the highest in Europe.
• An employment rate among the highest in Italy.
• A strong tradition for technical training.
• Its industrial system is noticeably diversified. The most devel­
oped sector is industrial machinery, where 25% of manufac­
turing industries and approximately 50% of the total regional 
workforce operate.
• Ferrari, Lamborghini, Maserati, Ducati are just some of the 
names that can be mentioned to give an idea of how concen­
trated the high-performance motor industry culture is in the 
region.
• Internationally renowned for the industrial district system: in­
dustrial clusters with hundreds of specialised and independent 
small and medium-sized businesses operating in the same 
sector, which collaborate, compete and are concentrated in 
demarcated areas. With sales abroad reaching 60% of turnover 
in some cases, the regional districts in some sectors (ceramics, 
food production, food-processing machines, packaging ma­
chines, machine-tools, etc.) are the most significant in the 
world, for a number of businesses, in volume and total sales.
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• The sub-supply sector is one of the most developed in the 
country and it is vertically integrated with the activities o f lar- 
ger businesses._______________________________________
• Some of Italy’s most important universities and research cen- 
tres are located in Emilia-Romagna.__________________________
Source: Cordis, European Commission.
In consequence, regional policymakers endorsed the arguments 
of a sound policy geared to give business support to a wide 
range of small- and medium-sized companies which were 
serving local needs with local resources. These are the frag­
mented and traditional companies we have been describing in 
Chapter 1, par. 4. As has been said, their location is as likely to 
be influenced by incidental or historical reasons as from the 
local availability of factors relevant to their business, including 
the closeness to their market. Public policy would have led to a 
great number of those companies becoming capable of a labo­
rious and hard-working activity of local networks for engen­
dering social and pro­
ductive interdependen­
cies, in the meanwhile 
upgrading some of 
them to the status of 
local leaders whose op­
erations would have 
embraced international 
niche markets.
The rationale for the regional government policy initiatives 
was the conspicuous assumption, however short on empirical 
support, that SME-oriented business development services 
were “under-provided by the market because of their highly 
developmental nature. The reluctance of the private sector to 
invest in the supply of [those services could have locked] an
Public policy should aim at reward­
ing local SMEs with a high propen­
sity to clustering. It should also 
raise the awareness and need to col­
laborate for mutual benefit among 
those who have made it a habit to 
operate in isolation.
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SME cluster within traditional ways of doing business” (Clara 
1999). To put it differently, there are circumstances in which 
the free market either does not provide the services desired by 
SMEs or, albeit when the services are produced, SMEs are 
subject to the exclusion principle because they cannot afford to 
pay for them. Each of these situations requires the interference 
of government. The Emilia-Romagna regional government 
stepped in conceiving a public action that was instrumental in 
catalysing joint public-private efforts, even bringing business 
leaders directly into policy-making through an Agency-shaped 
body. Civil society and the private sector represented by ruling 
interests and special-interest organisations were asked to be­
come involved in formulating regional strategies and to trans­
late their commitment into real actions more closely reflecting 
the local priorities as well as reconciling the objectives of eco­
nomic competitiveness, social cohesion and environmental 
progress.
The decision to establish the Agency was made through the 
legislature, which in turn provided the funds through taxation. 
The outcome of this desire to intervene was the creation of 
common service centres for businesses, termed “Business 
Service Centres”. As providers of specialist-added value ‘real’ 
services (i.e., the op­
posite of financial 
support or monetary 
incentives), the cen­
tres sought to give 
new life and energy 
to medium-size and 
smaller enterprises 
in single-product industrial districts. These services, as op­
posed to monetary incentives directly granted to companies, 
have been defined as “activities which generate structural 
rather than temporary changes in the organisation of produc­
tion within a company. In other words, the use of such services
The associational attitude combined 
with the regional authorities’ com­
mitment brings to the establishment 
of business services centres to pro­
mote the SME collective advance of 
autonomy, innovation and competi­
tiveness.
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by a company facilitates structural changes such as process re­
structuring, product diversification or a change in the growth 
of the market” (Bellini et al., 1990).
To implement that policy, the regional government’s operative 
arm was its own Agency: ER VET —  Regional Board for Eco­
nomic Development 19. This regional development Agency 
was established in 1974 with the mission of “translating re­
gional planning choices into actions, designing and carrying 
out innovative projects together with the economic groups 
concerned”. During the second half of the 70s, the Agency’s 
main target was planning and building new business parks for 
micro and small companies. Later on, by the early 1980s, 
ERVET had turned its activity to the setting up of “a geo­
graphically distributed network of Business Service Centres 
tailored to the needs of the local economies... The Centres 
were created in collaboration with all the business associations 
operating in Emilia-Romagna, and their combined membership 
includes nearly 1 000 firms. The Centres offer members a vast 
and continuously update range of specialised services”20 
(www.ervet.it/) (Table 3.2).
19 The regional government is ERVET’s majority shareholder. Other 
partners are business associations, chambers of commerce, munici­
palities, and Banks (www.ervet.it/).
20 “Taken together, the Centres and the parent organisation consti­
tute the ERVET System. [Nowadays] the ERVET System consists 
o f the parent organisation and eight specialised structures termed 
Business Service Centres: ASTER operates in the fields of technical 
and scientific innovation, technological innovation and information 
technology; CERMET is the centre for product and process quality 
certification; CESMA and DEMOCENTER serve the sectors of 
machinery manufacturing and factory automation; CERCAL and 
CITER for the fashion industry —  in particularly, CERCAL for 
footwear industry and CITER for textile information; CENTRO 
CERAMICO and QUASCO serve the ceramics and construction
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Table 3.2
The ERVET System’s cluster-based initiatives
• Expanding local infrastructure, both physical assets and 
intangibles (educational and institutional development in­
cluded).
• Transferring knowledge, information and technology.
• Setting up cluster specific education and training programmes.
• Adopting and sharing internationally accepted standards and 
management practices.
• Building supplier and distribution networks.
• Generating more export revenues.
industries” (www.ervet.it/). Entrepreneurs on the behalf of various 
handicraft and industry associations, and one representative of the 
parent company form the Centre’s board of directors.
Recently, ASTER has been turned into a consortium between the 
Universities of the Emilia-Romagna region, the research centres, the 
regional government, the regional Chambers of Commerce and the 
main entrepreneurial associations.
The new mission of this agency —  as circumscribed by the regional 
government —  “consists of the promotion of industrial research, 
technology transfer and innovation in the region. Its main target is 
represented by both providers of knowledge (research world) and 
potential users (enterprises and institutions). ASTER collaborates 
with the former for the exploitation and spread of research results 
(also at international level), while to the latter it offers assistance in 
technology and knowledge transfer, thus enabling continuous inno­
vation and increased competitiveness” .
“In order to attain these goals, ASTER has been appointed to create 
and support the network for technology transfer, also by the offer of 
services, the launch of projects, the realisation of research contracts 
and strategic technology. Target audience: Research bodies, enter­
prises, institutions”.
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• Exposing local small businesses to international contacts and 
practices.______________________________________________ __
• Fuelling additional entrepreneurial opportunities and support- 
ing would-be and new entrepreneurs._______________________
• Realising more wealth and more disposable income into the 
economy.
Together, the parent company (ERVET) and her offspring (the 
Business Service Centres) constitute a network whose nodes 
(the Centres) are firmly fixed into the regional fabric of the 
cluster communities. In the business-services industry, the net- 
shaped Agency operates as a market actor, an observer and, 
often, the hidden regulator through the management of subsi­
dies, other public endowments and entitlement programmes 
required to make provision for delivering business services. 
The regional authority largely funds activities of which none 
can truly be termed “profit-making”. In the case of ERVET, 
public funds have been going to the parent company and then 
Service Centres have been bidding for funding from it. The re­
mainder of ERVET’s
finance has been gen- Subsidies are distributed according
erated from European to a grand plan worked out in the
funds, through service regional government. 
charging policies and
some small contributions from partner organisations.
Some Centres serve national markets and a differential pricing 
policy operates for services outside the region where the guid­
ing principle is entirely revenue generation. This sort of finan­
cial mechanism likens the economic and institutional govern­
ance of the ERVET system to a Russian matriushka, with ser- 
vice-centres levels of governance embedded in ERVET, and 
this, in turn, in the regional level of governance.
The Agency’s double or triple role influences the buying and 
selling decisions. That triggers off a process of reflexivity by
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which the very act of observation forces interaction between 
buyers of business and technology development services and 
the Agency. The for­
mer are persuaded’ The Agency is a big, all-powerful 
to address their de- and all-bountiful mother figure 
mands to the Agency. watching over the cluster.
The Agency’s role as
a high-powered arsenal distributing a variety of public hand­
outs produces a powerful me-too attitude among potential 
buyers as they compete for resource and support.
Ultimately, it is ERVET the prototypical quasi-govemmental 
Agency ‘putting-govemment-into-business’ of which interven­
tionist policymakers have been dreaming to divide rise above 
the cluster economy as the fair, stand alone mother who knows 
better than customers what ought to be provided and delivered 
to them.
4. THE AGENCY’S FLAWS
For some, the Agency is like a public servant that drives a ma­
chine for subsidies (‘passing the hat round the government’); 
to others, it is a business organisation chasing opportunities in 
the marketplace. Consequently, the Agency has two contrast­
ing personalities among his managers: namely, “political entre­
preneurs” —  the warriors of subsidies playing guanxi21 with
21 “Guanxi” means to care for each other. In the Chinese business 
context, guanxi (usually translated as “connections”) means that first 
businesspersons negotiate a relationship and afterward a contract. As 
the popular saying goes, “guanxi greases the wheels of all contact 
between people in China”. “Guanxi conjures up images of karaoke 
outings with officials, nods of understanding in smoke-filled rooms, 
and the invisible hand not of the market, but of influence” (The 
Economist, In praise of rules, Survey of Asian Business, April 7th 
2001: 18).
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bureaucrats in public administration, and “market entrepre­
neurs” —  the warriors of markets who take risks. Whereas the 
former in collaboration with interest groups have an under­
lying interest in fighting for the control of subsidies rather than 
for deploying and directing their efforts towards profitable 
business, the latter are engaged in productive activity.
Regulatory constraints and inspection charges have become a 
massive and relentless force placed by government officials on 
the Agency. Unfortunately, there are no outward signs of care­
ful scrutiny and oversight of the Agency’s style of manage­
ment whose findings, in turn, could shed a clear light on the 
Agency’s process of
providing services. Key With the agency sitting astride the 
questions include: Are public-private fence, it is difficult to 
business propositions discover who awkward to find out 
evaluated in business w l̂° ге°Ну makes decisions for the 
terms or settled politi- services the agency provides. 
cally? Are unsustainable practices encouraged by the Agency? 
Is the provision of subsidised services an effectual practice in 
terms of triggering a learning process that helps firms to appre­
ciate their value so as to switch later on (by the time the learn­
ing period is exhausted) to service provision on a self-funding 
market basis? Are benefits from the Agency’s intervention 
higher than costs, and how are benefits and costs distributed? 
Are performance targets used which are built into a market 
perspective? Is there an innovation performance of the Agency
—  that is, the relative success by which, thanks to its activities, 
companies seek out and adopt new processes and products)? 
To questions like these, answers are not easily given or under­
stood, apart from a long chain of signs, clues and idiosyncratic 
rather than exhaustive evidence. As a result, the burden of
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proof concerning by what standards the agency ought to be 
judged remains ambiguous.
On one hand, there is a lack of a set of standards to be pre­
scribed in legislation. Authorities ought to set out broad out­
lines of ‘best value’ —  that is, good value for money —  re­
gime for provision of business services. The process of best 
value would allow the decision-makers to evaluate how the 
Agency is carrying out its activities and which back-up alter­
natives are open to public scrutinity.
There is a paucity of research on the 
Agency’s peiformance which is due 
to a pathological bond between re­
searchers and Agency. The incentive 
for researchers is to tell people out­
side the Agency what the Agency 
wants to hear.
thinking. Serious analysis based on a formal heuristic model“  
is rare.
Lack of hard data is certainly an impediment to such research, 
but the overriding concern is the conflict of interest that devel­
22 The end result of the most common approach is represented by 
statements like this one: “The Italian regional development agency 
ERVET has shown that through its Service Centres in the industrial 
districts of Emilia Romagna the co-ordination of the relevant actors 
at the local level (local administrations, business associations, 
Chambers of Commerce, trade unions etc.) can be flexible and re­
sponsive to changing needs, while at the same time enabling a 
strategic function to be exercised” (Best Practices in Strategic 
Support Services for SMEs, Final report of the Athens seminar 
15-16 May 2000). For the alternative approach, see the scrutiny of 
the Illinois Department on Aging (IDOA) by Koremenos, Lynn, 
2001 .
On the other hand, per­
formance and bench­
marking exercises are 
either bland descriptions 
or practitioner reflec­
tions which produce a 
mere list of wishful
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ops as research teams and analysts simultaneously supply 
advice to the Agency, curry favour with management and carry 
on research into how the Agency is run. In the past this has 
hampered the production of high quality research by local 
research teams familiar with the language and corporate cul­
ture of the Agency management. To retain control of impartial 
and objective research, there is a need for research organisa­
tions, preferably of a cross-border character, whose moves, 
whichever way one looks at them, are a step backwards from 
any sort of Agency influence. But there is still an open ques­
tion as regards ways and means needed to finance that scrutiny 
by researchers eager to delve deeper to discover the real per­
formance.
More general findings are, however, available about the impact 
of public policy on cluster development. Empirical data from a 
survey on clusters carried out in 1999 by Michael Enright 
“suggest that one should be circumspect with respect to claims 
of dramatic impacts of policy on cluster development... 
Although there are a number of examples of successful 
government programs that have supported cluster develop­
ment, efforts to assess the importance of various cluster devel­
opment policies across
existing clusters indi- 77\e findings call into question the 
cate that, on average, achievements of public policy on 
government policy cluster development. The more re-
tends not to be consid- searchers investigate the perform­
e d  to have contrib- ance f rom the demand side (i.e.,
uted a great deal... on f rom those who benef lt f rom РоПсУ
r .1 intervention), the less encouragingaverage, none of the , , /  6 6
. . .  , the results become.policies assessed was
considered to have
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even had a moderate impact on the competitive success of the 
clusters in the sample” (Enright, 2001)23.
Table 3.3 reports Enright’s finding in the area of business 
services, which are often the focal point and the most sensitive 
one of the Agency’s intervention. The data highlight the poor 
impact of government policies24 or, at best, show a large indi­
rect part of state support in cluster development —  as has been 
found in another survey conducted in the USA (Poole et al.,
1999).
Apart from those evidences, there are also clues that cast a 
shadow over the Agency’s claim to be a positive instrument of 
economic intervention. Indeed, they throw the spotlight on the 
potential for abuse and poor incentives by the Agency.
23 The author points up that the survey was addressed to “individuals 
knowledgeable about particular clusters and cluster initiatives. A 
total of 160 usable responses were received, with a geographic 
breakdown of: Americas 39, Europe 65, Australasia (including Asia, 
Australia, and New Zealand) 52, Africa 4” .
24 Enrights argues that “there can be a variety of possible reasons 
for this finding. One is that cluster policies have emerged only re­
cently and take time to have an impact. Another is that most of the 
clusters that exist developed without any particular policies for clus­
ter promotion. Yet another is that policies have been less important 
than other features of the clusters”. He concludes that “more work 
will be necessary to isolate the precise implications of these results”. 
By the way, data corroborates Peter Drucker’s famous dictum that 
warfare is the only example of a modern government programme 
that has achieved its objectives.
242 CLUSTER POLICY
Table 3.3
Assessment of government policies in the provision 
of business services for cluster development
“Please rate how important government policies in the area of 
business services have been in promoting the development of this 
particular cluster” .
(Very Important = 5; Important = 4; Moderate = 3; Unimportant
= 2; Very Unimportant = 1; No Policy = 
-1 ).
0; Negative Impact =
Provide business services Mean
Provision of technological services 2.02
Contract research and development 1.58
Contract market research 1.42
Contract accounting and other firm infra­
structure services
0.55
Other services 0.52
Source: Enright, 2001.
First, most Agency-aid efforts, however well intended, have 
the practical effect of insulating the cluster economy from the 
shock caused by a wave of radical innovations. In the face of 
changing times, “every organisation —  Peter Drucker (1992) 
wrote in the “Harvard 
Business Review” —  
has to prepare for the 
abandonment of eve­
rything it does”. By 
contrast, the Agency’s 
stategy is that of pro­
tecting the economy 
from such a shock, reinforcing the collective attitude to invest 
in the best people and resources in an attempt to defend the 
old. The protection from the inevitable devalues the cluster’s 
ability to be prepared for a “tectonic shift in [its] economic
The risk of ossification of the cluster 
economy is amplified by the Agency 
policy that pursues incremental im­
provements within the cluster’s tra­
ditional attributes, rather than 
promptly responding to radical 
shifts in technologies and products.
PIERO FORMICA 243
base” (Peters, 1994) Once the A gency’s money runs out, the 
cluster econom y is weakened further because core com peten­
cies —  the talents, skills and tradition that m ade for its com ­
petitive advantage —  have been degenerating into core rigidi­
ties.
In m any ways, interm ediary Agencies behave like medieval 
guilds. The guilds operated a closed system  with rules and 
regulations which usually guaranteed com prom ises betw een its 
m em bers by suppressing com petition. M em bers are a closed 
group, ‘those-w ho-know ’, who settle for protection o f their 
established rights and continuity, and shy away from  breaking 
new ground. A ritualistic adherence to those rules instigates a 
sense of disengagem ent and insensitive to changing needs. 
This means that inasm uch as innovation decisions are con­
cerned, the A gency’s guild-m ode holds back the developm ent 
of innovations that in the foreseeable future m ight be the cause 
o f severe dam age to the
interests o f members. j j ie agency exercises a kind o f con- 
The Agency thereby af- trol over the type o f innovation to be 
fects the pace of the pursued in the cluster. 
cluster’s developm ent
by favouring innovation that is attuned to the m em bers’ vested 
interests —  that is, increm ental innovations rather than disrup­
tive ones. The form er are the glue that binds together the 
A gency’s diverse constituencies. Conversely, as we know 
from  Schum peter (quoted from  Hirschm an, 1958: 57), the 
latter w ould lead to com pletely new products and services that 
m ight cause losses to existing operators because the radical 
type o f innovation would “render painfully acquired skills 
useless and valuable equipm ent obsolete” . On the whole, the 
A gency’s guild-m ode deflects entrepreneurs from  the 
prom otion o f innovative start-ups to safe investments in 
satellite industries. Too often ventures in trade and real estate 
are preferred to m anufacturing innovation.
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Second, the A gency’s policies and intervention are driven by 
some form  o f financial “intervention index”+25. The subsidy- 
led A gency26 distorts the m arket by deflecting business from  
its prim ary role of risk-taking investm ent for profit genera-
• 97tion“ to the search for grants and subsidies. R& D  subsidies 
alongside regional aid account for the largest part o f the EU 
national governm ents’ assistance to the m anufacturing indus­
try. Due to a barrel o f econom ic incentives frequently with the 
EU label attached to it, the Agency can exercise the ‘soft 
pow er’ to persuade rather than the ‘hard pow er’ to coerce com ­
panies to want what 
it wants: precisely, that 
large areas o f supply of 
business services re­
main outside the m ar­
ket econom y. Not least 
because the intrusive 
presence o f the Agency 
in the business- services 
market, small fam ily firms, which lack in know ledge and ex­
perience needed to attract additional resources for innovation, 
may have no choice but to participate in the A gency’s pro­
25 The “intervention index” is the sum of endowment funds (often 
hidden behind a facade of targeted projects), subsidies —  general, 
selective and specialist grants, and other handouts as a share of the 
private sector’s capital spending, research expenses and alike.
26 From now on, we shorten to subsidies the cornucopia of public 
provisions.
27 OECD research and analysis show that the elasticity of a com­
pany’s fund to subsidies reach a maximum when the fund-subsidy 
ratio is equal to 15%, then the elasticity start off with falling sharply 
and is equal to zero once subsidies attain 30%.
Allowing the agency to keep a tight 
grasp over the cluster economy 
through control o f  public funds, 
policymakers have set themselves 
against the possibility o f competi­
tion between business service p ro ­
viders and the choice fo r  clients that 
is its natural consequence.
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gram m es. Participation The presence o f the Agency in the
is the sole way to ob- business-services market saps the
tain ‘needed’ govern- entrepreneurial capacity o f small
m ent support. They family firm s in particular.
have to apply to a bureaucratic Agency for the ‘righ t’ to inno­
vate, thereby com peting for handouts from  the Agency and not 
for custom ers. By all accounts, the regulation o f the m arket 
steadily grows.
Third, the Agency suffers from  financial m ism anagem ent —  
often the end product of the previous weaknesses. The efforts 
o f regulators to enforce stricter financial then enm esh the 
Agency in endless budget report-w riting to justify  past actions. 
G enerally speaking, heavy bureaucratic guidelines and proce­
dures em bracing institutional and procedural details are a by­
product o f the increasing dependence o f many local and na­
tional Agencies on funds set up by the supranational bodies 
such as the EU Com m ission and m anaged by their internal 
non-accountable bureaucracies. Consequently, the A gency’s 
“outside contractors have to wait m onths for payment. M ore­
over, the Com m ission frequently pays well below the m arket 
rate for work. This encourages [the Agency and its contractors 
as well] either to de­
liver a second-class Supranational bodies like the EU  
product, or to exag- Commission use a mixture o f mo- 
gerate the hours they nopoly pow er and bureaucratic au- 
have worked. An in- thority to force rates down and pay- 
creasingly inefficient ment Perio(is and extend payment
system  produces a periodsc ™ s can еаШУ l e r n t e
J , . , . . , , into fraud, prompting yet more
cu ture in which bend- ,regulation and scrutiny.
ing the rules is taken
for granted” (Peel, 1999). To bend rules or otherwise to m a­
nipulate them, leads to abuse and the toleration o f abuses. The 
m ore that regulators impose detailed rules rather than a general 
set o f robust principles in order to avoid scandals, the more the 
A gency directors and executives will settle for fulfilling the
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letter o f detailed prescriptions, without thinking o f the broader 
ethical purpose they serve. Encouraged to concentrate on com ­
plying highly prescriptive rules, they fail to capture the eco­
nom ic substance o f the A gency’s activities. Interventions from 
a distant bureaucracy (e.g., Brussels) produce a highly opaque, 
unpredictable and tim e-consum ing process and prevents timely 
and efficient allocation of resources.
Fourth, the m anagem ent o f public funds by the Agency shapes 
a pattern o f behaviour which degenerates too often into a bar­
gaining process between Agency executives and high-ranking 
public servants on one hand and organised econom ic groups on 
the other. The seem ingly inevitable outcom e is an invitation to 
covert collusion and insider dealing to get rid o f com petitive 
bidding. W hat Agency
functionaires have to Successful marriage between inter- 
sell is ‘influence’. Es- est groups and government contains 
tablished interests deem  the seeds o f downfall because it 
that time is better spent tums int0 сгопУ capitalism. 
behind the scenes, nego­
tiating and deal m aking with the Agency rather than running 
the business. Each group, lacking encom passing interest in the 
general econom ic perform ance of the society, presses for its 
own share o f subsidies. None will relinquish any o f what it has 
already got. This is a recipe for paralysis as the Agency finds it 
hard to cut down current activities which are fam iliar to subsi- 
dies-m inded lobbying groups. Pork barrel econom ics over­
whelms entrepreneurial econom ics. The A gency’s whole sys­
tem twists around a sterile bureaucracy28.
Fifth, the governm ent exercises financial influence on the work 
o f the Agency, which thereby is bound by governm ental
28 This type of behaviour is familiar to the Soviet-type, statist socie­
ties. Yet even in co-ordinate market democracies, the builders o f the 
Agency model face similar pressures (Olson, 2000).
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decisions regarding im plem entation o f its functions. The con­
sequence is that the Agency is forced to turn to local politi­
cians for additional funds while new governm ental pro­
gram m es require the Agency to reinvent itself repeatedly. In­
creasingly A gencies becom e subject to the whims of political 
favouritism  rather than client need or m arket demand. Political 
interference brings about a huge overlap betw een party politics 
and the Agency. There is an um bilical cord connecting elected 
legislators and senior civil servants to Agency directors and 
executives which may detract the latter’s ability to enhance 
perform ance and seek real opportunities.
M ost worryingly, the positions of chairm an of the board and 
other key roles are often
not advertised. Rather, The appointment process is fa r  to be 
Agency directors, execu- open and formal. The legitimacy o f 
tives, project co-ordina- the board in terms o f representative- 
tors and codifiers, en- ness and effectiveness o f its mem- 
m eshed in red tape, are bers is questionable. 
approached informally by political factions and asked to take 
on the job. They are invariably drawn from  the ranks of politi­
cal parties or collateral to them.
There is a w idespread concern about the influx of these indi­
viduals as political advisers into the governm ent, especially if 
they have never really had a proper job. Indeed, m ost o f them 
either rem ain within a single Agency during their entire career 
or m ove from  one Agency to another, or becom e civil servants, 
never experiencing a real diversification of their career patterns 
(Peters, 2001: 224). At any rate, a form of “negotiated 
corporatism  29 (Table 3.4) will prevail in which unaccountable 
pow er and concerted actions are shared between politicians, 
public officials, form er governm ent and party functionaries
29 See Illustration 2 for the definitions of corporatism and the differ­
ent variants it can take, in addition to the one in the text.
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em ployed  by  the A gency  and the m ost ac tiv ist se lf-in te rested  
parties en trenched  at the top o f  the su b sid ie s’ m ountain . S y m ­
bio tic  re la tionsh ips betw een  them  im pair the e ffic iency  o p era ­
tion o f  the econom y. T he effec t is to com p o u n d  the p rob lem  o f 
align ing  A gency  b eh av io u r and m arket signals. ‘C o rre c t’ m ar­
ket signals are d isto rted  by defects in the behav iou ral signals 
both  by the A gency  w hose code o f  p rac tice  is d ic ta ted  by p arti­
san po litick ing  and  by the in terest g roups that becom e m ore 
inclined  tow ards the w ay o f  ac ting  o f  the A gency  than to the 
needs o f  their m em bers.
Table 3.4
Definitions and variants of corporatism
Definition
Corporatism is a rather extreme version of the legitimate re­
lationship between interest groups and government in that it tends 
to restrict the number of interest groups involved in the policy 
process (Peters, B. G.).
Corporatism is an arrangement characterized by a “limited num­
ber of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically or­
dered and functionally differentiated” groups that are given a 
virtual license to represent their particular area of competence 
(definition put forth by Schmitter, P. quoted by Peters).
Forms
“Societal corporatism”.
• Interest groups are the leading actor of policy making 
(Schmitter, P.).
“State corporatism”.
• Government is the dominant actor (Schmitter, P.).
“Liberal corporatism” or “corporate pluralism”.
• A less formalised relationship between interest groups and 
government.
• A more intense negotiation among the groups themselves 
during the process of policy making (Lehmbruch, G. quoted
by Peters)._____________________________________________ _
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“Meso-corporatism” or “negotiated economy”.
• Less restrictive variations of the general pattern of
relationship between the public sector and organised, private 
interests (Peters).
“Negotiated corporatism”.
See the text above.__________________________________________
Source: Peters, 2001.
Last but not least, under pressure from  political parties and as 
the Agency adapts to their needs, sharing the spoils becomes 
more im portant than building value. The Agencies increasingly 
rely on unfair practices to prevent its current and potential 
rivals from  com peting+30. Private sectors alternatives are 
stifled or crushed by the m ixture o f subsidies and special privi­
leges. U nder a subsidy regime, governm ent officials as regula­
tors are often captured by the Aency being regulated, so that 
regulation instead of prom oting com petition creates govern­
m ent m ediated barriers
to entry, which ‘enti- There is an increased ability fo r  the 
tie’ the agency to act Agency to go its own way. 
like a private m onop­
oly in the business services industry. In principle, by retaining 
the right to intervene in the A gency’s decision process and,
30 In countries like Italy, the rule by political parties (partitocrazia in 
Italian jargon) and the practise of consociativismo, that is of having 
all political parties —  whether in government or in opposition —  
work together to cut deals on every issue and sharing the spoils, 
have been extensively put to practical use at all levels of govern­
ment. For these political conditions, if for no other reasons, the intel­
lectual theorising about the agency and its applications provokes 
mixed feelings, a greater concern and, sometimes, a fall or descent 
into contempt.
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hence, by lim iting delegation, the regulator could reject p ro­
jects that would enable the Agency to exercise a m onopolistic 
power. In practise, by distorting the inform ation transm itted to 
its principal, that is the regulator, the A gency can seize the 
opportunity for m inim ising the negative influence o f restrictive 
rules and regulations imposed on its autonom y, and m axim is­
ing the chance o f getting the mix o f funding sources (i.e., the 
mix o f grant, m em bership, earned, sponsorship or other in ­
come) which meets the needs o f its m onopolistic stance (M ar­
ino, M atsusaka, 2001).
All in all, the Agency is to some degree influenced or con­
trolled by non-com m ercial actors —  if not politicians, then bu­
reaucrats. This adm inistrative guidance is given partly infor­
mally, partly through political and bureaucratic control o f the 
access to public funds, and partly by m eans o f regulation. 
Through the leadership exercised by governm ent officials and 
interested parties, the Agency is a secretive and unaccountable 
organisation that thinks “inside-out” rather than “outside-in” . It 
looks like the m odem  version o f the “m edieval manorial 
econom y” (Henderson, 2001) whose dependants were treated 
as supplicants for protection and privileges from  their lord, 
who was entitled to define the broad interest of his realm.
The quality o f this type o f leadership is a pivotal factor that 
jeopardises the long-term  cluster sustainability.
Even investigations o f restrictive practices are unlikely for it is 
“an accepted political convention that the judiciary  should be 
left with a m inim um  of contact with issues o f public law where 
aspects of policy are most obvious” (Stevens, Yam ey, 1965: 
Chapter 3). The Agency thereby can easily degenerate into a 
board of arbitration concerned with adjusting disputes between 
the interested parties instead o f responding to issues at stake 
raised by market participants. For all these reasons, it is only a 
m atter of time before a dread m alaise perm eates the Agency, 
which changes into an iron cage a bureaucratic m achinery that
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stifles entrepreneurship. Bureaucratization is an im pedim ent to 
responding quickly to environm ental challenges. As a conse­
quence, clusters that are plagued with frequent Agency prob­
lems as in those pointed above are unlikely to act flexibly in 
novel situations.
5. THE AGENCY’S CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: AN ISSUE OF EVER­
GROWING IMPORTANCE
A ccording to the “Draft Guidelines on Corporate Governance 
for Public Com m ent” issued by OECD, “Corporations must 
seek to create sustainable com petitive advantage to meet the 
expectations at large of their shareholders, as well as their 
other contractual partners, such as em ployees, custom ers, 
creditors and suppliers, and the com m unities and societies in 
which they operate. Corporate awareness o f the broader envi­
ronm ent in which the firm operates can have a significant im ­
pact on the reputation and the long-term  success o f the com ­
pany” (w w w .oecd.org/daf/governance/guidelines.htm ).
Good corporate govern- Corporate governance generally re-
ance enables society to fers to the process by which organi-
adm inister public goods sations are directed, controlled and
effectively and to re- held to account. It encompasses au-
soive any problem s eq- thority, accountability, stewardship,
. v 1 г \п р г \  leadership, direction and control eq­u itab ly —  argue OECD • ,
. °  , ercised in the organisation.
econom ists. Good cor­
porate governance is a (Australian National Audit Office, 
key factor in building 1999)
a robust A gency capable o f securing sustainable growth and 
prosperity. A sound governance helps to ensure that the 
A gency uses its resources more efficiently, leads to a more 
com petitive cluster and better relations with shareholders and 
stakeholders, and enhances the confidence of its client-compa- 
nies.
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Although the present 
corporate governance 
springs up as the 
A gency’s m ost criti­
cal point, so far this 
im portant issue has 
been neglected. G ov­
ernm ent officials tend
As fo r  the corporate governance o f  
the Agency, what is known is little 
more than aspirational or idealistic 
statements o f good intentions. 
Generally speaking, the governance 
o f the agency stands outside both 
the structure o f democratic account­
ability and the disciplines o f the 
market.
to be conservative
and generally support the status quo on governance. Yet, the 
increasing range, num bers and powers o f transnational, na­
tional and local Agencies dem and cultural change to alter the 
ingrained traditions o f opaque, largely unaccountable (to cli­
ents) governance. People who find it difficult to com prehend 
the decision-m aking will neither participate nor benefit.
A vital test o f a good corporate governance system  is whether 
it provides clear rules of merit to ensure that under perform ing 
m anagers can be fired. Unfortunately, under the present cir­
cum stances it is hard to say how properly Agency managers 
are doing their jobs.
Selected by political parties with the com plicity o f organised 
econom ic groups,
A corporate governance system is 
the “set o f  incentives, safeguards, 
and dispute-resolution processes 
used to order the activities o f vari­
ous corporate stakeholders ” such as 
owners, managers, workers, credi­
tors, suppliers and customers.
m em bers of the 
board and execu­
tives are given very 
little pow er to act 
on their own initia­
tive. Directors are 
often appointed on 
a part-tim e base, (Kester, 1996: 109, quoted from  
Guillen, 2000).which do not allow 
them m uch time to attend m eetings, and those in non-executive 
positions are spuriously independent and they are not paid 
enough to devote proper attention to the job. So, rather than 
dynam ic drivers of a corporate perform ance needed to encour­
PIERO FORMICA 253
age investor confidence in the Agency, directors and managers 
are only form al supervisors o f the A gency’s activities dictated 
by the vested interests of political and pressure-group share­
holders and stakeholders. Since there are no perform ers, poor 
perform ers cannot be penalised or dismissed.
Innovation enables clusters to develop and m aintain their posi­
tion in the value chain at various geographical levels, from  the 
local econom y to the world arena. It follows that the A gency’s 
corporate governance has to come to terms with a threefold di­
m ension o f resource allocation for innovation: strategic (what 
types o f decisions are made), organisational (who m akes deci­
sions) and developm ental (how benefits are generated and dis­
tributed). This perspective sheds lights on 7 distinct stand­
points for good corporate governance. They are:
1. The Agencies require system s of corporate governance that 
pursue the following values:
• All activities are conducted to the highest ethical stan­
dards and m easures o f social responsibility with clear 
and accessible codes o f practice.
• Specific actions are subject to criteria that ensure that 
they are fair, responsible, and proper.
• M anaging and utilising diversity are em bedded as keys 
to business success.
• The responsibility, authority, training, and tools neces­
sary to make decisions is given to the people closest to 
the internal or external custom ers.
• C lear and publicly accountable responsibilities are as­
signed.
• Initiative and a ‘can-do’ attitude are welcomed.
• There is a clear focus on needed outcom es to achieve the 
substantive goals of the Agency.
• An internal climate where prudent risk-taking is encour­
aged, alongside the developm ent o f critical faculties or
254 CLUSTER POLICY
“cognitive conflicts” , and m istakes are used as tools for 
constant im provem ent and creativity.
Effective, honest, and open com m unication is encour­
aged am ong all employees, business units, and custom ­
ers to im prove Agency effectiveness.
A board o f clearly independent directors, neither chosen 
by the ch ief execu­
tive office directly Independent directors, who are ap- 
nor through the in- pointed independently o f political 
fluence o f partisan considerations, would contribute to 
politicking W hen dilute the political control o f the 
directors are on a Agency.
board they are there precisely as directors of that com ­
pany and should not have the interests o f any other body 
in mind. N or should there be ties betw een the directors 
and the m anagement. O therw ise corporate governance 
would be impaired.
The board is conceived as a team  united around a com ­
mon purpose, and thus lim ited in num ber to around 
10-12 people, all of whom  are sufficiently m otivated 
and com m itted to their task to devote the necessary time 
to the job. So the board should not be dom inated by po­
litical shareholders. G overnance structure based on the 
tenets o f political representation has often provoked two 
casualties: on the one hand, an attitude towards a corpo­
rate conduct for which inappropriate links, cosy arrange­
ments and currying favour with politicians and party 
functionaries have been the traditional deal-m aking 
habit of the Agency; on the other hand, a board too large 
to be fully efficient, and sometim es lacking in the neces­
sary breadth of skills which are needed.
Rendering members of the A gency’s auditing panel 
genuinely independent and internal auditors m ore pow-
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erful so that they 
can w ithstand the 
pressure from  the 
board and stop 
rubber-stam ping 
decisions taken
Accountability means the require­
ment o f those who in the Agency or 
other kind o f organisations hold the 
power to render account both to 
their constituencies and themselves 
and to explain what they are doing 
and why.
by it. Auditors 
m ust observe ethical as well as technical norms. Paid 
consultants (for the Agency) should not sit on the audit 
com m ittee.
2. Executives should be 
ily influenced directors 
advisory board formed 
there is rarely, if ever, 
an opponent on the 
board who can act as 
a spokesm an and a 
“level the playing 
field” for shareholders 
who do not agree with 
m anagement.
held accountable31 by strong, not eas- 
as well as by a supervisory and an 
by autonom ous experts. At present,
Effective Agencies require clear 
lines o f authority between inde- 
pendent-minded board members 
prepared to determine independ­
ently the critical role o f the 
Agency, and those executive and 
operational staff responsible fo r  
key tasks. These lines o f authority 
should encourage entrepreneurial 
attitudes within the organisation, 
and a willingness to adapt to 
change.
3. Board arrangem ents 
should define the roles 
and responsibilities of 
the chairm an and the 
ch ief executive, policies concerning the use and the appoint-
31 “Accountability ensures that power holders have some idea of 
what they are doing and why. If they are no longer required to ex­
plain this, if accountability diminishes, then they also tend to lose an 
understanding of what they are doing. You can see this phenomenon 
all over the world” (statement by Karel van Wolferen, director of the 
Institute for Comparative Political and Economic Institutions).
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m ent o f non-executive directors, form ation and role o f the 
audit com m ittee (if any). W hat is crucial is a clear-cut 
distinction o f role between the chairm an and the ch ief execu­
tive —  the chairm an’s job  being that o f a non-executive who 
m anages the board, and the chief executive’s one that o f run­
ning the business. In addition, the boardroom  should be en­
riched with the new blood o f a strong independent deputy 
chairm an to act as a counterw eight to a chairm an with a wealth 
o f experience.
4. The board o f directors should open up channels o f com m u­
nication with the market. To do this, the board should encour­
age interactive processes betw een the Agency and the local 
com m unity through which it can listen to the market. Rather 
than being confined to organised groups, m em bership o f indi­
vidual firms should be unrestricted.
5. The board should facilitate provisioning and delivery of 
business and com m unity services by m aking more use o f m ar­
ket forces and the private sector. Local em ployers should be 
actively engaged in working with the A gency to find innova­
tive solutions to issues addressed to econom ic developm ent, 
including topics related
to the broader habitat in The Agency should rely on leaders 
which the firm  operates at all levels o f the local community 
__  like transport, edu- w l̂° continuously strive to exceed
cation and the environ- ^ e Soa ŝ set and energetically com-
_  . municate the vision.ment.
6 . The Agency should aim at desirable collective outcom es. 
For this, the Agency should nurture social capital based on net­
works and mutual recognition o f worth betw een governm ental 
bodies, corporate entities and civil society. G athering together 
all these players, the Agency would give rise to a broader in­
volvem ent in governance. The current situation m irrors a board 
in which there are directors whose “relationship shares” and 
collusive arrangements with governm ent are large enough to
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give them  a controlling influence, or w ho hold several ap­
pointm ents whose interconnections increase the control over 
the Agency by a few hands.
7. In a fast-changing world, the Agency should be quick and 
flexible to innovate and adapt its corporate governance prac­
tices, so that new demands can be met and unleashed opportu­
nities grasped.
So far, throw ing the spotlight on the Agency corporate govern­
ance we can see that its code does little to nudge corporate 
governance towards a m ore client-friendly model. The Agency 
ought to adjust its thinking and become m ore transparent that it 
has been up to know. Therefore, new standards such as those 
listed above should be established by the A gency or, if it does 
not intervene, the governm ent should do this.
6. SHARE- AND STAKEHOLDERS
W ith a spectrum  of shareholders that em braces regional and 
local authorities, a variety o f business associations, interest 
groups and even com panies, the A gency’s goal swings from 
m axim izing the benefit for the com m unity as a whole to sup­
porting short-term  private interests rather than long-term  pub­
lic ones.
An area o f controversy is whether the Agency should be run in 
an attem pt to m ediate between shareholders’ different interests 
or, on the contrary, ought to forge even closer links with a 
disparate array o f stakeholder groups —  defined as those from 
workers to custom ers who have a stake in the Agency. A ccord­
ing to a fully-fledged stakeholder model, “those who are sig­
nificantly affected by decisions should participate in making 
them ” (Joseph, Parkinson, 2002: 54). To advocates of stake­
holder value, “stakeholder inclusion leads to better long term 
business perform ance —  including increased econom ic value 
for shareholders” . Stakeholders are outsiders that provide new
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insights (which spur the agency to an outw ard-looking culture) 
or dissent (which makes Agency executives less resistant to 
criticism ). Should the wider interest o f stakeholders be ne­
glected, the Agency would risk suffering m ore from  clashes in 
the working cultures o f such different entities involved in it —  
which dim inishes the effectiveness o f its organisation. So, the 
need for an integration processes. Even though stakeholders 
were excluded, their influence on the Agency would still be 
there without their taking responsibility for the effects o f their 
actions. All in all —  goes the argum ent o f those advocating 
stakeholder inclusiveness —  it is better to have stakeholders in 
than out.
From  this cherished argum ent the advocates o f stakeholder 
inclusion draw a tenet which says that “the developm ent of 
loyal, inclusive stakeholder relationships will becom e one of 
the most im portant determ inants o f com m ercial viability and 
business success” . The stronger the stakeholder relationships, 
the higher the value for shareholders (W heeler, Sillanpää, 
1998).
The critics o f this school of thought hold that the creed in 
stakeholder values is music to the ears o f Agency executives 
who have to pay attention to needs and claim s o f a broad range 
o f ‘stakeholder species’ that populate the A gency’s habitat —  
namely, elected and appointed officials, civic institutions, 
interest groups, professional organisations, the media, agency 
em ployees, contractors, clients, creditors, et cetera. Forces like 
these always yearn for and dem and a voice in running the 
Agency.
The debate is as follows: Should stakeholders be put on an 
equal footing with investors or, even worse, stakeholders first 
and shareholders last, Agency m anagers would be made re­
sponsible towards everybody and, therefore, towards nobody. 
Instead of being forced to take unpalatable decisions, m anagers 
could please everybody in the m eanw hile that they were
PIERO FORMICA 259
putting into practice what the econom ists call “agency theory”
—  that is, the proposition that they seek to m axim ise their own 
pow er and rem uneration. Each stakeholder too w ould tend to 
m axim ise its own opportunities instead of attem pting to de­
velop together with the other political and interest groups a co­
hesive culture and a coherent mission for the agency. C onse­
quently, pow er games would take precedence over perform ­
ance targets. W hat is more, by their innate instinct to stepping 
into rivalry and pow er games, warriors o f subsidies are those 
who mostly would profit from  this genre o f governance. Con­
versely, warriors o f the free m arket would see their authority 
degraded.
W hat the Agency really needs —  as this sort o f criticism  has 
been voiced —  is a clear line o f authority by an independent- 
m inded board prepared to determ ine independently the critical 
role o f the Agency, attain a considerable degree o f freedom  in 
tackling the pertinent tasks, encourage the entrepreneurial atti­
tude from within its organisation, and, last but not least, en­
force change on m anagers stuck in their own thinking and 
working practices. It is contestability (i.e., “the ability for 
shareholders to be able to change m anagers if they are not 
doing a good jo b ”) which can ensure that the Agency meets 
new dem ands and seizes new opportunities in the m arketplace 
(M icklethwait, W ooldridge, 1997: 208).
The m ost effective way to lock in stakeholders is allowing 
them to harvest business opportunities bred by the Agency and 
to benefit from the positive feedback effects o f unfettered m ar­
kets, without raising the risks of the stakeholder-style govern­
ance. Unencum bered m arket dem ocracy gives stakeholders 
“access to inform ation necessary to fulfil their responsibili­
ties” , as the OECD Draft Guidelines on Corporate G overnance 
recom m ends, leaving them free to make their own choices. 
This does not mean that the prom otion o f freer m arkets is the
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perfect solution, but those critics seem m uch m ore sceptical 
about alternatives like the stakeholder m odel o f governance.
On one hand, those who advocate a shareholder m odel tend to 
stress that A gency directors and executives ought to be pro­
tected from the whip hand o f the politicians, who, in the guise 
o f dispensers o f governm ental endow m ents, want to take deci­
sions on their behalf. In so m any circum stances a curious as­
pect is that what is resolved by parties officials largely over­
comes what is a m atter for m anagers. Hence, shareholders 
should challenge politicians whose aspiration is to hold m an­
agers to ransom  through their control over public expenditure.
On the other hand, shareholder advocates would be inclined to 
include em ployee representation on the A gency’s board, were 
representatives o f the em ployees to be settled on the board in 
order to rethink the present hierarchical system  of comm and- 
and-control. As m uch as and even more than other organisa­
tions, the Agency has to release the entrepreneurial hostages 
held in its own hierarchy. One observer has pointed out that 
nobody better than the em ployees them selves m ight bring into 
the boardroom  the view point that “Placing all the pow er at the 
top means putting senior m anagers under enorm ous pressure, 
w hile reducing those at the bottom  to autom ata —  which, of 
course, does not allow to change a jobholder into a business­
person”32.
Convergence o f interests between shareholders and employees 
spotlights the presence of an econom ic stake that should enable 
the Agency to draw its own identity from  the business world 
and, thereby, to ally itself with pro-innovation and free m arket 
businesses.
32 From Victoria Griffth’s interview to IBM ’s Laurence Prusak, Fi­
nancial Times, 10 November 1998.
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There is no single model of good corporate governance, and 
corporate governance practices are not a bed o f roses. The 
Agency cannot evade decisions that are bound to determ ine the 
course o f its perform ance for years to come.
7. IN PRAISE OF THE COMPETITIVE IDEAL: 
THE AGENT MODEL
There are two schools o f thought in the debate on the Agency 
model. One says that there is a need for a veritable revolution 
because the practice o f com petition has fallen far short o f the 
ideal. The alternative view is that we should attend to the 
weakness o f this unique body, not throw away its distinctive 
character. Critics are better at identifying what is wrong than 
saying how it should be put right.
Decades o f tradition cannot be expunged in a few years. The 
Agency has easily taken root in the ground of a “Nash equilib­
rium ”33, albeit one which is inefficient. “There are many Nash 
equilibria —  John Kay has noted —  and the better ones should
33 John F. Nash, 1994 Nobel Laureate, developed an equilibrium 
concept for non-cooperative games that later came to be called 
“Nash equilibrium”. He introduced the distinction between co­
operative games, in which binding agreements can be made, and 
non-cooperative games, where binding agreements are not feasible. 
In a Nash equilibrium, players all fulfil their expectations and their 
chosen strategies are optimal.
be preferred to the 
worse. Still, it can 
happen the other way 
around” (Kay, 1998a). 
The Agency is grossly 
inefficient but holds a 
dom inant position in
Nash equilibrium implies an out­
come in which everyone is doing 
what is best fo r  them, given the 
choices which have been made by 
everyone else. Each person's best 
choice will not necessarily lead to a 
collectively optimal result.
262 CLUSTER POLICY
the subsidies ‘m arket’. The interaction betw een the Agency, on 
one side, and special interest groups and com panies, on the 
other which are current or aspiring beneficiaries o f subsidies 
m anoeuvred solely by the Agency, m ust be regarded as a non- 
cooperative gam e where the influence o f each player on the 
others cannot be ignored. So, each party in question has to 
consider other parties’ reactions and expectations regarding 
their own decisions. By “strategic interaction” everyone is 
aware that learning and using the A gency’s m echanism  is the 
most sensible thing to do given the choices which have been 
made by everyone else. Each player, understanding the strate­
gies of the other players, cannot im prove his or her position by 
making an alternative choice. The outcom e is that all are stuck 
together with an inefficient Nash equilibrium .
Notwithstanding, harsh decisions have to be made. To go 
along with the rationale of good corporate governance seems 
unlikely by itself to force the cultural change needed to reverse 
decades of public protection and econom ic privileges. The core 
concepts and principles underpinning the Agency model ought 
to undergo considerable revision. M ost profound and critical 
changes in m arket conditions should be an opportunity for 
radical reform , not a plea for politically opportunistic change. 
A virtue ought to be made o f the necessity im posed by new 
m arket conditions for a genuinely radical reform. Oddly, the 
question o f the A gency’s structural reform  is a red herring. 
Only a small proportion o f the Agency problem  is truly struc­
tural. The rest is the lack o f a policy clim ate that really favours 
pluralism  and com petition over the A gency’s m onopolistic, 
sheltered stance.
The Agency must be rem oved from  the political arena where 
the dom inant, invisible hand not o f the m arket but o f influence 
jeopardizes vitality, co-operation and com petition, and experi­
mentation that are essential features o f the cluster as a m arket 
economy. This entails cutting down the subsidy-based govern-
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m ent involvem ent in the delivery of business and technology 
developm ent services.
Current and potential 
rivals can contest the 
A gency’s dom inant 
position as barriers 
to entry into the in­
cum bent’s m arket are 
lowered or even de­
molished, and efficient 
m arket exit is facilitated. The forceful encouragem ent o f com ­
petition by the process of m arket contestability, enabling poor 
perform ers to be replaced by better perform ers, should im­
prove overall system  performance. Business service consumers 
could exercise real options about how to choose among pub­
licly and privately provided services.
The need for genuine market for business services is nowadays 
evoked by the most active players in local clusters For one 
thing, the A gency’s participatory m odel, in which interest 
groups are involved in making decisions collectively about 
business services, does not seem to be prom ptly attuned to the 
current dem ands expressed by individual com panies because 
each and every company ought to be em barked in a long 
process o f convincing all other participants that its requirem ent 
is the correct one. For another, an increasing num ber of busi­
ness leaders, enterprises of all sizes and industry-w ide associa­
tions have reached the conclusion that the Agency model is not 
able to face sea changes (highlighted in Table 3.5), which are 
contributing to widen the local cluster’s boundaries from a 
self-contained territory to a strong international dimension. 
From  their achievem ents in export m arkets, local clusters have 
got m uch benefit in terms of experience and business relations 
so as to forge even closer international links over time. These 
system s have increasingly led to a wider and deeper interna­
tionalisation process through international industrial co-opera­
The job  o f government should be 
that o f questioning all aspects of 
service provision by exploring the 
way competition can be used to im­
prove the provision o f business ser­
vices. The Agency should compete 
directly with the private sector for  
funding.
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tion, in terna tional ou tsourcing , techno logy  transfer, fo re ign  d i­
rect investm ents, and so on.
Table 3.5
Major changes in local clusters
• A broader environment in which firms must operate.
• Increased interactions with large corporations outside the local 
cluster.
• International delocalisation of manufacturing and services for a 
better performance in terms of cost effectiveness and market 
competitiveness.
• Diversification around the firm’s cores competencies.
• New forms of organising economic activities (e.g., firms’ net­
works and network-firms), which, in turn, create links beyond 
the local cluster.
• New key community players and partners, such as universities, 
research institutions, knowledge-based start-ups, and entre­
preneurial growth companies which bring forth an international 
vision of territorial development.
In the new  com petitive con tex t, asym m etric  shocks spring 
from  the A g en cy ’s policy. S hou ld  the A g e n cy ’s in terven tion  
be add ressed  to shelter the rearguard  o f  the c lu s te r’s business 
arm y from  the ou ter ri­
v a ls ’ fire, this w ould  
have a ch illing  effect 
on territo ria l innovation. 
O n the contrary , if  the 
A gency  w ere ex p eri­
m enting  w ith po licies 
in favour o f the m ost 
advanced  part o f the
Which firms should be left out o f  the 
Agency’s intervention? There is a 
trade-off between the solidarity 
principle, which implies the inclu­
sion o f as many firm s as possible, 
and innovation, which suggests 
making a choice in a targeted fash ­
ion close to the notion o f  selecting 
potential winners.
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business league34, this would jeopardise the most sensitive 
ingredient in the cluster econom y —  which is social cohesion. 
In theory, the A gency’s policy could be designed to suit ‘aver­
age’ conditions. In practice, actions that try to reconcile rear­
guard and vanguard, solidarity and innovation, often stir up a 
clash o f interests that paralyse the A gency’s life.
If the A gency model is no longer viable, which alternative 
organisational forms can tackle changing needs in changing 
m arkets? “Free agents” provide the ideal form  of industrial 
self-governm ent in the cluster econom y. If  the agency is a 
state-biased consultant, free agents are business-sensitive doers 
who negotiate a perform ance contract basis bypassing govern­
m ent processes led by the agency. Self-interest w ould lead to 
great m obility between free agents and the disclosure of the 
secrets o f one to another. They are ’free’:
•  From  the influence o f governm ent patronage and restric­
tion of competition.
• To prom ote greater com m unity participation.
• From  acting out a part that som eone else like the 
Agency has not written for them.
• To respond to the m oves m ade by other players instead 
o f being forced to respond to those made by the Agency: 
in other words, willing to play with “seductive” rather
34 For example, this is the tendency observed by Farell and Laurid- 
sen (2001: 14) in the case of the Emilia-Romagna region: 
“...officials within the regional government and ERVET believe that 
it is exactly the leader firms who have the potential to participate in 
international networks. This marks a fundamental shift in the Emil- 
ian model of provision of real services —  the emphasis is now on 
helping leader firms to survive in international markets, and on help­
ing medium sized firms to grow and adapt to a leadership role, 
rather than on supporting the network of small firms as such” .
266 CLUSTER POLICY
than with “forcing” m oves35.
•  To design a “m otivation-to-buy” strategy36 in order to 
nurture innovation in the m arketplace rather than grap­
pling with the A gency’s strategy based on bureaucratic 
m odalities and hence on the lubrication o f the budget-al- 
location channels. Private service providers thus realise 
that innovation is a business around the logic o f the 
situation ordained by m arket conditions. By im plication, 
they move where and when opportunity knocks, pro­
ceeding in a non-linear progression in which m arketing 
tools can be used “before there is any research” 
(Drucker, 1973: 801). Conversely, the A gency organises 
innovation as a function carried out by a preconceived 
time sequence (i.e., the traditional one in which research 
comes first and m arketing is put into play at the very 
end), under the guidance o f a decision pattern drawn up 
by its governm ent, EU Com m ission and universities 
constituencies. This approach often em bodies a disre­
gard for m arket signals.
35 «д f orcing move is based on the fact that other players have to 
respond to the move made by one player, and that there is only one 
possible response to the move. A seductive move is based on the fact 
that other players do not have to respond to it, but they want to, be­
cause it takes into account other players’ strategies and goals” (Sota- 
rauta, 2001).
36 The assumption beneath this strategy is that innovation occurs 
mainly in the market and the process is driven by the customers. As 
Peter Drucker put it, “Innovation is not science or technology, but 
value... To start out with the consum er’s or client’s need for a sig­
nificant change is often the most direct way to define new science, 
new knowledge, and new technology. Innovation in a business 
enterprise must therefore always be market-focused” (Drucker, 
1973: 788).
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• To be resilient. W hen hit by change, they are rem arkable 
at adapting —  in contrast with the Agency that stagnates 
or recoils, being reined in by its bureaucratic attitude.
•  To think up effective new ideas and enact the policies 
once they have been agreed.
• To assem ble im agination, know ledge, talent and capital 
necessary to channel their efforts in the m ost productive 
and innovative ways.
• To m ove where and when opportunity knocks.
The creation and developm ent of a cluster econom y is a spon­
taneous and evolving process that em erges from  freedom. Free 
agents are part o f a free-m arket com petition in which failures 
are a possibile outcome. Econom ic failures are inherent in that 
process and play an essential role in the progress o f the cluster 
econom y. Failure is like a forest fire burning up space for new 
growth. Free agents
help to get back in Free agents in the market make
the gam e those who small, localised mistakes. The plan-
otherwise w ould per- ning bureaucracy o f the agency
sist in their failing makes big, extensive mistakes.
ways and, therefore, would becom e losers. The com petitive 
ideal displays an array of free agents (as those shown in Table 
3 .6) in a free market, who can take the lead in territorial dy­
namics.
Table 3.6
Examples of free agents
• Agents acting as business intelligence for research and devel­
opment of new products, marketing, market research and plan, 
sales, et cetera.______________________________________________
• Agents forging relationships with potential customers in the 
name of the companies.______________________________________
• Agents forging relationships with potential customers in their 
own name, selling the products and buying the technologies 
directly.____________________________________________________
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• Agents creating links between producers and distributors —  
which means establishing contacts with specialised organisa­
tions and introducing products and technologies without men­
tioning names and sources. If a distributor is interested, confi­
dential agreements are made between the agent and the dis­
tributor, allowing the latter to contact the producers directly for 
more information.
The question arises as to why there is not already more com pe­
tition betw een Agency
and free agents, and The agency-model conspiracy falls 
what, if anything, gov- apart under the pressure o f market 
ernm ent could do to forces. Policymakers’ moves should 
stim ulate it As has af oot ^ a t would favour that pres-
been echoed in the case sure'
of the packaging m achinery cluster in Bologna (see Exhibit 
3.3), governm ent ought to be able to im prove on the present 
approach through a broad range o f actions: from  contestability 
of the Agency (putting out the im plem entation o f subsidised 
business services for com petitive bids) to prom otion o f the 
m arket discipline, assigning an increasing influence to the pri­
vate sector.
So far, public policy has forced them  to connive with the 
Agency instead o f m ar­
keting their own services. Government has usually been the 
It is said that many of the Agency’s most effective ally in keep- 
Agencies set up with re- in8 competitors out. 
gional funding are facing
increased com petition from  com pany associations and trade 
bodies which offer many of the same services and com pete for 
the same subsidies. Yet beneath the surface lies the interest of 
the two parties to make reciprocal arrangem ents in order, first, 
to m ultiply and, then, share the handouts.
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Exhibit 3.3
Constraints to the actions of free agents in the case of the 
packaging machinery cluster in Bologna
“There are several firms in Bologna which are specifically 
devoted to sales and export of other firms’ machinery —  
these commercial firms play a highly important role for many 
small firms. Typically, such a firm will have a long term rela­
tionship with several manufacturers, selling complementary 
machinery, and will seek to find orders on foreign markets, 
then negotiating a package deal on behalf of the manufactur­
ers, and receiving a percentage of the sales price as its 
reward. These sales firms are crucial to the success of smaller 
firms in the district, yet tend to go unrecognized by national, 
regional and local government —  they do not receive the 
sorts of export insurance assistance that their German equiva­
lents do. Furthermore, the associational structure of the dis­
trict is poorly suited to their needs: while they are unable to 
take advantage of associational assistance provided for manu­
facturers, the relevant organizations for commercial sector 
companies also has little relevance for them”.
Source: Farrell, Lauridsen, 2001: 9-10.
Innovation can flourish if an increasing num ber o f free agents 
see greater benefits in com petition rather than in collusive 
practices with the Agency. The rem oval o f restrictions upon 
the free play o f the market, thereby setting into m otion a com ­
petition policy, is the key to raise free-agents profile from  self- 
em ployed portfolio professionals37 to organisations in which 
the em ployee’s sense o f job  security lies in his em ployability
37 Persons who make their living by doing a variety of kinds of work 
for different clients (Handy, 2001).
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—  which m eans that each and every em ployee in a free-agent 
organisation looks to his personal value in the m arketplace.
One o f the prerequisites to enhance a free-agent culture is a 
policy shift from  what, borrow ing from  O lson’s term inology, 
one could call a “contrived” m arket, which is the outcom e of 
certain institutional arrangem ents about and around the 
Agency model, to a “self-enforcing” m arket, which spontane­
ously em erges from  the agent m odel (Olson, 2000: 174). 
W hereas the form er is based on the principle o f tax- and 
subsidy-m axim ising, the latter dem ands tax- and subsidy-cut- 
ting. The m ore a given governm ent spends and the more it 
taxes in order to finance the Agency, the m ore is the risk that it 
crow ds out free agents’ investm ent com peting for the same 
m oney. E ither public money goes to the Agency or free agents 
have to carry a higher tax burden. In a fram ew ork o f lower 
taxes and less subsidies, com panies w ould have at their own 
disposal more resources to allocate for spending increases go­
ing into investm ent and business services. Once the m arket is 
free and its reach has been enlarged, then the way is fully open 
to com petitive offers made by free agents. Requesters o f ser­
vices transact with private service providers on a perform ance 
basis so that the provision o f services truly meets the needs of 
recipients.
Tn the alternative scenario the econom ic process is biased to­
ward the giver o f subsidies, that is to say the Agency, to which 
com panies must apply to fill the gap in resources for capital 
spending and support services. W hat is more, as recipients of 
public funds they have to bear the cost o f com plying with the 
A gency’s regulations and its adm inistration or “delivery” , as 
well as to afford higher transaction costs (i.e., costs o f negoti­
ating, m onitoring and m aintaining relationships with the 
A gency) in com parison with a regim e o f low taxes and low 
subsidies within which free Agents in the m arketplace can 
flourish (Table 3.7). Besides, dealing with the agency is time 
consum ing —  which reduces the opportunity to create interac­
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tion values through seductive relationships rather than to be 
tied up in subsidy-em pow ered relationships.
Table 3.7
Mutually opposed models of supply and demand 
for business and technology development services
AGENT MODEL AGENCY MODEL
Supply Supply
Competitive market Non-market alternatives
Customer knows best Supplier knows best
Ruled-based system “Guanxi” or connections-based 
system
Tax- and subsidy-cutting in a 
free-market economy
Tax- and subsidy-maximasing 
in a state-managed economy
Competitive offers Subsidized offers
Demand Demand
Company A Company В
Turnover 100 Turnover 100
Taxation 30 Taxation 50
Remuneration of factors 
of production 30
Remuneration of factors 
of production 30
Available resources 40 Available resources 20
Additional resources from sub­
sidies through the agency 20
Transaction costs (information 
and dealing with agents) 10
Transaction and compliance 
costs (information and dealing 
with the Agency, consistency 
of information, timeliness of 
responses, costs for lobbying 
and dead weight loss along the 
way) >10
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This brings critics to the conclusion that the A gency m odel re ­
places a m arket-friendly environm ent with one that is condu­
cive to the form ation o f a variety o f elected and appointed offi­
cials, adm inistrators, directors, executives, project m anagers 
and co-ordinators, econom ic planners, governm ent econom ists, 
codifiers, m ediators, external auditors, advisers and high priced 
consultants. All these insiders form  a class o f apparatchiks 
united in an agreem ent, basically im plied, to act together and 
pursue a com m on purpose under a com m on guide, that o f the 
Agency. This type of mutual awareness in itself constitutes a 
kind of disguised conspiracy that produces restrictive practises 
in place o f competition. C losely aligned with the subsidy 
policy, they together secure and control public funds so as to 
present an organisation far less open and transparent than the 
Agency should be as a public-driven institution —  which ex­
plains why transaction costs are a hefty burden. Furtherm ore, 
political gam esm anship prevents rather than encourages open­
ness and free-flowing com m unication. An open policy-m aking 
process favouring transparency by the active intervention of 
free agents is suffocated by the very political nature o f the 
A gency, which is a solo perform er em ploying a patronising 
tone. Therefore, what prevails is the instinct for keeping closed 
expertise, that is m atters on which only the Agency sees itself 
as com petent to pronounce.
U nder these circum stances there are no ways to restrain the 
governm ent-induced pow er o f the Agency by m eans o f a coun­
tervailing pow er38 exercised by the A gency’s suppliers or 
custom ers. In fact, the form er are part o f the tacit collusion and
38 The notion of countervailing power has been introduced by J. K. 
Galbraith as a mechanism alternative to competition in its classical 
form, which restricts economic power held by a firm. This counter­
part of competition appears in the form of new restrains “not on the 
same side of the market but on the opposite one, not with com peti­
tors but with customers and suppliers” (Galbraith, 1957).
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m ost o f the latter, as it has been noted earlier39, are little, pri­
vate com panies which are forced to ‘buy’ from  the Agency.
Builders and enthusiasts o f the A gency’ com pliance machine 
play down the significance o f the anti-Agency criticism s. The 
counter-argum ent they have been raising is that the Agency is 
an instigator o f policy innovations, new ideas and initiatives 
SM Es would not be able to easily conceive and implem ent 
alone on the m arketplace. Innovation by SM Es entails more 
than careful free agents: it totally requires an operator that is 
mindful o f the public-good content of its own action when 
innovative processes and products have to be tailored to the 
needs o f small- and m edium -sized com panies. Should free 
agents cover this type of content, those firms could not afford 
the pertinent costs, especially when the market for risk-capital 
is lacking —  which seems the case, for instance, o f the Italian 
districts (OECD-DA TAR, 2001b: 137). Thus, by accenting the 
notion o f “m arket failure” , the A gency’s advocates em phasise 
its peculiar role in sprinkling SM Es with public aid. Besides, 
the Agency is a vehicle for competition. By applying a princi­
ple borrow ed from Joan Robinson, the English econom ist who 
wrote a seminal book on the “Econom ics o f Im perfect Com pe­
tition” , those who em brace the Agency model draw a picture 
that shows a (quasi) m onopolistic stance o f the Agency at one 
stage (upstream ) o f the delivering process which fosters com ­
petition at other stages (downstream). The A gency’s defenders 
postulate that upstream  m onopoly in the provision o f radical, 
innovative business practices brings about a dow nstream  poly­
poly o f business-services providers. The Agency makes entry 
easy to the “m anufacturing” stage o f the business service in­
dustry (Robinson, 1960: 236-237).
That the Agency serves a good purpose can be proved by the 
observation that for most program mes public funds are con­
39 See par. 4 in this Chapter.
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strained by a 50% contribution to the total am ount o f spending. 
Recipient com panies have to match the contribution. Even so, 
the real contribution from  the com pany side is rather below 
50%. By deflecting adm inistrative procedures —  in some in­
stances, as already m entioned (see par. 4 above), inflating 
w orking hours spent on the project co-financed by the agency
—  com panies change into hidden subsidies a relevant part of 
what ought to be their full contribution. This leads to a serious 
distortion for non-genuine and non-m arket costs are big obsta­
cles to arriving at the most efficient solution.
To name a few, there are at least three additional dark sides of 
the Agency m odel for which the d issenters’ argum ents seem 
more convincing.
First, were the public-good content a relevant argum ent, public 
authorities ought to be directly in charge o f policies for cluster- 
based initiatives so as to escape the danger o f a variety of 
abuses ensuing from  a vicious cycle in which governm ent offi­
cials, agency directors and executives, and ruling interests are 
involved. Indeed, the A gency’s intervention is often used as an 
excuse by organised special interests for “predation through 
lobbying that obtains special-interest legislation or regulation” 
(Olson, 2000: 197) in many form s o f protection or support well 
beyond the provision of public goods. As an alternative, an 
earm arked tax should be channelled specifically into the 
Agency for the provision o f public goods so as to provide 
autom atic feedback. Voters have to put their m oney where 
their mouth is. Nonetheless, such a tax cannot rem ove all the 
inherent defects o f the political market in which the A gency is 
embedded.
The argum ent for the public-good content is at odds with the 
real course of action taken by the Agency. To some degree a 
public good exhibits two qualities: indivisibility (i.e., one per­
son’s consum ption of the good does not reduce the am ount 
available to another) and non-excludability (i.e., a public good
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is som ething the benefits o f which no potential consum er can 
be prevented from  enjoying: it is difficult or im possible to 
exclude individuals from  benefiting from  the good). Yet the 
Agency discrim inates in favour of specific subjects —  those 
who share the costs o f a program m e it has adopted. Divisibility 
and excludability are the outcom es o f the Agency intervention. 
There are still evidence that suggest som eone else like a free­
rider has taken advantage o f the efforts made by those who 
have helped contribute to the production and costs o f a given 
program me.
Second, to serve their original purpose, public funds that pre­
tend to be sharply focused on innovative projects m ust be in 
tim ing effective and in duration limited. Unfortunately, gov­
ernm ent program m es have long lead times for paym ent and 
im plem entation. Short of that, the perverse nature o f subsidies 
is such that they show a tendency to be addictive —  which 
implies that “once subsidies are in place, it is very difficult to 
wean people from  their addiction to them ” (de M oor and 
Calamai, 1997: 57). The responsibility for such dependence 
lies squarely with governm ent officials who have never kicked 
their habit o f bailing out the Agency. This has also a negative 
effect in the form  of less com petition in the provision o f busi­
ness and technology developm ent services not least because it 
makes the Agency more ‘v isible’ than free agents.
Third, the Agency biases the political process towards the re­
cipients o f subsidies. Public funds are conveyed in the direc­
tion o f program m es fuelled by lobbying practises, and cosy re­
lations with governm ent officials can contract into an adverse 
selection o f low-quality proposals. This m echanism  induces 
additional dem ands for subsidised program m es that otherwise 
would not exist. A m ore active Agency also attracts opportun­
ists, who perceive that a new governm ental program m e can 
serve as a useful pretext for achieving their own objectives.
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8. CONCLUSIONS: MAKING COMPETITIVE 
FORCES PLAY TO THEIR STRENGTHS
Spontaneous form ation o f local clusters has induced public 
authorities to conceive an organisation that should identify and 
fill gaps in the cluster developm ent process. That is the 
Agency: a public-private partnership that intends to com ple­
m ent the working of clusters by playing the role o f catalyst of 
collective actions among privately owned, often fam ily-run, 
small- and m edium -sized businesses, predom inantly going to 
look outside their national boundaries for growth. Public-pri­
vate partnership can help to share costs and may increase the 
leverage o f governm ent funding, first and forem ost benefiting 
small, private com panies not accustom ed to presenting articu­
lated calls for action to the local policym akers. Through the 
Agency, they would have a better chance o f accessing bigger 
budgets, more funding, im proved training on com m on issues, 
and higher levels o f functional expertise to draw  upon.
G overnm ent-backed Agency has becom e a decisive instrum ent 
of political power. Policym akers have put an exclusive em pha­
sis on the Agency as a large-scale institutional arragem ent for 
the governance o f the cluster econom y. By setting policy about 
how cluster should develop and perm itting the Agency to exer­
cise control over it, governm ents have been enclosing the 
‘innovation com m ons”
The A gency’s institu­
tional thickness pre­
vents that small-scale 
m arket arrangem ents 
im plem ented by free 
agents interfere in the 
governance system  of 
the cluster economy.
Albeit the time is ripe for actions that should force deregula­
tion o f the A gency’s realm, policym akers are not in determ i­
The Agency’s flaw s should heighten 
policym akers’ awareness that it is 
vital to enhance market solutions by 
free agents. Yet, the Agency as a 
large-scale institutional arrange­
ment fo r  the cluster governance is 
likely to remain a central part o f the 
political armoury.
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nation to break down a m onolithic, A gency-based system  of 
governance. This, which is entrenched in their thinking, cannot 
be dislodged: “I have made up my mind. Do not try to confuse 
me with alternative policy views and facts that challenge the 
A gency’s internal (governance structure) and external (value 
added to the cluster) effectiveness” . Instead o f regarding the 
A gency’s role as unseem ly, they prefer to continue with a 
pow er-sharing arrangem ent between officials and Agency ex­
ecutives.
A picture after the m anner o f Joan Robinson evokes the apolo­
gists of the Agency model and the governm ent planners as 
those who figure they have found the magica form ula  that 
benefit clusters with alm ost endless good times (Robinson, 
1970: 86). W hichever way one looks at the A gency, what we 
have to keep asking ourselves is if the Agency is a triumph of 
hope over experience, of experience over hope, o f arrogance 
over experience. To find an appropriate answ er to this ques­
tion, there is a need for clarity about the capital and organisa­
tional structure, the relationship between the public function (if 
any) and the econom ic perform ance, and the external account­
ability o f the Agency. Attem pts to check up with observations 
of both internal results (i.e., what actually happens inside the 
Agency in terms of adm inistrative efficiency) and external 
ones (i.e., who are the end beneficiaries) are adulterated by 
being those results 
linked to institutional 
support —  which is 
like saying ‘political 
endorsem ent’. Thus, 
differences o f opin­
ions and ideological 
bias are im possible to exclude. This explains why so far only 
the surface o f the Agency problem  has been barely scratched.
The A gency’s fortune has been prim arily dependent upon the 
largesse o f central and local authorities whose willingness to
Even when there are attempts to 
create measurable goals fo r  the 
[Agency], the [Agency] may attempt 
to shift these in its own favour.
(Peters, 2001)
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experim ent with policies for territorial developm ent looks 
stubborn. In this respect, the Agency looks like the so rcerer’s 
apprentice o f public bids (mostly m ade up by the eurocracy in 
Brussels) round which elected and appointed officials have 
been com peting to rew ard their favoured causes. Keenest at­
tention should therefore be paid to the m anner in which the 
Agency has been governed —  basically, at the root o f the 
Agency, lack o f transparency, accountability and openness.
A m ounting tide o f criticism  is going to change the A gency’s 
portrait from  the im age o f a fairy godm other that enhances 
econom ic perform ance into that o f a corporatist w itch that 
harms the cluster economy. T oday’s dissident voices within 
the cluster econom y are individual entrepreneurs as well as 
com m unity players: a num ber o f organised business groups —  
once the A gency’s active cohorts and now adays its sleeping 
partners in retreat. Doubts have begun to creep in even among 
some who used to be solid advocates o f governm ental activi­
ties through the Agency. Yet they hesitate to do a complete 
about-face.
O pponents o f the Agency model charge that public largesse 
squanders resources and so it encourages unsustainable prac­
tices. The m onopolistic stance of the A gency deflects its m an­
agers from  attempts to increase their efficiency or to reveal the 
A gency’s true costs o f production for the services provided. 
M oreover, a ‘regulatory juggernau t’ by an ‘adm inistrative dic­
tatorship’ stifles the A gency’s process o f providing cost-effec­
tively services. The bottom  line o f these concerns is simple:
The Agency is an incumbent that 
crowds out private sector decision­
making and maintains its position  
whether out o f its control o f infor­
mation concerning the public-policy 
making or through the practise o f  
cross-subsidies from areas where it 
retains a ‘legal ’ monopoly.
Com panies and or­
ganisations receiv­
ing the A gency’s 
support have to bear 
heavy costs of over­
regulation. Rather 
than those who 
m anage things, they
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m ust em ploy people who count them. In principle, entrepre­
neurs w ant a clear-cut “business-like” relationship with the 
A gency as well as an explicit time lim it placed on Agency 
decisions. In practice, as m ost o f them  put it, working with the 
Agency is like navigating through red tape, with slow and non 
transparent decision making. Especially in regard to micro and 
small enterprises to which the Agency claims to give the 
greatest care, it sounds as if only counterproductive results 
ought to em erge from  getting involved in the A gency’s spiral 
o f subsidies.
Regulation, on its own, Subsidies-led increased interface 
im pedes rather than between public officials, Agency’s 
prom otes com petition. employees and private business 
The A gency is trans- make the agency the site where 
form ed into a m achine government does deals, which lead
r ,„• , „ to suspicions o f wrong doing.for political patronage, r  J 0 0
interface in business and even corruption. For one thing, a 
small group o f Agency directors and executives can exert 
enorm ous influence over elected and appointed officials in get­
ting the rules changed to their benefit. For another, politicians 
can split authority between different Agencies, and take advan­
tage o f their rivalry. All the while lobbyists clustering round 
the pork barrel are seen as hi-jacking the A gency’s agenda. 
The logical conclusion is that the A gency’s bureaucracy, seek­
ing to expand its own pow er in com petition with other A gen­
cies for increased funds,
attem pts to lim it rivalry Interagency rivalries, special inter- 
to areas outside its core ests and entrenched bureaucracy 
activity and, at the same frequently hinder the agency’s ef- 
time, induce policym ak- forts. 
ers to produce new policy
initiatives for new program mes that the Agency itself will 
accom plish. This is one o f the reasons why there is substantial 
disagreem ent among analysts o f bureaucracy as to both the
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nature and efficacy of this kind o f com petition among A gen­
cies (Peters, 2002).
Concessions to the The Agency makes access to infor-
com petitive ideal mation inefficient and cumbersome.
call for a change The market demands a greater dis-
mood whose closure about public bids.
repercussions w ould precipitate the ultimate fall o f the cluster- 
based Agency model. The problem  of role recognition contin­
ues to bedevil free agents who have seen them selves as the 
victims of unfair com petition by the Agency. Governm ents 
must rem ove much of the inform ation and brokerage function 
of the Agency, and rem ove would spell the end o f long-term  
implicit contracts with the governm ent. Thus, free agents could 
have access to inform ation that is clear, objective, com pre­
hensive, relevant, and easy to find. Because o f an information 
gap (i.e., the Agency knows more about public bids), poor 
quality projects have been pushing good ones out o f the m ar­
ket. Stricter procedures and criteria for subm itting bids and 
selecting winners should be perfected so as to reach a higher 
level of transparency. G overnm ents should also provide suffi­
cient time and flexibility to allow for the em ergence of new 
ideas and proposals by free agents. The result would be more 
dynam ism  in the cluster economy.
In the cluster econom y it is a crucial turning point the passage 
from what von Hayek (2002: 37) called “central direction and 
organisation of all our activities according to some consciously 
constructed blueprint”, which led to the creation of bureau­
cratic Agencies, to the
developm ent o f alterna- Subsidy-based policy politicise the
live policies centred on c,uster есопотУ■ Market-based poli-
, ir  j • • T cies conceive programmes that arebusiness self-discipline . . , r  . . . ...
. faced with competition between dif-
in a com petitive clim ate ferm , bminess service providers,
m oderated by public апд therefore offer companies alter-
authorities. Elected and native choices.
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appointed officials should play the role o f facilitators or refe­
rees that enforce the com petition game betw een free agents, 
rather than that o f players wearing the A gency’s colours. A c­
cording to this view, policym akers are seen prim arily as creat­
ing a level playing-field, whereas it is deem ed inappropriate 
for them  to give preferential treatm ent to any Agency.
In consequence, their It is a vital move to replace the 
attitude should shift dominant value o f governmental 
from  actively enforc- programmes centralised in the
Agency to operating a ‘hands-off’ approach to business ser­
vices, directly facilitating private sector agents that deliver 
those services. The private sector wants to see public authori­
ties facilitating its life, not m anaging it. All levels o f govern­
ment ought therefore to get rid of all the A gency’s activities 
the private sector could run perfectly well and usually better. 
On the whole, a bigger role must be conferred to m arket d isci­
pline.
A gencies have fallen into a bureaucratic trap because their 
prom ises far exceed their ability to perform. There are several 
key reasons for this perform ance gap.
First, governm ent backing makes the Agency risk-free. B e­
cause there is no threat o f bankruptcy, the Agency lacks the 
incentives to seek grater efficiency and effectiveness.
Second, the Agency should award appointm ents and contracts 
on m erit rather than for political preferences. Nevertheless, 
they fail to attract high quality, professional m anagem ent from 
outside the ‘fam ily’ of politicians and, therefore, without po­
litical patronage and parentela  relationships as likely to come 
from  political affiliation as from consanguinity. Independent, 
businesslike directors and experts are excluded from the ‘inner 
c irc le’ because merit selection for policy-m aking positions un­
like political recruitm ent implies that the A gency’s pro­
ing policy m ediated 
by the im plem enter-
A gency’s hands with that o f their 
decentralisation in the marketplace.
282 CLUSTER POLICY
gram m es will be selected by business com petence criteria, 
whereas political appointees make a selection according to 
their political predisposition. M eritocracy is overw helm ed by a 
spoils system  of an introverted oligarchy whose rule o f con­
duct is that o f withholding from the Agency enough autonom y 
from  doing its job  in a more business-like manner, otherw ise 
this would imperil closer ties with the governm ent (Peters, 
2001: 87).
Third, should business m anagers replacing bureaucrats should 
retain control o f the Agency, a better control o f the A gency’s 
costs w ould result. But a greater efficiency does not mean that 
the Agency is doing the right things. As Peter D rucker has ad­
m irably elucidated, the lack o f effectiveness is intrinsic to the 
very nature o f a governm ent agency. The essential argum ent 
D rucker makes is that inasm uch as the Agency is “paid out a 
budget allocation '’ rather than “for satisfying the custom er” the 
result is that budget-based institutions see larger budgets 
rather than greater achievem ents as the m easure o f perform-
The Agency’s major goal is the ex­
pansion o f its budget directed at in­
ternal maintenance, so that the con­
tinuation o f its existence can be as­
sured.
ance is the ability to maintain or to increase one’s budget” . 
This implies that the same business m anagers must becom e 
politicized bureaucrats them selves so that they can be success­
ful in the process of “buying in” —  to wit, “getting approval 
for a new program m e or project” . Partisan politicking is much 
more highly valued than perform ance.
The foregoing argum ent is not straightforw ard for those who 
argue that the Agency is a budget-based institution solely in its 
early stage o f developm ent. Later when the A gency’s m ain 
revenue stream  comes from custom ers, the Agency m ust sat­
ance. “Results —  
D rucker observes 
—  in the budget- 
based institution 
mean a larger 
budget. Perform-
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isfy its clients to win larger budgets. This criticism  looses its 
w eight once the origin o f that revenue stream is unveiled. G en­
erally custom ers only seem  to pay as the key resource transfers 
for the Agency rem ain from  public resources. The Agency is 
valued in terms o f how m uch support it receives from  elected 
and appointed officials far more than for services rendered. So 
we com e back to the budget allocation thesis raised by Drucker 
(Drucker, 1973: 142).
Fourth, reliance on subsidies m akes the agency less dem anding 
in term s o f project selection. W hat stands out is a broader idea 
of ‘preferences’ that
easily encom pass Subsidies allow the Agency to be
good as well as bad less demanding o f their clients than
projects. To obtain f ree agents in the market must be.
its budget, the
Agency must satisfy the dem ands o f different constituencies 
rather than m axim ising outcom e. Citing again Drucker, “it 
must placate everyone” , and if this means that the Agency 
cannot “abandon the wrong things, the old, the obsolete” , then 
the lack o f results is a good excuse for “redoubling efforts” and 
hence for getting much help (i.e., additional resources) from 
governm ent (Drucker, 1973: 145).
Finally, public authorities try their hardest to avoid responsi­
bility for the A gency’s failures. In reality, with subsidies 
pum ped into the Agency, taxpayers are those who assum e the 
risk for projects.
It is time to question received wisdom. The ultimate task of 
public policy for clustering ought to be of the quantum -physics 
type. Rather than managing m atter called cluster from  the out­
side —  lifting it from the gravity o f selfishness, m oving it 
against frictions caused by lack o f trust and spontaneous socia­
bility, m elting or burning it to change its form —  public policy 
should intervene to m anipulate m atter from inside the ‘atom ic’ 
and ‘m olecular’ structure o f the Agency model forged by poli-
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cymakers. In that m icrocosm , “there is plenty o f room  at the 
bottom "40 that allows legislators to change the current course 
o f policy making. Oddly, it is easier said than done. So, the 
shape o f things to come is not already apparent.
Such m oves, which would turn on its head the 50 or so year- 
old intervention policy icon, risk being neutralised. M arket 
com petition continues to be hindered by top-dow n controls 
exercised by governm ent and its favouritism  paid to the 
Agency. Policym akers and the bureaucracy around them  hold 
an Agency ideology that simply states that either the Agency 
and its existing program m es must be preserved or, if there is a 
need for changing policies, a new set o f policy priorities must 
be imposed by them and the subsum ed program m es must be 
im plem ented by the Agency.
Even amid the torrent o f criticism , there are no encouraging 
signals that policym akers want to initiate a com prehensive re­
view of policy, reversing the tendency in favour o f the Agency 
model for the time being. Indeed, they want to avoid tackling 
real problem s head-on. At best, re-engineering the Agency ap­
plying to it the m anagem ent principles o f the private sector, 
seems the ‘great’ idea around. D oing so, policym akers want to 
avoid answering the 
question if there is 
still a m ission and of 
what type for an or­
ganisation in growing 
disarray. At worst, 
they drag their feet 
on Agency structural 
reform  in the face of interested groups opposition. All in all, 
governm ent policy for cluster and clustering is far from  having
40 As the Nobel Prize Winner Richard Feynman proclaimed in a fa­
mous speech at Caltech in 1959.
There are a number o f rather amus­
ing examples o f Agencies that have 
long outlived their stated purposes 
and have become essentially sine­
cures fo r  the remaining employees.
(Peters, 2001)
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travelled the full distance from  a political m arket to a com peti­
tive liberalised market.
Consensus-building, mostly influenced by special-interest poli­
tics, is largely responsible for a feat not yet achieved, that 
dream ed of by the Irish philosopher Hugh Forde41 who has 
conceived “a regional econom y built on collaboration, led by 
industry clusters where there are no boundaries betw een m em ­
bers or across m em berships, where the partnerships that exist 
w ithin and across clusters extends to include all custom ers and 
suppliers. There is perspicacity, resolve and com m itm ent to ar­
ticulate the inherent challenges o f a transparent and seam less 
environm ent where the need for social and political change as 
well as organisational, technological and cultural change is ac­
cepted and satisfied. In the absence o f boundaries in this 
Dream w orld, there are only people and relationships. The ex­
change o f people and skills and the diffusion o f explicit know l­
edge and technology, across clusters and with externals in the 
form  of alliances, partnerships, and grouping o f com petencies 
are em pow ering the cluster com m unity to improve, solve prob­
lems, benchm ark, listen, talk, think, im agine, create and inno­
vate. Apathy, gatekeepers, com placency, arrogance, bureauc­
racy, and poor quality are annihilated”42.
A dream w orld-type of cluster evokes a high quality o f leader­
ship. Further research is required to explore the role o f leader-
41 hugh.forde@sabv2010.com.au
42 Quoted from The Clustering Alliance, December 2001, No 24, a 
newsletter of Clusters Asia Pacific Inc., apd@orac.net.au
ship in the different 
stages o f cluster for­
m ation and develop­
ment. H istorically, 
visionary industry
There is a profound cultural clash 
between the genuine entrepreneurial 
nature o f the cluster community and 
the bureaucratic management o f the 
Agency ’s apparatus.
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heroes have incubated clusters, and from  the em bryo stage to 
the full developed their followers as industry leaders have 
played a very constructive role. The governm ent’s part has 
been first to identify clusters Their successors have played a 
very constructive role from  the developm ent stage to the full 
expansion. The governm ent’s part has been first to identify 
clusters and then reinforce them. But, in doing this, political 
factors, often disguised as institutional ones, have intervened 
to change the leadership in favour o f the A gency’s introverted 
oligarchy, which, overw helm ing the business suprem acy, has 
been retreating into its shell instead o f being a locom otive of 
the cluster economy.
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